19 September, 2006 1:00 PM

Timeline
Japan and the Iraq War

Compiled by Michael Penn

Apr. 28, 2002


Jul. 11, 2002

Aug. 4, 2002

Aug. 13, 2002

Aug. 28, 2002

Sep. 6, 2002

Sep. 13, 2002


Sep. 26, 2002

Nov. 21, 2002

Dec. 6, 2002

Dec. 10, 2002


Dec. 26, 2002

Jan. 19, 2003

Jan. 23, 2003
Feb. 10, 2003

Feb. 15, 2003

Feb. 16, 2003

Feb. 17, 2003


Feb. 25, 2003

Mar. 14, 2003


Mar. 15, 2003
Mar. 16, 2003

Mar. 19, 2003



Mar. 20, 2003

Mar. 22, 2003

Mar. 24, 2003

Mar. 26, 2003


Mar. 29, 2003

Apr. 2, 2003

Apr. 5, 2003

Apr. 6, 2003

Apr. 8, 2003

Apr. 10, 2003

Apr. 28, 2003
May 21, 2003

May 23, 2003

May 30, 2003
Jun. 9, 2003

Jun. 10, 2003

Jun. 11, 2003


Jun. 13, 2003
Jun. 17, 2003

Jun. 18, 2003

Jun. 24, 2003
Jun. 25, 2003

Jul. 1, 2003

Jul. 3, 2003

Jul. 4, 2003


Jul. 10, 2003
Jul. 17, 2003

Jul. 24, 2003

Jul. 25, 2003
Jul. 26, 2003

Jul. 27, 2003

Aug. 20, 2003


Aug. 22, 2003


Aug. 25, 2003

Aug. 29, 2003

Sep. 6, 2003
Sep. 13, 2003


Sep. 14, 2003
Sep. 17, 2003

Sep. 18, 2003


Sep. 20, 2003
Sep. 22, 2003

Oct. 1, 2003

Oct. 4, 2003


Oct. 5, 2003

Oct. 6, 2003

Oct. 12, 2003

Oct. 15, 2003





Oct. 17, 2003


Oct. 18, 2003



Oct. 22, 2003

Oct. 24, 2003

Oct. 26, 2003

Oct. 28, 2003

Oct. 30, 2003

Nov. 2, 2003



Nov. 6, 2003

Nov. 10, 2003



Nov. 12, 2003

Nov. 13, 2003




Nov. 14, 2003


Nov. 15, 2003

Nov. 18, 2003

Nov. 19, 2003
Nov. 25, 2003

Nov. 28, 2003



Nov. 29, 2003


Nov. 30, 2003



Dec. 1, 2003


Dec. 2, 2003



Dec. 3, 2003


Dec. 4, 2003

Dec. 5, 2003




Dec. 6, 2003


Dec. 9, 2003





Dec. 15, 2003

Dec. 16, 2003

Dec. 18, 2003
Dec. 20, 2003
Dec. 26, 2003
Dec. 29, 2003

Jan. 4, 2004

Jan. 5, 2004

Jan. 6, 2004

Jan. 8, 2004
Jan. 12, 2004

Jan. 18, 2004

Jan. 19, 2004


Jan. 21, 2004


Jan. 24, 2004

Jan. 26, 2004
Jan. 28, 2004

Jan. 29, 2004


Jan. 30, 2004

Jan. 31, 2004


Feb. 1, 2004

Feb. 2, 2004
Feb. 7, 2004

Feb. 9, 2004

Feb. 10, 2004

Feb. 17, 2004

Feb. 20, 2004


Feb. 23, 2004

Feb. 27, 2004

Mar. 2, 2004

Mar. 18, 2004


Mar. 19, 2004

Mar. 24, 2004

Mar. 27, 2004
Mar. 30, 2004
Apr. 4, 2004

Apr. 6, 2004


Apr. 7, 2004
Apr. 8, 2004


Apr. 9, 2004




Apr. 10, 2004


Apr. 12, 2004

Apr. 13, 2004

Apr. 14, 2004
Apr. 15, 2004
Apr. 17, 2004




Apr. 20, 2004



Apr. 26, 2004


Apr. 29, 2004




May 1, 2004


May 5, 2004


May 7, 2004

May 8, 2004

May 10, 2004

May 11, 2004

May 15, 2004


May 16, 2004


May 17, 2004




May 25, 2004

May 26, 2004


May 27, 2004




Jun. 1, 2004


Jun. 4, 2004



Jun. 8, 2004




Jun. 9, 2004

Jun. 15, 2004




Jun. 17, 2004

Jun. 18, 2004

Jun. 28, 2004





Jul. 7, 2004

Jul. 8, 2004

Jul. 11, 2004

Jul. 12, 2004



Jul. 26, 2004


Aug. 6, 2004




Aug. 10, 2004
Aug. 19, 2004

Aug. 21, 2004


Aug. 31, 2004



Sep. 7, 2004

Sep. 10, 2004




Sep. 14, 2004


Sep. 21, 2004

Sep. 26, 2004

Oct. 4, 2004


Oct. 7, 2004


Oct. 13, 2004


Oct. 14, 2004

Oct. 22, 2004

Oct. 27, 2004



Oct. 31, 2004




Nov. 2, 2004



Nov. 3, 2004

Nov. 4, 2004


Nov. 6, 2004



Nov. 8, 2004
Nov. 9, 2004
Nov. 10, 2004

Nov. 11, 2004

Nov. 25, 2004

Nov. 27, 2004

Nov. 28, 2004

Dec. 4, 2004
Dec. 5, 2004

Dec. 7, 2004

Dec. 9, 2004


Dec. 14, 2004

Dec. 16, 2004

Dec. 24, 2004

Jan. 20, 2005



Jan. 23, 2005

Jan. 28, 2005

Jan. 29, 2005

Jan. 31, 2005

Feb. 6, 2005

Feb. 22, 2005




Feb. 24, 2005

Mar. 7, 2005



Apr. 13, 2005


Apr. 14, 2005


Apr. 18, 2005

Apr. 19, 2005


Apr. 20, 2005

May 4, 2005

May 10, 2005

 

