Newsletter
No. 166
January 20, 2006
THE LIGHT AND SHADOW OF JAPAN-TURKEY FRIENDSHIP
By Michael Penn
There can be little doubt that Japan’s
relationship with Turkey is the strongest and deepest bilateral
relationship that Japan maintains with the nations of West
Asia and North Africa. Although oil has made the Persian
Gulf more crucial for Japan strategically, there is still
a certain shallowness in those relationships in terms of
real affection and trust. Egypt, with its ancient pyramids
and sphinx, maintains a hold on the Japanese imagination,
as it does with all people around the world. However, for
Japan, Turkey is something even more special.
The Ottoman Empire and Persia dominated the West Asian region
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Arab peoples
were still subject to the Ottomans, the British, the French,
and finally, after 1911, the Italians. Japanese travellers
passed through British-Ottoman Egypt on their way to Europe
even before the Suez Canal was completed in 1869. By the 1870s
and 1880s, curious Japanese had begun visiting Istanbul (a.k.a.
Constantinople) every few years, and there was talk of establishing
direct diplomatic relations as well.
It was the Ertugrul disaster that really consolidated
the friendship, however. In the summer of 1890, a decrepit
Ottoman warship called the Ertugrul arrived in Tokyo
Bay on a diplomatic mission. The Ottoman Sultan had sent a
medal of honor to the Meiji Emperor in return for one that
he had received in Istanbul from the visiting Prince Akihito
Komatsu in 1887. The leader of the Ottoman mission, Rear Admiral
Osman Pasha, charmed the elite of Tokyo with his polished manners
in the “high-collar” context of Rokumeikan society.
However, when the ship began its journey home, it was swept
up by a typhoon and destroyed off the coast of Wakayama prefecture.
Hundreds died and only 69 men survived. As a token of friendship,
the survivors were cared for lavishly and sent home to Istanbul
aboard two Japanese frigates, the Hiei and the Kongo.
In the 1890s, tokens of friendship continued
to be passed between the Meiji Emperor and the Ottoman Sultan,
and private citizens like Shotaro Noda and Torajiro Yamada
tried to keep the national friendship alive and vital. Although
Japan and Turkey were destined to be on opposite sides of
both World Wars in the early 20th century, there was never
any animosity between them, but only the calculations of
national interests and European alliances. Some British planners
wanted Japan to send troops to Mesopotamia (Iraq) to fight
German and Ottoman troops in 1917, but the project was scrapped
due to concerns about what Japan might request later in a
postwar settlement. As for the Second World War, Turkey stayed
out of it until 1945, and didn’t play a serious military
role.
During the 1920s and 1930s, and then
beginning again in the 1950s until this very day, Japan and
Turkey maintained strong relations. Bilateral trade was never
very crucial due to geographical and economic constraints,
but, especially in diplomatic circles, a distant but deep
friendship was acknowledged and celebrated. Many Japanese
tourists go to Turkey, and Japan maintains a positive image
among most Turks. It has been noted as well that the Japanese
language and the Turkish language may be very distantly related,
and it is possible that in the pre-historic past, Japanese
and Turks were the same people living somewhere near today’s
Mongolia.
Japan provides considerable economic
assistance to Turkey. One of the bridges over the Bosphorus
was built with Japanese aid. Other infrastructure projects
have also been built, and some sister-city relationships
are maintained as well. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s
upbeat visit to Turkey in early January 2006 reaffirmed the
long-standing history of friendship between the two nations.
The Japan-Turkey friendship is something to be welcomed. The
bilateral relationship may bring a host of positive developments
for both nations. At the same time, there is something else
that is hardly ever noted -- not all of the effects of the
friendship are necessarily positive and constructive.
The clearest case regards the issue of Turkish Kurds.
The Turkish-Kurdish conflict has roots that go back to the
terribly-botched First World War peace settlement that caused
so many other conflicts in the century that followed. Both
the Turkish perspective and the Kurdish perspective are quite
understandable in light of history.
The Kurdish notion is that they were cheated by Turkey and
the European powers after the First World War. Instead of establishing
an independent Kurdistan in southeastern Anatolia, their land
was partitioned between four hostile nations: Turkey, Iraq,
Iran, and Syria. Kurds speak an Indo-European language related
neither to Turkish nor Arabic, although it is related to Farsi.
In Turkey and Iraq, in particular, the resulting conflict has
been intense at times, and tens of thousands of people have
died violently in both countries in recent decades. The point
of view of Kurdish political leaders is simple: We are a separate
people, and we demand a separate nation.
The basic Turkish view, however, is also understandable. At
the end of the First World War, they came dangerously close
to losing their own independence. Britain and France carved
away all of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and even
the Anatolian heartland was under threat. Greece laid claim
to the capital city of Istanbul and most of the Anatolian coast.
There was talk of an Armenia and a Kurdistan in eastern Anatolia
at the same time. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George
and Greece were happy to work together to essentially eliminate
Turkish power for all time and confine them to a subject status.
It was the great historical fortune of Turkey that at precisely
that time an extremely capable and intelligent leader, Mustafa
Kemal (Ataturk), arose among them to lead them to victory in
both war and peace, and helped his people to establish a reasonably
powerful nation in Anatolia. From the Turkish nationalist perspective,
talk of an independent Kurdistan smacks of the divisions and
humilations of the past. Ataturk had drawn the line: No more
partitions of Turkey.
