In the aftermath of the September 11th elections has come another political event in Japan that may be almost as important. Yesterday, Seiji Maehara was elected DPJ leader over party co-founder Naoto Kan by the breathtaking margin of 96 votes to 94 votes.

The reasons for Maehara’s victory were various. The most important is probably the feeling among many DPJ members that the party needed a fresh start after its humiliating loss, and that Maehara, much more than two-time leader Kan, offered that new beginning. Another issue is that younger DPJ members in their 40s had been chafing at the dominance of the (somewhat) older generation in the party that had monopolized power since it was formed in the late 1990s.

Maehara has his qualities. He is quite young at age 43, and is handsome and articulate. He is not bound by conventional thinking, and should be able to debate well against Koizumi. Maehara has long been marked as a rising star in the party, but his rise to leadership so early is still a stunning development.

However, there is one huge problem with Maehara: He is committed conservative with security-policy oriented, rightwing views about the Japanese Constitution and about China. In terms of fundamental political ideology, one question can legitimately be asked: What separates the views of Seiji Maehara from the views of Junichiro Koizumi? Answer: Nothing that I’m aware of.

The dangers of this situation are apparent. At the moment, there are only two political parties in Japan that have a reasonable chance to govern the nation in the next five or ten years: the LDP and the DPJ. With the rise of Maehara to the leadership of the DPJ, there is essentially no choice for Japanese voters: Both parties now stand for the same things.

DPJ liberals, who represent at least half of the party membership, may soon find themselves in a dilemma. Maehara has already vowed two things: He will not lead according to “party factions” and he supports constitutional revision to allow Japanese forces to participate in overseas military actions. In the number two spot of the party, he has appointed Yukio Hatoyama, an older party co-founder, but also a conservative who supports constitutional revision. In the number three position, policy chief, Maehara is appointing Takeaki Matsumoto, yet another anti-China hawk with strong Defense Agency connections. The liberals are nowhere to be found in the top leadership of the new DPJ.

Grumbling among some DPJ liberals has already begun. One of them told the Yomiuri Shinbun: “Maehara is always visiting the Pentagon with defense hawks of the LDP. Such a man shouldn’t be DPJ leader.”

If Maehara is able to consolidate his leadership position in the way that he hopes, then it is pretty clear that he will cooperate with the LDP to revise Article Nine. At the same time, the 96 to 94 vote shows how divided the DPJ really is now. If Maehara overreaches himself—which seems quite possible—it could lead to the break-up of the party. Obviously, if that happens, the LDP dominance in Japanese politics will be greater than ever before. On the other hand, with Maehara, Hatoyama, and Matsumoto leading the DPJ, any one of which would fit comfortably in the LDP anyway, what difference does it really make?

A month ago it appeared that the LDP might break up and that a truly viable, basically liberal party might sweep into real power for the first time in Japanese history. Today, that prospect has never looked more distant. Rightwing anti-China hawks are firmly in the saddle.

For Japanese-Islamic relations, the new DPJ leadership confirms all the more the outcome of the September 11 elections: A more aggressive, US-aligned Japan.