Governing coalition members Taku Yamasaki, Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, and Toshihiro Nikai meet with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in Washington and discuss possible US military action against Iraq.
Foreign Ministry officials announce that Japan may continue to refuel US warships in the Indian Ocean in the event of a new Iraq war.
LDP elder Hiromu Nonaka rules out using Japan’s Antiterror Laws to allow SDF forces to participate in military action against Iraq.
Opposition leader Naoto Kan announces that the DPJ will not support military action against Iraq without sufficient proof about WMD.
Richard Armitage, on a visit to Tokyo, discusses the Iraq situation with Japanese leaders.
The US government requests Japan to continue its Indian Ocean refueling efforts in the event of a new Iraq war.
After meeting with President George Bush, PM Junichiro Koizumi and FM Yoriko Kawaguchi begin diplomatic efforts to encourage support for tough new UN inspections in Iraq.
Japan agrees to support the US-British draft of a UNSC resolution requiring Iraq to dismantle its WMDs.
US government sources announce they will want “contributions” from Japan in the event of war.
Top Japanese officials announce that the SDF may be sent to postwar Iraq to help with rebuilding efforts.
Armitage visits Tokyo, and the Japanese government quietly pledges support for US military action against Iraq. Armitage notes that the US expects Japan to take a leading role in postwar Iraq.
Iraqi VP Taha Yasin Ramadan tells visiting DPJ member Nobuhiko Suto that Japan is a hostile country and a “satellite” of the US.
Yamasaki and Fuyushiba announce publicly that Japan will support an American attack on Iraq even without UN endorsement.
The FM advises Japanese nationals to leave Baghdad.
A Kyodo news survey finds that almost 79% of the Japanese public opposes a US attack on Iraq.
Several thousand Japanese march in protest to US war plans as part of a worldwide demonstration of antiwar sentiment.
Fuyushiba of New Komeito reverses his earlier comments and now announces that an attack on Iraq must have UN support.
PM Koizumi condemns antiwar rallies as “sending the wrong message to Baghdad” and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda begins publicly criticizing France for opposing a US attack on Iraq.
FM Kawaguchi expresses support for a US-British draft of a UNSC resolution authorizing an attack against Iraq.
Ambassador to Lebanon Naoto Amaki sends an internal telegram to all Japanese embassies declaring that launching a war without UN approval would “undermine the framework for international peace.”
Antiwar protests in Japan draw 10,000 people in Tokyo alone.
PM Koizumi publicly announces that he feels a US-British attack on Iraq is valid with or without a new UNSC resolution.
PM Koizumi declares that he “understands and supports” the US attack on Iraq. All four opposition parties call the attack illegal under international law. Polls find that about 80% of the Japanese public opposes the US attack.
President Bush, in a phone call to Tokyo, praises PM Koizumi’s “courage and friendship” in supporting the Iraq War.
Yamasaki and Fuyushiba announce that any SDF deployment in postwar Iraq would require a fresh UNSC resolution.
Amaki sends a second FM telegram declaring that PM Koizumi’s support for the US attack was a policy “going in the wrong direction.”
Former PM Ryutaro Hashimoto expresses anger at Yamasaki’s comments about sending the SDF to Iraq and about assuming about 20% of the costs of Iraq’s reconstruction.
FM Kawaguchi asserts that Japan may participate in Persian Gulf minesweeping operations without any new legal authorization.
Armitage expresses strong gratitude to Koizumi and expresses hope that Japanese minesweepers will be sent to the Persian Gulf.
Ruling coalition lawmakers announce that sending the SDF to Iraq will require a new UNSC resolution and support of Persian Gulf countries.
Yukio Okamoto meets US officials in Kuwait and urges them to seek UN support and put Iraqis in charge of Baghdad as soon as possible.
The FM announces that Japan’s postwar aid to Iraq will be capped at US$100 million.
US Treasury Secretary John Snow requests Japan to give “considerable” financial support to the rebuilding of Iraq.
Yamasaki tells the UAE FM that Japan may send the SDF to Iraq.
PM Koizumi, en route to a visit to President Bush in Texas, announces that he may propose new legislation to send the SDF to Iraq.
PM Koizumi visits Cairo and announces that Japan and Egypt will cooperate in sending medical aid to Iraq.
Japan lifts economic sanctions on Iraq.
The Koizumi cabinet unveils the outline of a bill allowing the SDF to be sent to “non-combat zones” in Iraq for reconstruction activities.
