One of the four Shingetsu Directors, Shintaro Yoshimura of Hiroshima University, has forwarded his analysis and commentary on the recent presidential elections in Iran. His original manuscript is in Japanese, but I am providing a translation here. If there are any errors in this translation, they are my responsibility and not his.

REGARDING THE NINTH IRANIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

As Shingetsu Newsletter No. 27 has already mentioned, Iran has held its ninth presidential elections on June 17th and 24th. In Japan and internationally, these elections have garnered considerable attention. In covering the elections, not only the surrounding countries, but also from the BBC and CNN and Asian countries, about 400 reporters and cameramen flowed into the country. When the election was over, the “conservative hardliner” Ahmadinejad had won by a large margin and thus created anxiety among observers. He will succeed President Khatami, who was the standard-bearer of the reform forces and had served for two terms and eight years. When matched with the current conditions in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, doubts over nuclear development, and tense relations with the US, this event is regarded as having increased the degree of insecurity in this region and in the world.

Photo: Mahmud Ahmadinejad
Source: Unknown

The results of this election can be said to have defied most predictions. Although it is not possible to make a detailed analysis of these elections at the current juncture, I would like to offer some general comments in regard to the unexpected results of the election.

First of all, it is clear that disappointment with the Khatami government has caused the national support for the “reform forces” to ebb. However, in spite of that, the turnout at the polls was 63%, much higher than might be expected under such circumstances. Certainly, this was down from the elections of 1997 (79.9%) and 2001 (66.8%), but we must nevertheless consider why the turnout crossed the 60% mark. In this regard, we must first of all credit President Bush who, shortly before the election, called them “sadly consistent with [Iran’s] oppressive record,” based on his view that Iran promotes international terrorism and crushes domestic freedom. The effect that this had on the boycott movement cannot be overlooked. The leaders of the Iranian regime were able to use Bush’s statement as material to mobilize the vote and to credibly paint the boycotters as participants in an “American plot.” They asserted that the criticism was not just aimed at this particular election, but at the constitutional and Islamic nature of the government as a whole. They even declared that Iran was more advanced in comparison with America in that presidential elections are carried out by a direct vote in their own (religious) democracy, and not mediated by two great conservative political parties. Futhermore, the main religious leaders in Iran (Marja), such as Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Hossein Nouri-Hamedani, and Seyyid al-Shirazi have said that it is a Shia Muslim national duty to vote.

Other than Rafsanjani, the other candidates were a diverse list of relative unknowns. For that reason, it can be said that the 63% turnout rate reflected a simple kind of patriotism in the face of foreign pressure. Indeed, when I recently visited Iran, I often heard people explain their behavior by saying “I did it because I love Iran.” As a result of the election turnout, on the day after the elections (June 18th) one newspaper headline read “The Election Boycott is Defeated.” Also, Iranian leader Ali Khamenei declared that “The greatest victor in these elections is the Iranian people.” Thus the election results were interpreted by some as a humiliation for President Bush and his remarks about the deficiencies of Iran’s democracy.

The second point to be noted is that no candidate was able to achieve a majority in the first round of voting. That Rafsanjani would be one of the final two could come as no surprise considering his political experience and leadership skills. However, the fact that he would be facing Ahmadinejad in the runoff was something that very few would have predicted. The first round featured three candidates who could generally be called “reformers,” three “conservatives,” and one “realist.” That the votes would be broadly dispersed among these candidates in the first round was only natural. It is worth noting that both the “reform camp” and the “conservative camp” were unable to field a single representative, and that political struggles within these camps were ongoing. In the “conservative camp” was the young (44) and handsome revolutionary second-generation candidate Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who was thought to head the list. However, he ultimately fell to fourth place with only 4,070,000 votes (13.9% of the total). As for Rafsanjani, he received 6,169,000 votes (21.1%). Finally, Ahmadinejad, who had once seemed to be too radical and too unpopular, was able to receive 5,710,000 votes (19.3%).

