Newsletter No. 724
News-Analysis
August 29, 2007

 

GOOD COP - BAD COP: THE COUNTERATTACK BEGINS

In less than two weeks the special session of the Japanese Diet will open, and now is the season to try to lure, coax, or intimidate the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to back off its decision to oppose an extension of the MSDF mission in the Indian Ocean. But the signals are coming out mixed: the chief members of the new Abe cabinet are taking a conciliatory line, while the outright fear-mongering is being promoted by the American “alliance managers” in Washington. Is this the old good cop-bad cop routine? Or is it really just two uncoordinated responses?

I don’t know the answer. But if it is coordinated, then the “good cop” role is being played primarily by new Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and especially new Defense Minister Masahiko Komura.

Machimura’s initial line was more cautious: “My basic stance is to hold discussions with the opposition parties on such a premise and work to deliver a constructive response. The meaning of ‘flexible’ is not always clear, but if it means revising the legislation, currently our discussions have not progressed to that point. A new Cabinet has made, I believe that it is necessary to hold a series of various discussions under this Cabinet, and if some sort of constructive answer or agreement is attained, it should be valued.”

Komura, however, signaled clearly that revisions to the law were indeed on the table: “We will listen to the DPJ’s opinions and the entire Cabinet will consider whether there are proposals to be incorporated. We do not have a stance that flatly rules out the possibility of revising the law.”

The Asahi Shinbun noted openly what I had already suspected was true: Former Defense Minister Yuriko Koike had been planning to make a frontal assault on Ozawa and the DPJ and was not prepared to take the kind of conciliatory approach that Komura seems to be adopting. Clearly, the result of the Koike-Moriya feud has already had a serious policy impact in Tokyo.

It should be noted that Machimura already seems less flexible than Komura on this issue. Here was the way he laid out his basic position to a press conference: “I believe that the bottom line is that the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law must be extended. After the terrorist attacks of 9.11 there was a unanimous decision made by the United Nations Security Council, and based on that decision, as a member country employing international measures against terrorism, and as it is our natural duty as a member of international society, we currently execute these measures. The activities of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are praised globally, and from the perspective of taking responsible actions as a member of international society, and of course in light of Japan-US relations as well, extending the law is something that really must be done. Japan spent over one trillion yen during the Gulf War. However, President Ozawa insisted that this was not enough to earn international praise and urged the proactive carrying out of international peace cooperation activities. I find it myself to be doubtful that these assertions are consistent with his current opposition to extending the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Therefore, I believe that eventually the understanding of the DPJ will be achieved, and I plan to do everything in my power to ensure it is.”

Machimura is appealing here to “duty” and “responsibility” in this message. The real fear-mongering and threats are currently coming from the US embassy and the “alliance managers” in Washington. It is they who are playing the role of “bad cop.”

Below is an op-ed just published in the Asahi by two of the key “alliance managers” in Washington, Kurt Campbell and Michael Green.

Frankly, I find the arguments they are making here to be almost hysterical. According to them, if Japan stops giving free gas-station service to some warships in the Indian Ocean, then the “whole world” from Washington to Canada to Pakistan to the Arab Gulf states are going to decide that Japan should not be taken seriously for the next ten years. As a result, China is going to snap up all the Arab oil contracts of the Gulf and poor Megumi Yokota will never be reunited with her tearful parents… blah, blah…

What I really don’t understand about this generation of American leaders is why they are so ideologically inflexible and thin-skinned. Why are they behaving like five-year-old brats who pout and cry and threaten whenever they don’t get things exactly as they want?

What is really “American” about this?

Ozawa’s Bravado May Damage Japan for Years
By Kurt Campbell and Michael Green

It appears that Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) leader Ichiro Ozawa is determined to force a crisis with the government over the counterterrorism bill. This comes as a disappointment to those Americans who remember him as a stalwart defender of the U.S.-Japan alliance from his days as deputy chief Cabinet secretary almost two decades ago.

However, it does not come as a surprise to those who know his single-minded determination to deal a body blow to the Liberal Democratic Party today. We are told that Ozawa has decided that any political damage done to U.S.-Japan relationship will be forgotten in a few years when there could be a Democratic administration in Washington and -- he hopes -- in Japan, too. We fear that assumption is flawed and hope Ozawa will reconsider his stance and find a creative and workable compromise with the government. It will not be as easy to recover the reputations of Minshuto and Japan as Ozawa may think.