Armitage, on a visit to Tokyo, expresses support and appreciation for the bill to allow the SDF to go to Iraq.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless requests the Japanese government to send SDF forces, including C-130 transport planes, to assist US forces in Iraq.
The SDF Iraq bill is submitted to the Japanese Diet.
The governing coalition votes to extend the current Diet session in order to pass the SDF Iraq bill.
The four opposition parties boycott Diet proceedings in protest to the decision to extend the Diet session.
The Diet begins deliberations on the SDF Iraq bill.
PM Koizumi asserts that Japan should consider permanent SDF deployment rules rather than ad hoc legislation for each crisis.
The DPJ, the main opposition party, formally decides to oppose the SDF dispatch to Iraq.
A special committee of the Lower House of the Diet approves the SDF Iraq bill along party lines.
The SDF Iraq bill passes the Lower House of the Diet. All four opposition parties vote against the bill, and Hiromu Nonaka and Makoto Koga of the LDP abstain.
ASDF C-130 airplanes begin transport operations to Jordan.
Fukuda announces that SDF forces will not be sent to Balad, as US officials had suggested, because of strong guerilla activity there.
Opposition parties begin submitting censure motions against cabinet members in order to delay Upper House approval of the SDF Iraq bill.
The SDF Iraq bill passes an Upper House committee on party lines.
The SDF Iraq bill becomes law as it passes the Upper House of the Diet on strict party lines.
Yamasaki declares that the SDF will “definitely” be sent to Iraq. Privately, government officials have an October 2003 date in mind.
In response to a major attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad, top Japanese officials suggest that there will be no SDF deployment before the end of the year.
Armitage tells Japanese Envoy Tatsuo Arima “Don’t walk away” from sending the SDF to Iraq. Armitage further says: “For God’s sake, don’t say anything” about not sending the SDF.
Armitage tells US Ambassador Ryozo Kato that the US “expects” ASDF C-130s to help US forces in transport missions.
Ambassador Amaki leaves the FM and begins telling people that he was “virtually fired” for his antiwar stance.
Yukio Okamoto is sent to Iraq on a fact-finding mission.
Government officials quietly announce that Japan may contribute “several billion” dollars to Iraq’s reconstruction, contradicting the earlier policy that contributions would be capped at US$100 million.
A major fact-finding mission leaves Japan for the Persian Gulf.
Ambassador Howard Baker publicly encourages Japan to send the SDF to Iraq in guarded language.
Government officials declare Japan’s willingness to provide US$1 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and hint that they may eventually provide up to US$3 billion if the US requests it.
The US expresses delight at PM Koizumi’s re-election as LDP President.
On her reappointment as FM, Kawaguchi suggests that there are “other ways to interpret” Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
Okamoto leaves Japan on a mission to prepare the way for SDF deployment to Iraq.
Government sources announce that the SDF may be deployed to Iraq “as early as December.” It is further announced that Japanese aid contributions to Iraq may reach US$5 billion.
Defense Agency Chief Shigeru Ishiba publicly denies that sending the SDF to Iraq is related to any US request.
Vice-FM Yukio Takeuchi publicly denies that Ambassador Amaki was fired for his antiwar views.
Government sources announce that the SDF will probably be sent to either Nasiriya or Samawa in southern Iraq.
1) Ishiba declares in an interview that “there are ways to make use of the SDF other than in the exercise of the right to self-defense.”
2) A Dutch military official reports that Japanese FM and SDF officials told him in early October that Japan would establish an SDF base in Samawa if the LDP wins in Lower House elections.
3) Japan makes a firm pledge of $1.5 billion for Iraqi reconstruction.
President Bush visits Tokyo and thanks PM Koizumi for Japan’s financial contributions. However, when Koizumi urges more UN involvement in Iraq, Bush asserts that “the United Nations is old” and in need of reform.
1) Government officials announce that Japan will provide US$3.5 billion in loans to Iraq on top of the US$1.5 billion in grants.
2) Al-Jazeera airs a tape by Usama bin Ladin declaring that six US allies, including Japan, are targets for future al-Qaida attacks.
FM officials announce that the Japanese TV drama Oshin will be aired on Iraqi TV to encourage rebuilding efforts.
