Newsletter No. 849
News-Analysis
December 15, 2007

 

INDIAN OCEAN MISSION: PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA DOUBLES DOWN

The hints of determination that we thought we detected in Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s statements are now reaching fruition. Yesterday, the Diet approved a ruling coalition proposal to extend the extraordinary session once again -- this time through January 15th. By taking this action, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) now has all the legislative tools in its hands necessary to ram the MSDF Indian Ocean extension bill through the Diet using its House of Representatives supermajority by early January. Neither the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) nor any other opposition force can stop them if that’s what they choose to do.

Here at Shingetsu we have been covering this story intensively since the end of July, so we need not go over all of the ground that we have already discussed before, but it is still important to follow new developments and to repeat a handful of key points.

As we all know, the Bush Administration and its allies have been demanding persistently and adamantly that Japan redeploy the MSDF to the Indian Ocean. There have been many grounds for doubt about whether Yasuo Fukuda would strongly push this line himself, as he is surely a canny-enough politician to realize that the public isn’t really enthused about this, and that he would be much better advised to turn his full attention to the domestic reform matters that the Japanese voters really care about. For whatever reason (perhaps the internal demands of his right-leaning colleagues) he has drifted into the position of betting everything on the very same foreign policy matter that helped sink his predecessor.

And what about the supposedly crucial realm of public opinion? As we mentioned in Shingetsu Newsletter No. 763, Peter Ennis and The Oriental Economist had said that the LDP leaders privately believed that they needed at least 60% public support to pull the trigger and use the Koizumi Era lower house supermajority against their rivals. Confirming this account, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba later stated openly: “If we can raise support to 60%, I think the electorate will accept our voting the bill through a second time.”

So where does the public stand? According to the latest Yomiuri poll (yes, that’s Yomiuri!) there is currently about 45% of the public in favor of the bill and 43% against. When the question turned to whether the LDP should use its lower house supermajority to pass the bill, a tiny plurality (44% to 43%) was actually opposed to such an idea.

So let’s summarize what Fukuda and the LDP are proposing to do:

a) To use a lower house supermajority gained in September 2005 by a different prime minister -- and fought over the issue of post office privatization -- to pass a bill over the heads of an opposition party that trounced them in the far-more-recent July 2007 elections.

b) To use this lower house supermajority under a prime minister whose public approval rating may be falling to under 50% now, on an issue that itself that garners only about 45% public support, and in the face of an apparently small plurality that opposes the use of the supermajority on this issue.

c) To use a lower house supermajority to pass a bill on which there is quite a strong argument to be made that it is simply unconstitutional in the first place.

In spite of the problems of the DPJ (and they are very serious), I find the LDP’s position on this matter to be a real offense against democracy, whatever the practical political outcome may turn out to be. They are lucky that the Japanese public doesn’t like to pay attention to politics and think that their own opinions don’t really matter. A more demanding public would have their heads by now.

At any rate, the DPJ showed its own attitude by voting on the 13th against a second extension of the Diet. Although they carried the upper house, it is the lower house that takes priority in such affairs. The point is that the DPJ still hasn’t backed down an inch all through the months of US and other pressures that it has been exposed to.

By early next year we will see how vociferously the opposition reacts if and when the lower house supermajority is used. Fukuda is apparently making a serious gamble here. Will it trigger the elections that none of the political parties are ready for?

Fukuda Supports a Permanent SDF Deployment Law and the Fingerprinting of Foreigners

The Japan Times interviewed Prime Minister Fukuda recently and he stated his opinion that Japan should adopt a permanent SDF deployment law so that new legislation is not necessary for every case of overseas deployment. He said: “Because Japan doesn't have a permanent law, the SDF cannot participate in emergency peace cooperation activities or humanitarian activities… I think it is necessary to have a permanent law to create a system so the SDF can be deployed whenever necessary with approval from the Diet.”

This is not an original idea, and many others of diverse backgrounds have been saying the same thing for a while now.

My own opinion is that this kind of reform makes sense from a practical policy point of view; but logically it must come second to a more fundamental decision over the Japanese Constitution. It is not acceptable to carry on this policy debate without taking into account the highest law in the land, which is in my view being violated daily. If the public supports a Constitutional revision, then that’s fair. If they don’t, then the government needs to reassess the entire thrust of its security policy. Like the more specific issue of the Indian Ocean mission, where does the public get its voice heard here?

Also, in the same interview, and much to my own bitter disappointment, Fukuda expressed support for Kunio Hatoyama’s new foreigner fingerprinting measures. He said: “The process is necessary as a means to prevent terrorism and added it has already proven effective… the world has increasingly turned to fingerprinting after the September 11 attacks… stricter enforcement is better than the alternative: a greater spread of terrorism worldwide… there may come a day when the threat of terrorism has disappeared, and with it, the need for such strict monitoring.”

So make no mistake: Yasuo Fukuda, the moderate, is an “antiterrorism” crusader too, without much sensitivity to democratic legitimacy or civil liberties. This fits the pattern we saw with him when he was Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and argued in March 2003 that American public opinion was more important than Japanese public opinion in deciding whether or not to support the invasion of Iraq. (For a brief discussion of that incident, see my article entitled “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the Decision to Deploy the GSDF to Iraq” in SEJJIR Vol. 1 at the Shingetsu Institute website: Note especially the Conclusion on pages 47-52; also, see the Fukuda quotes provided in Shingetsu Newsletter No. 217 of March 2006).

