JAPANESE AID TO SUDAN AND AFRICA

As reported in Shingetsu Newsletter No. 14, Japan has been showing a certain degree of commitment to aiding the political process in Sudan. In April 2005, Japan pledged US$100 million in ODA to Sudan at a donors’ conference in Oslo. On July 16th, the Japanese representative in Sudan, Yasushi Akashi, reconfirmed to the Sudanese government that Japan would stand by its earlier pledges.

In practical terms, Japan sent a joint MOFA-JICA delegation to Sudan in the last week of June in order to examine the most effective ways for Japanese aid to be spent. Yesterday, MOFA announced the first two programs related to these pledges. One of them relates directly to Sudan:

Grant Assistance for Underprivileged Farmers: Sudan

1) The Government of Japan has decided to provide 100 million yen (approximately 930,000 dollars) "the Grant Assistance for Underprivileged Farmers," (formerly known as "the Grant Aid for Increase of Food Production (2KR)") through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to help the conflict-afflicted people in the southern part of the Republic of Sudan. Notes to this effect were exchanged on July 26 (Tue) between Ms. Nobuko Matsubara, Japanese ambassador to Italy, and Mr. David Harcharik, Deputy Director General of FAO in Rome.

2) The Grant is to support the FAO project aiming at enhancing self-sufficiency capability in food production among internally displaced persons started to return to southern Sudan and the local residents who receive those returnees, following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached in January this year to end the conflict between north and south Sudan. FAO purchases grains seeds (sorghum, maize etc.), vegetable seeds (tomato, water melon etc.) and agricultural hand tools (spades, scythes) from local farmers in other part of the country, and provide them as "starter packs" with some technical guidance to 7,000 households of the returnees and the local residents. The project, which intends to bring people out of cycle of hunger by assisting returnees' own efforts to produce agricultural products, has specific importance in overcoming protracted food shortage and dependency of food aid.

3) The Government of Japan has expressed its commitment to support "consolidation of peace" in Sudan at the Donors' Conference on Sudan 2005 held in April this year in Oslo and announced its intention to provide a package of assistance totaling 100 million dollars for the time being. This Grant for south Sudan is a part of such efforts and also intended to support the new regime of Government of National Unity in Sudan launched on July 9. In the same context, Japan decided to provide food aid (530 million yen) for the returnees and the local residents in southern Sudan through the World Food Programme (WFP). In conjunction with the implementation of the FAO project, it is hoped that the Japan's assistance will contribute to alleviation of food shortage and enhancing self-dependency among the returnees and vulnerable people in local community, and thus contributing to regional stability.

The second program relates to a number of African countries, but Sudan receives prominent treatment:

Food Aid to African Countries through the World Food Programme

The breakdown of the food aid is as follows:

For returning displaced persons to the southern part of the Republic of Sudan and receiving local community

(530 million yen) [About US$5 million]

After some 20 years of domestic conflict between north and south in Sudan, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was reached in January this year, and 500,000 displaced persons scattered around Sudan have already started to return to the south. It is expected that another 750,000 people will return within this year. In addition, the harvest has been decreased drastically in the southern part of Sudan because of the drought last year, causing serious food shortage among returning displaced persons and re-integrating local communities; about two million people are in urgent need of food. This food aid will provide wheat and maize to the displaced persons who will be returning to the south from other parts of Sudan and to residents of local communities receiving the returnees. Consolidation of peace without reverting to conflicts is an important challenge not only for peace and development of Africa but also for stability of the international community. From this viewpoint, Japan has expressed its commitment to support consolidation of peace in Sudan at the Donors' Conference on Sudan held in Oslo in April this year and announced its intention to provide a package of assistance totaling 100 million dollar for the near term. This food aid for Sudan is part of such efforts and is also intended to support the new regime of the Government of National Unity in Sudan, launched on July 9, 2005.

Analysis

One thing that strikes me personally about these reports is that Yasushi Akashi is a rather high-profile representative to be sent to Sudan. Akashi is one of the most well-known Japanese diplomats when it comes to UN and humanitarian issues. He was also the first president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute. In theory, he should probably therefore be somewhat left-leaning in his policies and politics, but I’ve never been quite so sure of that. Some of the quotes I’ve heard from him over the years lead me to believe that he is basically just another conservative MOFA bureaucrat. Be that as it may, he does seem to be a well-regarded figure internationally, and his involvement in Sudan may be significant.

Some reports hint that Japan’s generosity to Africa at the current juncture may not be entirely unrelated to the negotiations between the G-4 and the African Union over the issue of UNSC reform.

COMMENTARY

1) From John Edward Philips of Hirosaki University on July 28, 2005:

Shingetsu Newsletter: Yasushi Akashi… does seem to be a well-regarded figure internationally, and his involvement in Sudan may be significant.

Philips: I'm not so sure about this. I know of Muslims who blame him for allegedly having been in charge of a conspiracy to exterminate Bosnian Muslims. I personally don't subscribe to any such conspiracy theories, but it is hard to regard his tenure in the former Yugoslavia as anything but a failure, whatever else he may have done as a diplomat for the United Nations. My impression is that Akashi seems to be better regarded inside Japan than outside. That may be symptomatic of Japan's disconnect from the outside world.