At a donors’ conference in Madrid, Japan’s US$5 billion pledge is by far the single largest amount offered by the international community.
Government sources announce that some Japanese civilians will also be sent to Iraq to aid in reconstruction efforts.
President Bush expresses his hope that the US occupation of Iraq will have the same results as the US occupation of Japan from 1945-1952.
Fukuda reaffirms Japan’s intention to send the SDF to Iraq even though most UN personnel are pulling out.
1) PM Koizumi suggests that Japan may ask US and British forces to “guard” SDF forces in Iraq.
2) FM officials suggest that Japan may be required to forgive all Iraqi debt, effectively raising Japan’s aid contribution to $US13 billion.
Ahead of Lower House elections, some government officials now suggest that civilians, rather than the SDF, will in fact be sent to Iraq.
In Lower House elections, the DPJ makes significant gains, but the governing coalition retains a majority. PM Koizumi immediately announces that this is a public vote of confidence for sending the SDF to Iraq, even though he soft-pedaled this issue in his campaigning.
Fukuda announces that the SDF will be sent to Iraq “before the end of the year.”
In response to a major attack on Italian troops in Nasiriya, Fukuda announces that the SDF will NOT be sent before the end of the year, reversing his position of one day earlier. In Washington, NSA Condoleeza Rice expresses understanding of Japan’s decision but she “anticipates” that Japan will eventually send the troops.
PM Koizumi tells the visiting Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that Japan will not send the SDF before the end of the year and encourages the US to seek more UN support.
Ishiba assures Rumsfeld that Japan remains committed to sending the SDF “at and early date.”
1) Shots are fired at the Japanese Embassy in Baghdad.
2) A GSDF inspection team visits Samawa under Dutch auspices.
Fukuda reaffirms Japan’s commitment to send the SDF to Iraq.
PM Koizumi vows once again to send the SDF to Iraq but admits that it is difficult to distinguish what are in fact “non-combat areas.”
Government officials leak Japan’s “Basic Plan” for SDF deployment in Iraq. It calls for the SDF to enter Iraq in February and March 2004. Separately, Ishiba offers his opinion that southern Iraq is now “safe enough” for SDF deployment.
Two key Japanese diplomats, Katsuhiko Oku and Masamori Inoue, are shot and killed on a highway while driving to a reconstruction conference in Tikrit.
PM Koizumi asserts that the deaths of the diplomats will not affect Japan’s decision to send the SDF to Iraq. The opposition parties protest furiously, and even LDP member Koichi Kato declares that the Iraq War itself “was a mistake.”
State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announces at a press conference that “I think the Japanese government will do what it said” and send the SDF to Iraq.
PM Koizumi again vows to send the SDF to Iraq. He also observes: “Japan’s security is not guaranteed by our defense capability alone. Our security is maintained under the Japan-US security alliance.” The cabinet admits in a written statement that the Iraq War has not ended.
A Kyodo news survey finds that more than 63% of the Japanese public supports a “careful” SDF dispatch, but only 7.5% think that the dispatch should be sent “swiftly.”
Ambassador Baker publicly encourages Japan to send the SDF claiming that it would have “an enormous symbolic effect as well as practical.”
1) The Defense Agency officially concludes that Samawa is “safe” for SDF deployment and in need of humanitarian assitance. The plan is to send about 1000 troops.
2) FM Kawaguchi urges UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to have the UN “play an active role” in Iraqi reconstruction.
1) Fuyushiba tells party members that New Komeito will not “actively” support the SDF dispatch to Iraq.
2) Funerals for diplomats Oku and Inoue draw thousands in Tokyo.
The cabinet formally agrees to the “Basic Plan” for SDF dispatch. The exact date of dispatch remains vague due to disagreements between the LDP and New Komeito. All three opposition parties reiterate their opposition to the deployment plan. In Washington, one senior US official praises the decision and declares “Japan is emerging as a core player in the international community.”
Japanese officials express pleasure at the capture of former President Saddam Husain of Iraq.
New Komeito leader Takanori Kanzaki leaves Japan on a visit to Kuwait and Iraq. Government officials express surprise.
PM Koizumi approves the SDF deployment plan.
Kanzaki announces his tentative support for the SDF mission to Iraq.
An ASDF advance team leaves Japan bound for Iraq.