The key to Ahmadinejad’s second-place finish were the results in the religious cities, especially Esfahan, where he received 800,000 votes (43.6%). He also did well in Mashhad with 378,000 votes (14.6%), in Qom with 256,000 votes (13.2%), and in the capital city of Teheran with 500,000 votes (9.6%). On the evening after the vote, June 18th, it appeared that the “reformer” Kharrubi would come in second place, as he was leading Ahmadinejad by 300,000 votes. However, in a very short space of time, Ahmadinejad passed above him, and Kharrubi fell out of contention. Ahmedinejad thus succeeded in spite of not being terribly well-known, and having no major political achievements credited to him. His success in this case depended on the support he received from the Islamic Revolution Devotees’ Society (Jamiyat-i Isargaran-i Inqilab-i Islami), but also from the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij (a volunteer paramilitary militia). Through these organizations, it is thought that the poor were mobilized in his support.

However, it cannot be denied that he gained the interest of the general voters in the late going. Both Rafsanjani and Kharrubi were pledged to continuing the Khatami reforms. These appeals to opening to the outside and economic liberalization were mostly targeted at the young and the middle and upper classes. Ahmadinejad’s message was quite different: he called for a return to the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, especially the elimination of corruption and the achievement of social justice. He made a strong populist appeal of a fair distribution of wealth to the mostazafin (the dispossessed) and the victims of war and natural disasters. Among many in the poorer classes, Rafsanjani’s call for a liberal economic system like the advanced industrial countries and the United States sounded like just another way to expand the gap between the rich and poor. In that respect, the shift of the common people to the support of Ahmadinejad is not so surprising. For Japan and most the outside world, positive change is seen as meaning the spread of freedom. In contemporary Iran, positive change is more regarded as being an improvement in one’s economic prospects. Ahmadinejad was able to tap into this appeal.

On the 24th the second round of the elections saw the face-off between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. If one viewed the election as a simple contest between “reformers” and “conservatives,” then Rafsanjani had a strong advantage. If all the “reform candidate” votes streamed to Rafsanjani and all the “conservative candidate” votes streamed to Ahmadinejad, then Rafsanjani should have had a solid victory of about 16,000,000 votes to 11,500,000 votes. However, in reality, the official count recorded a whopping victory by Ahmadinejad of 17,240,000 votes to Rafsanjani’s 10,000,000 votes. Clearly, Rafsanjani was not in fact able to channel all of the expected votes into his candidacy. He was viewed as being short on political ability and was negatively impacted by the perception that his relatives were mostly interested in amassing personal wealth. As for Ahmadinejad, he benefited from a perception that he was like the second coming of Mohammad Ali Raja’i, who had been assassinated by a bomb in 1981.

Anyhow, it is perfectly clear that Iran now faces an important turning point in its history. Sixteen years after the death of Khomeini, especially after eight years of the Khatami regime, we can predict a major change in Iran. The “conservatives” are now thought to control the judicial, legislative, and administrative branches of the government. We must watch the future development of the “reform forces,” who have just received such a stern judgment from the Iranian people. It will also be necessary to keep an eye on Ahmadinejad as he tries to tackle the issues of economic revitalization, the nuclear issue, and relations with the United States.

For Japan, with its involvement in the Azadegan oil development project and its effort to expand trade and other economic links, the impact of this presidential election is huge. At the same time, for Japanese diplomacy, if it is not to simply fall in line with American policy, this will be a time of testing. In this regard, Japan must pay attention to the popular will in Iran and not view matters through colored glasses. It is hoped that Japanese diplomacy will help to bring peace and prosperity through its contributions to Iran’s economic revitalization. When I recently made my short trip to Iran, all sorts of people, whether conservatives or reformers, made clear once again that they are pro-Japanese. With this fact in view, I hope that Japan will not simply react to daily events and seek only immediate profits, but rather will take a longer view and create a grand political design that will help our country build our relations with Iran and the other nations of the Middle East.