Many in Minshuto believe that pulling Maritime Self Defense Force ships out of the coalition will only do damage to the "Bush-Abe" relationship. After all, both leaders are under assault at home and the Iraq war is polarizing American public opinion. However, the bill that Ozawa wants to kill authorizes the deployment of ships for the effort in Afghanistan and has nothing to do with Iraq. And support for the effort in Afghanistan enjoys broad bipartisan support in the United States.

If Japan pulls out suddenly from the coalition against the Taliban and al-Qaida, this will lead to inevitable and unfortunate questions for the next administration -- whether Republican or Democrat -- about Japan's reliability as an ally.

Nor would the damage to Japan's national interest stop with the bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship. Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and Afghan President Hamid Karzai have both been clear that they highly value the MSDF contribution to the war against terror in their region.

The Indian government has been keen to strengthen strategic ties with Japan and welcomes the MSDF presence in the Indian Ocean. In the Gulf states, the MSDF and air and ground deployments have also been well received and many leaders in those countries want to see even more Japanese military and diplomatic presence to help bring stability at a time when Iraq's future is uncertain and China is attempting to increase its access and influence in this rich oil-producing region.

The basis of Japan's relationship with all these countries is diplomatic and economic, but Japan's readiness to show the flag is viewed across South and Southwest Asia as a metric for how serious Tokyo really is as a strategic player in that region.

Then there is the impact on other members of the coalition. Canada is taking casualties on the ground in Afghanistan. Australia, South Korea and New Zealand all have troops and aid workers in harm's way. NATO is there. These are the major democracies that have made a commitment in Afghanistan because their leaders see this as a battle between civilization and terror. These are also nations that have supported a more active role for Japan in Asia and globally.

Whether or not Japan stands with them in Afghanistan will inevitably have an impact on how they assess Japan's future leadership in arenas such as the Group of Eight, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the U.N. Security Council. If Ozawa succeeds in blocking the counterterrorism legislation and Minshuto comes to power some day, what would a Minshuto prime minister say to Stephen Harper of Canada or the Australian prime minister, whether it is John Howard or Labor leader Kevin Rudd?

Would a Minshuto prime minister be able to say that Japan stands firmly with those countries in the war on terror? Would they be able to make the claim that Japan is ready to play a larger role in the international community? And how does Japan's ambassador to the United Nations explain that Japan is ready to take the leadership responsibilities of a permanent U.N. Security Council member the day after the counterterrorism law is killed and Japanese ships pull out of the coalition effort?

North Korea's view of a Minshuto decision to block the counterterrorism law is easier to predict. Alliances are not judged in one region alone, but globally. And North Korea saw a clear signal in Japan's decision to dispatch the MSDF to the Indian Ocean that the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger than it realized precisely because it is a global alliance.

But if that alliance deflates or drifts because of a withdrawal from the coalition, Pyongyang will be delighted. Pity the diplomats who have to try to negotiate with Pyongyang about the abductee issue after that.

If Minshuto forces a withdrawal by the MSDF in November, governments around the world will put on a brave face and say that they "respect" Japan's decision and value their relationship with Japan.

The coalition forces and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan will adjust and try to fill the gap. But conservative and liberal governments from Washington to Canberra and from Qatar to London will privately begin to reassess their assumptions about what role Japan is prepared to play in the world.

All of this should sound familiar to Ozawa, because it is precisely what happened after the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. There were growing expectations for Japan's global leadership until the Kaifu government stumbled in the face of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. At the time, Ozawa did more than anyone in the LDP to try to prevent the collapse of Japan's diplomatic weight. He put forward a vision of a "normal" Japan that would carry its weight in the international community.

But in spite of his efforts, it was 10 years before the world began to take Japan seriously again. That is worth remembering. Because even though it may be possible for a coalition to replace two ships or the opposition to replace the governing party, it can take a nation years to recover a reputation.

Kurt Campbell is CEO and co-founder of Center for a New American Security and served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia Pacific affairs during the Bill Clinton administration. Michael Green is senior advisor and Japan fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University and served as National Security Council senior director for Asia under President George W. Bush.