Newsletter No. 499
Editorial-Opinion
January 27, 2007

 

The following essay just appeared in The News International of Pakistan. It provides a Pakistani view of the recent changes in Japanese military policy set against the background of Japanese and East Asian history. Although he doesn’t say too much that is directly related to Japanese-Islamic relations, he does introduce a Pakistani frame of reference when he mentions Zia ul-Haq in the first paragraph. Additionally, he presents a clear view about Japan’s policy toward the Persian Gulf and Iraq in reference to the US-Japan security alliance.

THE RISING SUN
By Zarrar Khuhro

Those who consider it impossible for Japan to rearm would do well to read their history. It is not wise to place too much faith in Japan's pacifistic constitution because as our late, unlamented Zia ul-Haq famously remarked, the constitution is just a piece of paper. It can be rewritten, or simply torn up. Such is the tyranny of the present that few among us can picture Japan, home of Sony and Toyota as an aggressive power; but we must understand that pacifism is alien to Japanese history.

Traditionally, Japan has been a military culture that extols Bushido, the way of the warrior. Japan's pacifism is born of two great traumas, both unprecedented in Japan's history. One was the twin nuclear blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the other was the invasion and occupation of the Home Islands by a foreign power. Previously, the only other power that attempted an invasion of Japan was Kublai Khan's Mongol empire, and he was defeated every time he tried, the invasion fleets devastated by typhoons which the Japanese called the Kamikaze, the 'divine winds'. This led to a belief among the Japanese that their islands were protected by divine powers. In fact, even as the US Pacific fleet closed in on Japan, many believed that the gods would once more intervene. To the immense shock of the Japanese, there were no miracles… just the blinding flame of nuclear annihilation. Extreme traumas result in extreme reactions, and this is what took place in Japan. Having been defeated and occupied for the first time in history, and having been at the receiving end of the most devastating weapon ever designed by man caused the Japanese to turn their backs on centuries of militaristic thought and move in the opposite direction. But traumas do heal, and shock does eventually wear off. Once the Hiroshima generation has passed, there will be none to carry the torch of pacifism, or to remind the Japanese people of the cost of aggression.

Ironically, it was the US that took the lead in questioning the utility of Japan's pacifistic constitution. It was during the Cold War that US officials first toyed with the idea of a militarily powerful Japan as a regional counter to the USSR. It is now the war on terror that has given new impetus to the US desire to see an armed and assertive Japan as a regional ally. Note that it was in 2003, in response to a US appeal that Japan engaged in its first major overseas deployment by sending 1000 military personnel to Iraq. Now, with the US army demoralised and overstretched, and with the American public's appetite for foreign adventures at an all-time low, it will depend more and more on regional allies in order to maintain Pax Americana. In this context, the importance for the US of a well-armed Japanese ally in East Asia cannot be exaggerated.

From the Japanese perspective, re-armament is inevitable. East Asia is becoming an increasingly dangerous neighbourhood, and North Korea in particular is a cause of concern for Japan. The hermit kingdom has fired missiles over Japan, kidnapped its citizens and tested both ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. China is also an obvious cause of concern for Japan, as it continues its economic and military advancement. China views Japan with suspicion with good reason.

Finally, a reality check: Japan's military expenditure, while a very small percentage of the GDP, ranks it as 4th or 5th in world military spending. With growing regional threats, nuclear Korea and rising Chinese power and influence, Japan will inevitably have to arm itself in order to maintain its standing in East Asia.

The difference between Germany and Japan is that while both nations committed horrific atrocities, Germany has faced up to its past and undergone a process of reconciliation both within itself and with the victims of its aggression. Japan on the other hand remains in denial about the very fact that those atrocities ever happened in the first place. For example, a 1993 declaration of 'regret' over comfort women by the LDP government remains an object of controversy to this date, with many Japanese officials adamant that 'recruitment' of comfort women was voluntary and not coerced. The abuse of comfort women, though horrific by any standards, does not measure up to the wholesale massacres committed by the Imperial Army. Yet even admitting to this one abuse is very difficult for far too many Japanese. This level of denial does not bode well for the future direction of Japan.

With the teaching of Japan's wartime atrocities still a touchy subject in Japan, it will be very easy indeed for a future nationalistic government to sell the fiction that the Japanese invaded Asia in order to 'liberate' the natives from western colonialism. Any steps towards such an outcome will undoubtedly increase nationalistic sentiment in China, which in any case is in the process of an ideological transformation from a communist state to a capitalist one. For the future rulers of China, an alternative will have to be found to the unifying power of Marxist doctrine, and short of a new 'Son of Heaven' this appeal can only be found in nationalism. With a remilitarised Japan, still in denial about its past, it will be child's play for Chinese rulers to use nationalistic rhetoric in order to maintain China's unity.

Also, some may argue that for modern Japan, the economy is far more important than any hypothetical military adventures. This supposition is only partially correct. In the long-term, economic power cannot be maintained and expanded without military strength, and as a corollary, economic strength inevitable leads to military expansion. For Japan, which requires massive imports of raw materials a strong military capable of protecting supply routes is imperative. A future scenario involving a Chinese blockade of Japan will be an utter disaster for the Japanese unless they are capable of breaking such a blockade through their own military resources.

In fact, even simple interdiction of Japanese oil tankers will be sufficient to cripple the Japanese economy unless Japan has the resources and will to be able to exact a terrible price from would-be aggressors. In this context it again suits the US if the Japanese develop a naval power with a view to protecting trade routes to and from the Persian Gulf. Such a move would potentially curtail China's growing influence in that area while adding the forces the US can call to its aid in the Middle East. In the long-term of course, Japan's remilitarisation will inevitably lead to an arms race in East Asia, and eventually fulfill the American jingoistic fear of a China armed with modern weaponry that will be filched from Japan. The danger is that, with a new generation of Japanese in denial about their wartime atrocities, any economic downturn will result in a quickening of nationalistic sentiment etc. The danger is that while history does not repeat itself exactly, it certainly does rhyme, and the past is often echoed in the future. We have spent the last few decades being dazzled and amazed by Japanese technology and consumer goods, we may well be horrified in the future when the Japanese turn their undeniable brilliance and technological mastery towards weapons technology. The first major weapon system development by Japan will in all probability be in counter-technologies such as anti-missile and anti-ship systems, which the US will share in. The only no-go zone will be nukes but it is likely that Japan will progress in nuke tech to the point of being a screw turn away from a credible nuclear deterrent.