PM Koizumi tells visiting US envoy James Baker III that Japan is ready to forgive the “vast majority” of the US$7 billion Iraqi debt.
Kanzaki announces that New Komeito may back off its commitment to support the SDF deployment if security becomes worse.
PM Koizumi reaffirms his resolve to send the SDF and declares: “Without stability in the Middle East, there will be no peace or stability in the world.”
Iranian FM Kamal Kharazi tells visiting FM Kawaguchi that Iran is skeptical of Japan’s stated reasons for sending the SDF to Iraq.
New Komeito finally agrees to formally support the SDF dispatch.
Some local Iraqi groups pledge to protect Japanese forces when the SDF arrives in Samawa.
A Kyodo news poll finds that the Japanese public opposes the current SDF deployment to Iraq by a majority of 52% to 43%.
1) At the opening of the new Diet session, Koizumi declares that Japan must help prevent Iraq from becoming a “terrorist base.”
2) An advance GSDF force crosses into Iraqi territory.
During a Lower House debate, DPJ leader Naoto Kan declares that PM Koizumi has violated the Constitution by sending the SDF to Iraq and that Koizumi should therefore resign.
The GSDF advance team declares that Samawa is “stable” and safe enough for the main units to arrive.
PM Koizumi gives his approval for the main GSDF units to go to Iraq.
The government announces that about 30 civilian medics will be sent to locations around Iraq when security conditions improve.
Fukuda asserts that “there is a high possibility” that Iraq had WMD and attacks the credibility of US inspector David Kay who testified to the US Senate that Iraq probably had no WMDs.
A special committee of the Lower House approves the SDF plan along party lines.
The Lower House of the Diet approves the SDF dispatch plan. The opposition parties all boycott the session and three LDP members, Koichi Kato, Makoto Koga, and Shizuka Kamei absent themselves.
A ceremony is held in Asahikawa, Hokkaido, to honor the main GSDF units about to depart for Iraq.
Armitage, on a visit to Tokyo, pledges US support for the SDF in Iraq.
A Kyodo news survey now finds that a plurality of Japanese support the SDF dispatch to Iraq by a margin of 48% to 45%.
The Upper House gives the final approval for the SDF dispatch, the voting on party lines.
PM Koizumi suggests that Japan might “alter its interpretation” of the Japanese Constitution.
A small projectile attack hits near the Defense Agency headquarters in Tokyo. Nobody is hurt.
Media organizations receive letters from a Japanese leftist group claiming responsibility for the projectile attack and declaring that they will use violent means to prevent the SDF deployment to Iraq.
A mass lawsuit is filed against the government in Nagoya by Japanese who believe the SDF deployment violates the Japanese Constitution.
Three antiwar activists in Tokyo are arrested and held in jail for having distributed antiwar leaflets at an SDF housing complex a month earlier.
SDF forces reach an agreement with Iraqi landlords over the rental fees of land used for the SDF base at Samawa.
Amnesty International declares the three antiwar activists arrested in Tokyo as being “prisoners of conscience,” the first time such a designation has been given to people jailed in Japan.
In a speech in Washington, President Bush praises the slain Japanese diplomats, Oku and Inoue.
The head of the Iraqi Governing Council, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, on a visit to Tokyo, requests Japanese help in the oil and gas industries.
The GSDF completes its deployment into Iraq.
Yukio Okamoto, PM Koizumi’s Special Advisor on Iraq, resigns his post.
Kanzaki expresses his support for a constitutional amendment to define the role of the SDF.
The Defense Agency announces that SDF activities will be temporarily confined to inside the base camp due to increased security concerns caused by the Shiite rebellion of Muqtada al-Sadr.
Several mortar rounds land near the SDF base camp in Samawa.
Three young Japanese civilians are taken hostage near Falluja. A group calling itself Saraya al-Mujahidin sends a letter declaring that the hostages will be executed in three days unless the SDF pulls out of Iraq.
PM Koizumi vows not to submit to any “dirty terrorist threat” and rejects any notion of an SDF withdrawal. The DPJ announces that it will cooperate with the government while the SDP and Communist Party call for an immediate pullout of the SDF. US officials applaud Koizumi’s uncompromising stand.
Vice-FM Ichiro Aisawa sets up a crisis headquarters in Amman. Meanwhile, SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima demands that PM Koizumi immediately resign over the hostage crisis.
