Newsletter No. 990
News-Analysis
April 24, 2008

 

DECODING THE MYSTERY OF JAPAN-IRAN RELATIONS

The words that are beginning to come to my mind if I were asked to characterize current Japan-Iran relations might be “complex” or even “mysterious.” Some signs point toward greater tension and conflict in this bilateral relationship. Other reports suggest a higher level of positive cooperation and dialogue.

Tokyo Imposes Third Round of Sanctions on Iran

On the side of the balance sheet suggesting a deterioration of the relationship is the announcement on the 22nd that Japan was imposing a third round of sanctions on Tehran over its alleged military nuclear program. It will be recalled that Tokyo previously announced certain sanctions on February 16th and on May 18th of last year.

The first two rounds of sanctions had blacklisted a total of 23 entities and 27 individuals said to be related to Iran’s nuclear development. This latest round adds a further 12 entities and 13 individuals to that list. In sum, then, Tokyo’s current sanctions on Iran now touch 35 entities and 40 individuals. The full MOFA Statement is attached below.

In a press conference, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura gave an unusually clear account of Japanese official rationale for these new sanctions:

Naturally, Iran is not a country that is recognized under the NPT as being a nation that can possess nuclear weapons; and certainly they may not therefore create any such weapons. For the sake of the public welfare doubtful activities cannot go on. The NPT regulations allow for the punishment of doubtful activities, do they not? Of course, every country has the right to peaceful nuclear development, but at the same time it is necessary to provide evidence to the international community that military nuclear weapons are not being created. The issue at hand is that the United States, the EU, and the international community have doubts this development. Something must be done to make them say, ‘Ahh! Now we can see unmistakably that this is peaceful development.’ This is Japan’s stance.

The view expressed by Foreign Minister Komura is at least partially reasonable. It is reasonable for Tokyo to demand that Iran not develop nuclear weapons. It is also reasonable for Tokyo to demand further evidence from Tehran that its nuclear development projects have no military aspect. On the other hand, there are at least three big problems with the official Japanese stance:

1) They assume that the United States and the EU are completely fair and neutral observers. From what I have seen, many US policymakers do not seem to acknowledge that the development of peaceful nuclear energy in Iran is acceptable. The NPT guarantees all countries this right, but I’m not sure that Washington really recognizes this right for the countries that they don’t like. Tokyo needs to more clearly acknowledge the Iranian suspicion that the international community will not treat them fairly under a single international standard.

2) Tokyo has yet to acknowledge in any practical way the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was issued in Washington in early December 2007. If Tokyo were really fair-minded about this nuclear development question, why the almost complete lack of serious public discussion of the NIE? It seems like the political sensitivities of top Bush Administration officials count for a lot more in Tokyo than with the balance of the evidence that has been presented.

3) Iran may or may not have an illegal military nuclear weapons program under the NPT. However, India, Israel, and Pakistan undoubtedly do maintain illegal (or extralegal) nuclear weapons. Iranian diplomats would therefore be quite right in pointing out to Tokyo that they have a double-standard, or perhaps multiple standards, in dealing with nuclear weapons in the hands of countries that the NPT does not recognize as authorized to have them. If Tokyo is going to impose sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program, why not on impose them on the nuclear-related institutions of India, Israel, and Pakistan as well? What is the justification for singling out Iran for these kinds of measures? We are still awaiting that clarification.

The Sunny Side

If we were to base our analysis of Japan-Iran relations exclusively upon these new sanctions and the odd oversights of Tokyo’s nuclear non-proliferation policies, we would have to conclude that this bilateral relationship was characterized by a significant degree of malice on the part of Japanese policymakers. It is strange, then, to note that all of the other recent reports on the relationship emphasize positive matters.

According to the Tehran Times, Ambassador Akio Shirota called a couple of weeks ago for “improving comprehensive relations with the Islamic Republic.” Specifically, in a meeting with Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saeed Jalili, Shirota is reported to have said, “Iran is a strategic country and the main base for development in the region. It has great potential for trade and economic cooperation.” Jalili responded by saying, “Iran and Japan are two important actors in the international arena and can play a special role in international interactions… Iran and Japan have high potential for mutual, regional, and international cooperation… which should be used in favor of the two countries’ people.”

In a meeting with Mohammad Reza Nouri Shahroudi of the Expediency Council some days before that, Ambassador Shirota was reported to have said, “Japan understands the importance of Iran’s history, its role in the region, and its potential in various fields and that Tokyo is interested to expand ties with the country.”

Press TV reports furthermore that Iranian Ambassador in Kabul Fada-Hossein Maleki met with Japanese Ambassador in Kabul Hideo Sato and they agreed to pool their efforts to aid Afghanistan. They singled out education and the improvement of the Afghan university system as being an area in which they had common goals.

Meanwhile, on April 22nd MOFA Vice-Minister Itsunori Onodera met with Iranian Foreign Minister (and former Ambassador to Tokyo) Manouchehr Mottaki in Kuwait where they discussed, among other topics, how to stabilize the political situation in Iraq.

The very next day, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen told an elite audience in Washington: “Recent combat operations in southern Iraq in Basra highlighted yet again Iran's activities in ways that very specifically pointed to activities which, in fact, resulted in the deaths of coalition soldiers. And I think for the ability to create stability in that part of the world that not just this alliance, but those who are allied, will have to deal with Iran in the very near future.”

Apparently, Tokyo takes the view that Iran’s influence should be welcomed as a possible constructive force in both Afghanistan and Iraq, while the Bush Administration and its hounds continue to promote the notion that Iran is pure evil, and that any and all Iranian influence is a bad thing.

Separate Baskets?

I cannot resolve the apparent contradictions in Japanese policy toward Iran. Their handling of the nuclear development case suggests a near-complete subordination of Japanese policy to the political sensitivities of the Bush Administration. On the other hand, there is this ongoing diplomatic romance between Japan and Iran which has a tone completely different from that of Washington.

Perhaps Tokyo and Tehran have reached some kind of tacit understanding that the nuclear issue and the rest of the bilateral relationship will be handled in separate baskets: The nuclear basket to keep the Americans sweet; and the other basket to maintain basically friendly diplomatic ties between Japan and Iran.

Additional Measures based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act to Freeze the Assets of Entities and Persons Related to Iran’s Proliferation Sensitive Nuclear and Other Activities (Japan’s Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution on Iran’s Nuclear Issue)
April 22, 2008

Based on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), the Government of Japan has implemented such measures as freezing the assets of a total of 23 entities and 27 persons that were designated in the annex to those resolutions as related to Iran’s proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems (hereafter "nuclear and other activities"). Since further 12 entities and 13 persons were additionally designated in Annex I and III to UNSC resolution 1803 (2008), the Government of Japan invokes measures to freeze the assets of these persons and entities based on the Cabinet approval dated April 22 “Measures to Freeze the Assets of Entities and Persons Related to Iran’s Proliferation Sensitive Nuclear and Other Activities” based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.

(1) Payment regulation

Effective as of April 22, a license will be required for payments to those persons and entities engaged in Iran’s nuclear and other activities designated by the announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(2) Capital transaction regulation

Effective as of April 22, a license will be required for capital transactions (deposit contract, trust contract and money lending contract) with those persons and entities designated by the announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

UNSC Resolution 1803 (2008) calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to Iran’s nuclear and other activities.

Therefore, the Government of Japan requests financial institutions to steadily implement the measures above, and to thoroughly perform the duties of personal verification and report of suspicious transactions based on the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds.