Newsletter No. 237
April 12, 2006

 

JAPAN IN IRAQ -- STILL IN SEARCH OF A POLICY

As the Japanese deployment in Samawa reaches close to the 2 1/2 year mark, you might figure that Tokyo would have some idea what they want to do in Iraq. The most recent evidence, however, suggests otherwise.

First of all came comments by Foreign Minister Taro Aso last week. He said on a TV program that “I don’t think we should be the first to leave, just due to our own circumstances… It is extremely important to coordinate things, and withdrawing together would be the most desirable.”

Huh? First to leave? Pardon me, but hasn’t most of the original “Coalition of the Willing” long ago packed up its bags and taken off? Wasn’t the GSDF mission in Samawa originally guarded by the Dutch? Where are they now?

What Aso meant, of course -- though didn’t quite say -- is that Tokyo now psychologically considers itself part of that small, elite group that consists of the USA, Britain, and Australia. The “first to leave” and the “coordination” refer only to the diehard Anglo Powers, of which Japan has become an honorary member in light of the Jun-George relationship.

Worthy of note, too, is Aso’s offhand phrase, “just due to our own circumstances.” What are those “circumstances” precisely? He must be referring to the obvious illegality of the mission under the Japanese constitution, or perhaps the fact that most of the Japanese public has long opposed the mission. But being part of the Anglo Club is clearly more important than these insignificant matters.

Aso also suggested that the GSDF mission in Iraq possibly may NOT be withdrawn before Prime Minister Koizumi steps down in September. So the one deadline that seemed to be set last year has now been erased.

It is also reported that Aso told Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer that “the situation in Iraq did not permit a decision on when to withdraw the troops.”

So the upshot of the latest thinking in Tokyo is as follows:

When will the mission be ended? When one of the Anglo Powers goes first.
When will the mission be ended? When things are “coordinated” with the Anglo Powers.
When will the mission be ended? When the political situation in Iraq is stabilized.

And what does this all mean in practical terms? Nothing at all -- Tokyo still doesn’t have a clue what they are going to do. Instead of making their own sovereign decision, they are waiting for someone else to make a decision for them. Now that’s great policymaking, folks!

Photo: The GSDF in Samawa on April 12, 2006
Source: GSDF

 

The second half of the story regards news that emerged today about US-Japan negotiations in regard to the future of Japan’s role in Iraq.

It would appear that at the “Trilateral Security Dialogue” between Condoleezza Rice, Alexander Downer, and Taro Aso (held in Sydney last month), Secretary Rice informed Aso that it was “essential” that Japan send either military officers or civilians to join a “reconstruction team” on the ground inside Iraq. This follows, of course, many earlier requests from the Pentagon as well.

The relevant Kyodo News report says that Washington has specifically asked that Japanese civilians be sent to Basra. Readers of Shingetsu Newsletter No. 202 will recall that there was also a request in February for GSDF officers to be sent to Basra. However, showing a rare sparkle of intelligence, officials in Tokyo have apparently described these requests as being “difficult” (which usually means “no” in Japan-speak).

Another alternative being discussed now is sending Japanese civilians to Taril Airport, Dhiqar Province (a southern region whose capital is Nasiriya), which would be guarded by Australian troops. Tokyo is now “carefully examining” the request, according to the report.

We may surmise that the Bush Administration now feels that an expanded ASDF mission operating out of Kuwait is an insufficient demonstration of loyalty on the part of their Asian ally, and are determined to hold Tokyo’s feet to the fire until they make some sort of commitment to having a physical presence inside Iraq. The Pentagon and Rumsfeld would clearly prefer combat troops. The State Department seems willing to accept civilians. Basically, though, it is apparent that Washington is still pressuring Tokyo to keep a toehold inside Iraq.

From Washington’s perspective, what’s the big deal about keeping the Japanese in Iraq? Beats me! I suppose that in their minds it’s some kind of “symbolic” thing or another.

Even at this late stage in the game, it seems that neither Washington nor Tokyo is willing to face up to the political realities of what’s going on inside Iraq. It would be funny if it wasn’t so tragic.

 

1) From Tanya Murnock of the Naval Postgraduate School on April 13, 2006.

I believe I know the answer to the question, "what is the importance of Japan in Iraq?" Japan has been very vocal about securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for some time now. The problem with their application is that their Constitution (which was written for Japan by Gen. MacArthur following the Emperor's surrender in 1945) specifically forbids Japan from developing an offensive military capability. Two generations of Japanese have thus come of age believing in Japan's pacifism. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) is supposed to be strictly that -- defensive. This prohibits Japan from sending combat forces to any other country (defensive here now equals operations within Japan). How can a nation with no legal way to commit offensive forces be respected as part of a committee whose job it is to decide whether to commit forces?

Because of Japan's continued vocal request for permanent membership on the Security Council, Tokyo has been slowly finding more ways to give its SDF "international conflict legitimacy" (my phrase). Over the course of the past few years, SDF forces have been allowed first to observe, then allowed limited participation in, US exercises in other countries of the Pacific Rim. As a natural progression, Tokyo needed to continue its efforts by offering what legal support it could in Iraq. Tokyo was able to pacify the Japanese law by saying that SDF involvement in Iraq would only be for relief efforts -- no security or combat missions allowed. Of course, this still brought protests from the hardliners at home, but if Japan wants to continue its quest for a permanent seat, it has to show it understands the responsibilities of the job. Therefore, to Koizumi, Japanese forces must stay, to show that Japan will follow through when it commits forces, and stands by its word, as befits a permanent member of the Council.

2) From Adam Lebowitz of Tsukuba University on April 14, 2006.

Tanya Murnock provides a good argument connecting the SDF deployment with a desire for Security Council status. It could well be the case. However, a re-militarized Japan is sure to garner a Chinese veto. It is also doubtful that the US wants Japan on the Council, because irregardless of what forces Tokyo commits overseas, Washington is still against expanding the number of seats in principle.

Concerning another point Ms. Murnock has made -- How can a nation with no legal way to commit offensive forces be respected as part of a committee whose job it is to decide whether to commit forces? -- I think actually it would be well respected as a voice that gives full consideration to other forms of conflict resolution, especially if it were Japan. As in the case with China, no other country in the region (except Bhutan and the Maldives) supported Japan's recent bid. Why? Because of memories of WWII that resonate to this day. In conclusion, Japan's chances for a seat on the Council might be enhanced by a more literal reading of Article Nine, if the day comes when the US wants to add more seats.