Vice-FM Takeuchi suggests that the government should propose legislation to ban Japanese travel to dangerous areas.
Vice-President Dick Cheney, on a visit to Tokyo, praises the Japanese government’s determination to keep the SDF in Iraq.
Two more Japanese civilians are abducted in Baghdad.
The original three Japanese hostages are released in Baghdad.
The remaining two Japanese hostages are released in Baghdad. A Kyodo news survey finds that 68% of the Japanese public approve of the government’s handling of the crisis. For the first time, a majority of the public supports the SDF deployment to Iraq, by a margin of 53% to 38%. However, 57% call for a re-evaluation of the US-Japan alliance.
1) LDP leaders reaffirm their intention to keep the SDF in Iraq even though countries like Spain and Honduras may withdraw.
2) Coalition lawmakers agree not to pursue legislation banning Japanese travel to dangerous areas due to constitutional concerns.
LDP House of Councilors member Takeaki Kashimura describes the ex-Japanese hostages as being “anti-government, anti-Japan elements” during an Upper House committee meeting.
1) Speaking at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, LDP Secretary General Shinzo Abe states that “Japan cannot maintain its national security under the current Constitution” and cites the sustainability of the US-Japan alliance as a key reason.
2) Two mortar rounds land near the SDF camp in Samawa.
An Asahi Shinbun poll shows that 60% of the Japanese public opposes any change to Article 9 of the Constitution, although, for the first time, a small majority, 53%, would like to see some other kind of revision.
LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Fukushiro Nukaga, speaking at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, asserts that “it is necessary to establish a permanent general law on international cooperation by the SDF.”
FM Kawaguchi publicly describes the abuse and torture of Iraqis by US soldiers at Abu Ghraib as “inhumane and regrettable.”
140 GSDF members depart Japan in order to begin troop rotations with SDF forces stationed in Samawa.
A grenade attack kills a Dutch soldier in Samawa. Japanese leaders pledge to tighten security to protect SDF members.
The three antiwar activists in Tokyo jailed since February for distributing fliers are released on bail.
Reports surface that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau assesses Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement to be a “quasi-government” in Iraq. Other sections of the government dispute this assessment.
Defense Agency Chief Shigeru Ishiba states on a TV program that it would be possible for Japanese forces to participate in a UN multinational force in Iraq if there was an appropriate UN resolution.
1) Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda denies that the Cabinet Legislation Bureau had ever assessed Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement as constituting a “quasi-government.”
2) 110 GSDF members return to Japan having completed their tour of duty in Samawa.
FM Kawaguchi publicly backs Ishiba’s assertion that the SDF might participate in a UN multinational force in Iraq.
219 plaintiffs file a lawsuit in Shizuoka against the Japanese government claiming that the SDF dispatch to Iraq is a violation of the Constitution and that the government is infringing on their right to live peaceful lives.
Two Japanese freelance journalists, Shinsuke Hashida and his nephew Kotaro Ogawa, are killed by gunmen in Mahmudiya, Iraq, while traveling between Samawa and Baghdad. As Hashida tried to escape, the assailants called him a “puppet of the United States” according to an Iraqi witness.
Cabinet Legislation Bureau Director General Osamu Akiyama agrees before a Diet Committee that Japan may participate in a UN multinational force in Iraq so long as the SDF is not involved in the use of force.
10-year old Iraqi boy Muhammad Haitham Salih arrives in Shizuoka for eye surgery. He is hosted by a group of Japanese volunteers after the initial steps in bringing him to Japan had been arranged by Shinsuke Hashida, the slain journalist.
1) On a visit to the US, PM Junichiro Koizumi tells President Bush that Japan will participate in a UN multinational force in Iraq.
2) Ex-hostage Nobutaka Watanabe files a lawsuit in Tokyo against the government claiming that his ordeal was a result of an illegal dispatch of SDF forces to Iraq.
Interim Iraqi President Ghazi Ajil al-Yawir tells PM Koizumi that the SDF is the “most welcome” of all the international forces in Iraq.
1) The government announces that the SDF will not come under the unified command of the UN multinational force after June 30.