As a result, there is no love lost between
Turks and those Kurds who want independence. The Turkish
media has described Kurds as “Mountain Turks” to deny their separate
identity, and also as “terrorists” to invite the
sympathy of Western observers. For their part, the Kurdish
Workers’ Party (PKK) launched a rebellion in 1984 that
led to the deaths of tens of thousands. In 1999, the leader
of the rebellion, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Kenya, probably
with covert American and Israeli assistance. Ocalan, with his
cold-blooded, dictatorial methods, and later attempts to save
his own skin, is not a very sympathetic character, but the
general idea of an independent Kurdistan remains the real goal
of many Kurds.
There is reason to doubt that Tokyo is very sensitive to the
history and the full scope of issues that are involved in the
Turkish-Kurdish conflict, but in a willy-nilly way, they have
taken sides. For example, a report from Zaman Online suggests
that Prime Minister Koizumi indicated during his recent visit
that Japan would freeze all assets belonging to the PKK in
solidarity with Ankara. Prime Minister Erdogan may also have
asked Koizumi to close down the Japan-Kurdistan Friendship
Association, which some Turkish sources claim is a terrorist
organization.
There is also the long-running issue of Kurdish refugees in
Japan, and their treatment by Japanese immigration officers
and courts. Since the mid-1990s several hundred Kurds of Turkish
nationality have come to Japan and applied for recognition
as refugees. In general, Japanese immigration authorities are
very reluctant to grant people such status, but in the case
of Turkish Kurds, the hard line has been taken to extreme lengths.
Ordinary Japanese citizens have signed petitions and offered
support to the mostly-Saitama-based Kurdish community. For
their part, Kurdish refugee applicants have protested, fought
endless court battles, and even gone on hunger strikes.
One of the most vocal of these refugees was Ahmet Kazankiran,
who led a sit-in at the United Nations University in Tokyo
in July 2004. It was said that he had once protested for ethnic
rights in Turkey and had been arrested and tortured. He told
the Japan Times: “The Japanese government has
never accepted a single Kurdish Turk as a refugee in deference
for its diplomatic ties with Turkey, and it is only UNHCR that
we can count on as the last resort… We will stay here
until the United Nations take effective steps to pressure the
Japanese government to do something for us.” In fact,
Kazankiran was able to obtain status from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as a “mandate
refugee” -- that is, a refugee recognized as such by
the United Nations.
None of that, however, stopped the Japanese
government from deporting the man and his eldest son back
to Turkey in February 2005. The reaction in some quarters
was scathing. Said the lawyer for Kurdish applicants: “We have reached a point
where we cannot expect the Justice Ministry to take appropriate
measures to protect asylum-seekers… This is an embarrassing
incident, internationally speaking. The Justice Ministry not
only ignored the U.N., but challenged and insulted it. This
action will no doubt stain Japan’s position in the international
community.” The UNHCR itself declared that the deportation
was “contrary to Japan’s obligations under international
law.” Even the Social Democratic Party, led by human
rights lawyer Mizuho Fukushima, issued a statement that Japan “has
neglected its duties to cooperate with the UNHCR.” Later
in the year there was another scandal in which it became known
that the Japanese government had passed personal information
about the Kurdish refugee applicants directly to the Turkish
government.
What all of this demonstrates is that
there may indeed be a darker side to Japan-Turkey friendship
as well. Because of Japan’s strong affinities with
the country, Tokyo may be inclined to look the other way
when it comes to allegations of human rights abuses in Turkey.
This may be especially convenient to Tokyo as many Japanese
are not particularly welcoming of non-Japanese immigrants
in any case.
The ideology of the “war on terrorism” is another
problem here. While it may perhaps be understood why Ankara
would insist that Kurdish activists are “terrorists,” it
would be a big mistake to accept that logic wholeheartedly.
Like the Serbs in Bosnia or the Russians in Chechnya or even
Apartheid South Africa against Nelson Mandela’s ANC,
it is far too easy for political repression to be disguised
as an eternal battle for national security against “terrorism.” Indeed,
the whole global ideology of the “war on terrorism” has
a distinct tendency to favor the international “haves” over
the “have-nots.” We ought not to slip into a frame
of mind that would save us from the ravages of independent
thought: Each political conflict must be judged according to
its own particular merits, and by the facts that can be established.
In sum, the history of Japan-Turkey friendship is an excellent
tale that has brought with it much that is good and admirable.
It will no doubt produce more benefits in the future as well.
At the same time, however, we must always be on guard that
hypocrisy and political convenience not be allowed to present
itself as goodwill among nations.
COMMENTARY
1) From Joseph Tomei of Kumamoto Gakuen University on January
20, 2006:
Not meaning to take anything away from all the information
that Shingetsu Newsletter No. 166 has, but would a discussion
of the anecdotal (perhaps some other members might know if
it is true or not) story about the wholesale name change from
'toruko' (turkish baths) to soaplands?
The story that I have heard (that I absolutely
do not vouch for) is that the Turkish ambassador was once mistakenly
taken to one by a Tokyo taxi driver instead of being taken to
the Turkish Embassy and the diplomatic outcry led to them all
being renamed. If the story is true (and if not, why the wholesale
name change?), it would present some more evidence for Japan
being very conscious of its relations with Turkey.