KOIZUMI “CHANGES HIS MIND”: THE INDIAN OCEAN MISSION TO BE EXTENDED

On September 1st, the Japanese media was informed that Prime Minister Koizumi was considering the possibility of ending Japan’s MSDF mission to the Indian Ocean by its legal deadline of November 1st. (In November 2001, the Diet had passed the “Special Measures against Terrorism Law.” Under its authority, since 2002, Japan has offered refueling and other rear support to US naval forces operating near Afghanistan.)

Photo: Koizumi on Election Night
Source: Unknown

However, we have now seen the first effects of the LDP victory. It is now announced that the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean will indeed be extended. Kyodo News writes that Koizumi “changed his mind after [the] landslide election win.” This is somewhat reminiscent of an election a couple of years ago in which Prime Minister Koizumi avoided the issue of Iraq all through the campaign only to announce the day after the election that the Japanese public had given him a “mandate” to deploy the GSDF in Iraq.

It is clear that the issues of the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean and the GSDF mission in Iraq have become linked in the minds of LDP and MOFA leaders. They are said to want to avoid a situation in which they pull out from both missions at the same time. They feel that a simultaneous withdrawal from both missions would damage US-Japan relations. Apparently, even after four years of lockstep policy with Washington, Tokyo is still skittish about doing anything that smacks of political independence or distance from US foreign policies in the region. Is the US-Japan alliance really so fragile as all that?

Kyodo News confirms that the Bush Administration put pressure on Tokyo with an informal request that they keep the MSDF mission in place. This is despite the fact that, like the GSDF in Samawa, the Indian Ocean mission is finding it more difficult to find useful things to do. For example, the amount of gasoline that the MSDF is currently supplying to the US Navy has now fallen to about 10% of 2002 levels. Consequently, it seems unlikely that they are actually playing any major role. As in the case of Iraq, it seems that the symbolism of Japanese support is more important to Washington than the actual substance.

The Asahi makes some interesting observations: “The reasoning behind the extension is that a discontinuation of the refueling services in the Indian Ocean would likely strain Japan's ties with the United States and other countries engaged in anti-terrorism operations, according to government officials. If that occurred, Japan would feel obliged to keep the Self-Defense Forces on the ground in Iraq to prevent a further deterioration in relations, officials said. ‘Japan would have no choice but to keep the SDF troops in Iraq, even if other countries leave the country,’ a senior Defense Agency official said.”

Two points emerge from this passage. First, it underlines the fact that Tokyo sees a linkage between the Indian Ocean mission and the Samawa mission. In their minds, they think that extending the Indian Ocean mission will give them more flexibility on the decision of whether or not to extend the Iraq mission. I doubt whether the Bush Administration sees this linkage in quite the same way as the Japanese officials do.

Second, we have here once again a senior Japanese official whining that they have “no choice” in the matter of their country’s foreign policy. In November 2001, Tokyo had “no choice” but to send Aegis ships to the Indian Ocean. In March 2003, Tokyo had “no choice” but to support an illegal invasion of Iraq. In late 2003, Tokyo had “no choice” but to send the GSDF to Samawa. And in spite of all they have done for Washington in the past four years, it seems that even today Tokyo has “no choice.”

Undoubtedly, the security connection with the United States is a vital Japanese interest. But is it really true that they have no choices—or simply no courage?