The NATO Secretary-General in Tokyo

Back when US Ambassador Thomas Schieffer was aggressively threatening Ichiro Ozawa and the Japanese opposition should they block the re-extension of the Indian Ocean mission, Observing Japan blogger Tobias Harris repeatedly suggested that it would be much better for someone like NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to make the case for Japanese involvement rather than any US officials. At the time, I privately disagreed with Harris’ view that the Indian Ocean mission was all that desirable or necessary, but I certainly understood the clever tactical logic of his advice to the American authorities.

I was reminded of that as soon as I saw that Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was in Tokyo and talking about the Indian Ocean mission and Afghanistan. His initial comments on the 13th included the following: “I would hope that Japan... has not yet reached the limits of its possibilities in the political sense of participating in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan… I would hope that in the coming years, we could see interesting debate in Japan about what Japan could do more in Afghanistan under the banner of the United Nations, under the banner of ISAF… Apart from ISAF in Afghanistan, we do profit much from [Operation Enduring Freedom]. This is basically hunting al-Qaida and terrorists… We make it very clear that these are sensitive national issues. They are for Japan alone to resolve."

Yesterday, at a separate news conference, the NATO leader continued: “I made a plea and asked [the Japanese government] if it were at all possible that on the civilian side, not from the military side… that there would perhaps at a certain stage be support from Japan by sending civilian helicopters to Afghanistan… I underlined the word 'civilian' because the constraints, of course, are there.”

When one looks at what de Hoop Scheffer is saying, it actually sounds a lot more like Ozawa’s line than the LDP line, in spite of his expressions of gratitude for the MSDF mission. Remember that it was Ozawa who emphasized putting more Japanese forces (either military or civilians) inside Afghanistan itself in cooperation with the ISAF and under a clear UN mandate.

The DPJ Policy Muddle

On the other hand, critics of the DPJ point out -- with considerable justice -- that in fact the opposition has not been able to unify their position on the basis of Ozawa’s earlier proposals. The DPJ itself is deeply split on these kinds of issues. Should they be fortunate enough to form a government in the future, it is not very clear what their policy would actually be. The Yomiuri Shinbun, for example, never tires of pointing this out.

When and if the time comes, then the DPJ will certainly have to make some serious decisions on these matters. However, I don’t agree with those who say that the DPJ currently has the absolute responsibility of presenting detailed plans while they are still in the opposition. The first role of an opposition party is to point out weaknesses in government policy and to try to convince the public that they would manage better if elected into the key offices. Once they are really in power, that’s when their real governing responsibilities would begin.

At any rate, partly to keep their own party united, the DPJ has shelved the idea of presenting a detailed party plan at this stage -- but we already know Ozawa’s personal preferences in any case; he has been clear.

Note also that a senior DPJ member, presumably Ozawa or Hatoyama, recently told the press: “We won't submit a bill during the current Diet session, even if it's extended… If we submit an alternative bill, it would fuel debate of the [LDP] antiterrorism bill, making a vote on the bill at an earlier stage unavoidable, which wouldn't be a great tactic.”

Seiji Maehara is still the most vocal internal critic of his own party leadership.

The Ruling Coalition under Stress

The DPJ leaders are not the only ones feeling the heat however; there are also signs that New Komeito is unhappy with the current line of the LDP leadership as well.

Since the formation of the LDP-New Komeito alliance in October 1999, the smaller party has been a loyal and surprisingly undemanding supporter of the majority party’s positions. Even on the Iraq War issue -- and despite the supposedly-pacifist principles of the Buddhist party and opposition from within its Soka Gakkai backbone -- New Komeito stuck to the LDP with little public complaint.

But now that the LDP looks vulnerable in the wake of the July electoral disaster (from their perspective) there are signs that New Komeito is getting a little shaky in their commitment to stay by the LDP’s side. Most dramatic were the recent comments of Construction and Transport Minister Tetsuzo Fuyushiba in late November: “We can't agree to another extension of the Diet session… We're absolutely against passing the bill with a second vote in the lower house."

Despite Fuyushiba’s “absolute” opposition, as we have seen, the Diet session was indeed re-extended and Prime Minister Fukuda appears poised to use the supermajority.

New Komeito does not want an election in the early part of 2008, in which they feel certain that they will lose seats under the current circumstances. They fear that Fukuda’s use of the supermajority in late December or early January may trigger early elections, and they are worried.

I have no idea if New Komeito would really bolt from the LDP over this (since they have already stood still for so much else), but we need to at least acknowledge the possibility that a real split could emerge in the ruling coalition in the coming months. You’ve got to figure that arch-manipulator Ichiro Ozawa has this thought very much in mind as he plots his political tactics.

Let’s just leave it as an open question for now.

The Moriya Scandal

The scandal surrounding former Administrative Vice-Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya continues to swirl, and the man has now been arrested. However, the DPJ was forced to back off Finance Minister Fukushiro Nukaga to some degree, and thus were denied scoring any immediate knockout blows.

The LDP leadership has been insisting that the Defense Ministry scandals have “nothing to do” with SDF deployments; which is an assertion that may or may not be true depending on the angle from which you view the subject.

DPJ Secretary-General Yukio Hatoyama made the opposition argument this way: “How do you expect the public to understand the deliberations on the new antiterrorism bill if the Defense Ministry is mired in scandals over collusive relationships between politicians, bureaucrats and industry people?”

An unnamed LDP official countered: “The MSDF members risked their lives in the refueling activities in the Indian Ocean. It's a world apart from the case of Moriya, who was given free golf tours.”

Perhaps the real significance of the Moriya scandal for our purposes at Shingetsu is that it is eroding public trust in the Fukuda Administration, and it contributes to the distinct possibility that the LDP will do poorly whenever the next lower house elections are held.

But that is for the voters to decide -- whenever they might be offered the chance.