DIET ELECTIONS AND THE GSDF MISSION IN SAMAWA

As expected, the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is promising to withdraw the SDF from Iraq should they be elected with a majority on September 11th. Even though the Upper House would still be controlled by the LDP, it would be within the powers of the Prime Minister to carry out a withdrawal. The section of the DPJ Manifesto relating to Iraq is worth quoting in full:

Item 8: Withdraw the SDF from Iraq by December; Support Iraqi Reconstruction in a Way Suitable for Japan

The “Special Measures Law for Humanitarian Reconstruction Activities in Iraq” stipulates that the SDF must operate only in “non-combat areas,” but there are no such areas in all of Iraq. Recently, fighting and terrorism targeting the Iraqi people as well has been increasing, and the security situation in and around Samawa has also been deteriorating.

We would withdraw the SDF rapidly, before the mission’s December deadline. On the other hand, in regard to Samawa’s serious unemployment problem and other issues, we would contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq through positive support by means of ODA projects and the like.

At the same time, we would focus on resolving the sources of terrorism, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and build a structure of international cooperation that could provide security for the entire Middle East. These are contributions that are appropriate for Japan.

All in all, the DPJ’s Manifesto presents an attractive platform. The SDF would be withdrawn, but they pledge to remain involved in Iraqi reconstruction. They also wish to pay due regard to the broader issues that lie in the background of the Iraq tragedy.

There are grounds for believing that DPJ leader Katsuya Okada is personally sincere on this matter as well. In 1985, he spent a year at Harvard University studying international relations, and so has an interest in such matters. Although Okada would wish to maintain the US-Japan alliance, he would put more distance between Japan and the Bush Administration’s Persian Gulf, Arab, and anti-terrorism strategies. In June 2004, Okada made the following observation: “Koizumi's focus on the U.S.-Japan alliance has damaged Japan's efforts to build ties in the Middle East, such as with Iran.” This is a clear indication about what kind of strategy he would build if he were to become Prime Minister.

However, it is becoming less clear that the DPJ and the opposition forces will have an outright electoral victory, as I had recently suggested. On the one hand, the LDP is clearly in disarray, with one part of the organization battling other parts, often pitting the local chapters against the central party organization in Tokyo. Koizumi’s critics are ferociously attacking him as a dictator, and even among the LDP Diet members who supported Koizumi on the postal reform vote, there are many who secretly want him to fall. If LDP rebels Shizuka Kamei and Tamisuke Watanuki form a new political party to hold their seats, this will take votes away from the LDP. Also, the recent activities of Muneo Suzuki in Hokkaido might also work against LDP interests in that region.

On the other hand, the Communist Party plans to field a very large number of candidates, which will draw support from the DPJ. Also, New Komeito is remaining true to their alliance with Koizumi—at least until after the elections. The biggest problem for the DPJ, however, is that PM Koizumi himself has suddenly emerged as if revitalized by the fight of his political life. He is luring attractive female candidates to run against old anti-reform dinosaurs. Theses ladies are now being referred to as “Koizumi’s assassins” in some circles. Koizumi has also reached out to people like Takafumi Horie—Horiemon—the brash young entrepreneur who shook up the Japanese business world a few months ago in his attempt to carry out a hostile takeover of a major television broadcasting company. In this way, PM Koizumi is shrewdly trying to regain his earlier popularity. He seems to be off to a good start, as the most recent public opinion polls are testifying.

There are several scenarios that seem realistic. Let us look at each of them as they might impact Japan’s Iraq policy:

1) An outright DPJ victory: In such a case, we should expect a policy as outlined above. There would be a withdrawal from Iraq and more focus on a Japanese diplomatic policy independent of the Bush Administration.

2) A Koizumi-LDP victory: The current policy of strong support for the Bush Administration would be continued. The SDF mission would be extended past the December 14 deadline.

3) Neither major party gains a majority: This is where things might get strange. Koizumi has vowed not to deal with the LDP rebels even after the election. If he were to remain LDP leader after the election (and that is by no means certain) he would try to form a larger coalition with the DPJ, the Communist Party, or the Social Democratic Party (SDP). All three of those parties have expressed strong opposition to the SDF deployment in Iraq. So if, for example, an LDP-DPJ-New Komeito government came into power, would it maintain Koizumi’s diplomatic policies, or would it shift to policies like that in the DPJ manifesto? It’s not easy to predict.

In any case, one of the many strange factors in this election is that Koizumi himself, even if he wins, is expected to resign his position as prime minister in about a year. Who would his LDP successor be? No one knows. These are interesting times in the Japanese political world.

Until the September 11th elections clarify matters, we can only speculate about what the future shape of Japan’s diplomatic policies will be. Of course, it is also quite possible that the elections will actually muddle things even further. We’ll know soon enough.