2) Iraqi democracy activist Abd al-Rikabi sues the publisher of The Weekly Post for running an article on February 6 claiming that he promised that Iraqi tribes would protect the SDF in exchange for money.
The Japanese government formally decides to participate in the UN multinational force after June 30.
The main opposition party DPJ pledges that it will withdraw the SDF from Iraq if elected to power in the coming July 11 elections.
1) The early handover of sovereignty to an Iraqi government catches the Japanese government off guard. They rush to make administrative changes to prevent a legal vacuum in the status of the SDF. Japan formally recognizes the new Iraqi government in the evening.
2) In Washington, Vice-FM Yukio Takeuchi informs Richard Armitage that Japan will host a donors’ conference for Iraq in October.
Iraqi boy Muhammad Haitham Salih departs Tokyo for Iraq after successful eye surgery in Japan.
The Foreign Ministry announces a plan to train 20 Iraqi diplomats in Japan through courses at the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
In Upper House elections, the LDP loses seats to the DPJ but manages to retain a majority in alliance with New Komeito.
Muhammad Ali Hasan, Governor of Iraq’s al-Muthanna province, is interviewed by an Iraqi newspaper and expresses his disappointment with Japan for what he regards as being very limited reconstruction assistance in Samawa.
Members of the Inter-Religious Council of Iraq, on a visit to Tokyo, express thanks to FM Kawaguchi for Japan’s reconstruction efforts and express hope that Japan will do more.
Speaking in Hiroshima on the anniversary of the atomic bombing, PM Koizumi receives lukewarm applause and even boos as he begins to speak. He is clearly shaken up. Before Koizumi’s speech, Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba had demanded that the government protect the Constitution and criticized “egocentric” US foreign policies.
Mortar rounds hit the SDF camp in Samawa. No one is injured.
The Defense Agency announces that the rate of suicides among SDF members rose sharply in early 2004.
Mortar rounds are fired near the SDF base in Samawa, and returning GSDF members voice fear of deteriorating security conditions. The mortar firing continues for four continuous evenings.
Al-Sadr loyalist Ghazi al-Zargani tells a news agency that Japan may be targeted for attacks if the SDF cooperates with US forces in Iraq. However, he also expresses hope that Japan will play a large role in Iraqi reconstruction.
Ex-hostage Naoko Takato states at a news conference that she hopes to return to Iraq to rebuild a school in Falluja.
Former FM Makiko Tanaka holds a news conference and attacks PM Koizumi’s Iraq policies. She states that “Japan should not just follow blindly in the footsteps of the United States,” and that both US forces and the SDF should be withdrawn from Iraq in order to make way for “real humanitarian assistance” organized by the UN and NGOs.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda maintains that it is too early to conclude that Iraq had no WMDs even after US Secretary of State Colin Powell testifies that finding any stockpiles is “unlikely.”
Hosoda suggests that Japan will keep the SDF in Iraq for another year if security conditions permit.
Three of the Japanese ex-hostages launch an Iraq Peace Campaign in Miyazaki involving photo exhibitions and lectures.
Al-Muthanna Governor Muhammad Ali Hassan, on a visit to Tokyo, thanks Japan for its economic help and requests that more be done. He stays in Japan from October 3 to October 8.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda, responding to the release of the Duelfer Report in Washington, asserts that the Iraq War was legitimate even if Iraq in fact had no WMDs.
A two-day Iraq donor conference opens in Tokyo. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih asks for more aid from donor nations and suggests that Iraq might become “the Japan of the Middle East.”
A minor panic ensues when rumors hit Tokyo that two Japanese have been killed in Iraq. The rumor proves to be false.
A rocket is fired into the SDF base in Samawa, but it was unarmed and no one was hurt.
Japanese officials announce that a Japanese traveler, Shosei Koda, has been taken hostage in Iraq. The hostage-takers demand that the SDF be withdrawn within 48 hours or they will kill Koda. PM Koizumi rejects the ultimatum immediately.
1) The body of Shosei Koda is found in Baghdad. All three opposition parties demand that the SDF be withdrawn from Iraq. Koizumi says that the SDF will remain.
2) A rocket is fired at the SDF camp in Samawa. It does not explode, but does cause some damage to an SDF storage container.
1) The DPJ decides to submit a bill to the Diet demanding that the SDF be withdrawn from Iraq.
2) The Zarqawi group claims responsibility for executing Shosei Koda. They post a video of his execution on the internet.
A Kyodo news poll finds that more than 63% of the Japanese public feels that the SDF should be pulled out of Iraq in December.
The Defense Agency begins preparations to rotate a new SDF contingent into the camp at Samawa. This indicates that the government will not pull the troops out of Iraq in December.
Three men, one a Syrian, claim responsibility for the rocket attack on the Samawa base on October 22, and also say they had some involvement in the destruction of the Japan-Iraq Friendship Monument. They say that they want the SDF to withdraw from Iraq.
PM Koizumi reasserts that Samawa is not a combat zone.
PM Koizumi expresses his support for the US offensive against Falluja.
New Komeito leader Takanori Kanzaki expresses his consent for SDF operations in Iraq to be extended.
The three opposition parties jointly submit a bill to the Diet calling for the withdrawal of the SDF from Iraq.
Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister Jabr Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah, visiting Tokyo, praises the SDF mission in Iraq.
DPJ leader Katsuya Okada demands that Koizumi explain himself publicly if he plans to extend the SDF mission in Iraq.
Defense Agency chief Yoshinori Ono states that the SDF might be withdrawn from Iraq in a year’s time, December 2005.
Ono leaves Japan on a visit to the SDF base in Iraq.
Tsutomu Takebe of the LDP and Takanori Kanzaki of New Komeito leave Japan on a visit to the SDF base in Iraq.
The Koizumi cabinet informally agrees to extend the SDF mission in Iraq for another year.
The cabinet formally extends the SDF mission. The opposition parties criticize the move and a Nihon Keizai Shinbun poll finds that 61% of the Japanese public opposes the decision.
Egyptian Ambassador to Japan Hisham Badr expresses support for the SDF mission to Iraq during a public lecture in Tokyo.
The Tokyo District Court rules against the government and acquits the activists arrested for distributing antiwar fliers.
Cartoons are displayed at an unemployment office in Samawa criticizing the scantiness of Japanese aid activities.
1) British FM Jack Straw, on a visit to Tokyo, announces that British forces may protect the SDF in Samawa after Dutch forces leave Iraq in March.
2) False rumors appear that a Japanese engineer has been taken hostage in Iraq.
A Kyodo news poll finds that 55% of the Japanese public wants the SDF to be pulled out of Iraq when Dutch forces leave in March.
The British government formally decides to deploy 600 troops to protect the SDF after Dutch forces leave in March.
Leaflets begin appearing in Samawa threatening the lives of Iraqis who work for the Japanese forces.
Top Japanese government officials praise the elections in Iraq as a step toward democracy.
The Iraqi boy Abbas Ali al-Malki, who had received treatment for cancer in Nagoya in 2004, dies of illness in Iraq.
1) Responding to requests from PM Koizumi and British PM Blair, Australian PM John Howard announces that 450 additional Australian troops will be sent to Iraq to help protect the SDF in Samawa.
2) A poll finds that 44% of Japanese university students cannot correctly locate Iraq on a world map.
Iraqi journalist Hassan Ali Hassan testifies in an Osaka court that all of Iraq is a “combat zone” despite official Japanese government denial.
1) Dutch troops begin pulling out of Iraq and British forces take over their duties.
2) A mock tribunal held in Tokyo finds PM Koizumi guilty of war crimes for supporting the preemptive attack on Iraq.
Al-Muthanna Governor Muhammad Ali Hassan, interviewed on a local Iraqi TV show, expresses disappointment with Japan’s reconstruction efforts. He says that he wants large-scale projects for Samawa.
It is announced that the names of Shinsuke Hashida and Kotaro Ogawa will be added to the monument for fallen journalists in Freedom Park, Arlington, Virginia.
The Defense Agency abruptly cancels plans for Japanese journalists to visit the SDF camp in Samawa citing potential security risks.
Defense Agency chief Yoshinori Ono publicly defends the decision to cancel the reporters’ visit to Samawa while insisting that the security situation there is actually not so bad.
The widow of Shinsuke Hashida announces plans to build a children’s clinic in Samawa.
The Japanese government announces that the SDF will be pulled out of Iraq by December 14, 2005.
News reaches Tokyo that Akihiko Saito, a Japanese mercenary, has been taken captive in Iraq.

 


Note: Developments after May 10, 2005, will be posted later.

 

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