18 September, 2008 2:39 PM
Newsletter No. 36
July 14, 2005

 

JAPANESE RESPONSES TO THE LONDON TERRORIST ATTACKS

The time has come for a round-up of the Japanese responses to the July 7th terrorist attacks in London.

The attacks themselves certainly had the potential to have killed or injured Japanese citizens. At any time there are about 50,000 Japanese in Great Britain, of whom about half stay in London. In fact, however, there is little damage to report. At least one exchange student, Takayuki Kawashima, was riding on one of the trains that was bombed, but he was two cars behind the explosion and was unharmed. Several days after the attacks, it finally emerged that one Japanese woman was injured by flying glass that struck her face and hand, but her injuries were light. No Japanese businesses were affected either. That’s it as far as direct physical damage goes.

As for the immediate political reactions, they were in line with what one would expect. All five major political parties explicitly condemned the terrorist attacks in London. All the major newspapers did as well. However, differences were also apparent. Hardline commentators condemned the terrorism and demanded that Japan’s efforts in “War on Terrorism” should be strengthened. More liberal commentators also condemned the terrorism, but then went on to express concern or criticism of some aspect of government policy.

Prime Minister Koizumi led the charge as far as hardline responses went. He expressed his personal “deep anger” to a group of reporters in London. He said: “We must unite in continuing the war of terrorism.” From his perspective, this is fair enough. However, he then made the following, rather disingenuous comment: “This shows that there is no country that we can say there is no danger of terrorism.” The problem with this statement, of course, is that London has long been mentioned as a rather obvious target for al-Qaida-style terrorism, but Koizumi, for his own political reasons, seemed to want to suggest that the targeting of London was completely random (i.e. not related in any way to Blair’s strong support of Bush administration policy in the Islamic world).

Other hardline politicians made the expected hardline comments. The most flamboyant comment that was reported was that of Education Minister Nariaki Nakayama: “If we deny support [to the war on terrorism], we will become the laughing stock of the world.” Tony Blair’s theme of “civilization vs. barbarism” (which I thought Japanese commentators would be cautious about given the long history of civilization/barbarism narratives in Japan’s own relationship with the West), was in fact echoed by some. The Japan Times editorial, for example, didn’t shy away from it at all, and was remarkably violent in tone: “The perpetrators of the bombings in London on Thursday may claim to have some lofty purpose, but attacks on ordinary citizens are barbaric, pure and simple… the perpetrators appeared as cowards and have further discredited themselves and their so-called cause…” The Yomiuri Shinbun, for its part, hinted at a link between the issues of the London terrorism and the issue of nuclear development in Iran.

More liberal commentary did not focus on any single issue and was rather scattered in the issues it addressed. Unnamed politicians linked the London terrorism to the lack of progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Mainichi Shinbun worried that Japanese would gradually come to see the Islamic world itself as the enemy. The main opposition leader, Katsuya Okada, condemned the terrorist attacks, and then linked it to the issue of the GSDF deployment in Iraq: “I am concerned about the SDF in Samawa. The situation is becoming worse. I believe that with the ending of the water supply services their activities are becoming unnecessary. It is not acceptable for the SDF to be exposed to danger simply to show consideration for the United States. We strongly demand that an exit strategy be examined.”

Japanese officials and companies reacted to the terrorist attacks in a variety of ways. On the evening of July 7th, the Kantei, MOFA, and the Defense Agency all set up crisis rooms to collect information and to monitor developments. The efforts of the Kantei were under the authority of an official named Takeshi Noda and the MOFA crisis team was led by Hiroshi Fukada. Japanese citizens in London were asked to avoid any unnecessary travel on the day following the attacks. An official from the Kantei, perhaps Noda, suggested that Japanese branch offices in London could be potential targets of terrorism.

Back in Japan, efforts were stepped up to defend against possible terrorism. Justice Minister Chieko Noono stated the obvious when she declared, “Japan is among the targets of terrorism.” For those with a longer memory, it may be recalled that in a tape broadcast on al-Jazeera on October 18, 2003, Usama bin Laden had personally named Japan as one of six countries that he would target for their cooperation with the United States in regard to the Iraq War. The other five were Australia, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Spain—three of which have now been hit (i.e. the Bali, Madrid, and London attacks).

At ports and airports, as well as train stations and other such locales, security was tightened again. More officers were on duty and more security cameras were set up. Immigration officials have vowed to get tougher. Trash cans have been removed from train stations again to avoid any repeat of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist attacks of 1995.

Nevertheless, there were skeptics who felt that in the event of a real terrorist attack in Japan, officialdom would be unprepared. Makoto Asari of the Crisis Intelligence Co. told the Japan Times that “if a similar attack takes place in Tokyo, it is likely that the government will be thrown into chaos.” A more constructive suggestion was offered by Nobuhiko Suto of the Democratic Party of Japan: “The government needs to organize a department specifically to address terrorism, including analyzing terrorist groups, training experts, and dispatching officials to gather intelligence.”

 

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