Whether Akashi's appointment impresses the Sudanese at all is irrelevant. He is well thought of in Japan, and the Sudan has little choice in the matter of his appointment. Any negative, or positive, repercussions will probably have to be seen from the development of Sudan's oil industry. What will Japan get? That is how we will know how the Sudanese reacted to his appointment.

Shingetsu Newsletter: Some reports hint that Japan's generosity to Africa at the current juncture may not be entirely unrelated to the negotiations between the G-4 and the African Union over the issue of UNSC reform.

Philips: Duh… When you see the Japanese bureaucracy get serious about African studies the way they have gotten serious about Middle Eastern studies in the past few decades, I will believe they are interested in anything more than UN votes.

Another thing you have to remember about Akashi's actions and attitudes is that it is axiomatic in Japan that ethnic conflict is natural and that all conflict is ethnic. The very real academic debate, in the outside world, about whether conflict is an ordinary aspect of ethnic relations, or whether it is contingent and provoked by political manipulation, simply doesn't exist in Japan. Whether Akashi is 'progressive' or 'nationalist' in Japanese terms is irrelevant to his thinking about conflict in the world outside. To him it will not be a result of political manipulation by elites, but simply a result of having different ethnic groups in proximity.

There was some interest in kyosei (symbiosis) a few years back, but I don't think it had much impact on the national consensus about ethnic conflict. The debate in the outside world is real, and I don't mean to imply that those who find ethnic conflict natural are necessarily wrong. I do mean to suggest that it is a problem that someone in the Ministry of Education seems to have made up Japan's mind for it, to the extent that it is impossible to disagree with the official position. Those who find ethnic conflict natural may be wrong or right; or the situation may vary on a case by case basis. But that should be decided empirically, not by fiat.

2) From Michael Penn of the Shingetsu Institute on July 29, 2005:

I'd like to respond to some of yesterday's comments from John Edward Philips:

Philips: When you see the Japanese bureaucracy get serious about African studies the way they have gotten serious about Middle Eastern studies in the past few decades, I will believe they are interested in anything more than UN votes.

Penn: I'm quite willing to admit that institutional support for African studies is much weaker in Japan than it should be. What I'm not quite clear about, however, is why you think that the Japanese bureaucracy is "serious" about Middle Eastern studies. Although there have been a few short-term projects like the Islamic Area Studies program a few years ago, in general I've been struck by the general indifference to Middle Eastern studies from official quarters.

How many people from MOFA or JICA or other departments can be seen at the annual meetings of JAMES? Why have the projects for building a national center for Middle Eastern studies failed three times? While there are indeed a few dedicated academics who have been trying valiantly to strengthen Middle Eastern studies in Japan, I have not seen much evidence that the Japanese bureaucracy -- or even business circles -- have taken much interest. Do you feel differently for some reason?

Philips: Another thing you have to remember about Akashi's actions and attitudes is that it is axiomatic in Japan that ethnic conflict is natural and that all conflict is ethnic. The very real academic debate, in the outside world, about whether conflict is an ordinary aspect of ethnic relations, or whether it is contingent and provoked by political manipulation, simply doesn't exist in Japan. Whether Akashi is 'progressive' or 'nationalist' in Japanese terms is irrelevant to his thinking about conflict in the world outside. To him it will not be a result of political manipulation by elites, but simply a result of having different ethnic groups in proximity.

Penn: Your point here is a fascinating one, and in my own experience I can see what you mean. Many Japanese do seem to oversubscribe to the idea that ethnic differences and/or ethnic conflict are simply natural. I can also see a cultural fascination with racialism in Japan that would be viewed with skepticism and even suspicion by most of the outside world.

However, I think that when you say that whether Akashi (or any other Japanese) is progressive or nationalist is "irrelevant," you are overstating the case. While many Japanese may share some common ideas about ethnic conflict, their attitudes toward how to deal with these issues are likely to be quite disparate. Many progressive Japanese feel differences with foreigners, and they respond by wanting to interact with them because they find it stimulating and exciting. Their goal is to build mutually constructive relations. I've even heard some Japanese complain that they don't like other Japanese because they are "boring."

Nationalists, however, often have a racialist sense of superiority toward foreigners. Unlike the progressives who want to lower cultural barriers, they want to raise them higher. Many Japanese conservative-nationalists are preoccupied with controlling change, and they view foreign influence almost like an infection that must be limited and contained. They don't want the infection to spread to the "pure" Japanese people. This is particularly important when it comes to issues like immigration and terrorism.

To sum up, I think that it does make a considerable difference to Japanese-Islamic relations whether a particular Japanese official is progressive or nationalist. It will affect the kinds of policies that they are inclined to propose. It also affects how they deal with Muslims on an individual basis.

3) From John Edward Philips of Hirosaki University on July 29, 2005:

Penn: I'm quite willing to admit that institutional support for African studies is much weaker in Japan than it should be. What I'm not quite clear about, however, is why you think that the Japanese bureaucracy is "serious" about Middle Eastern studies.

Philips: Only in a relative sense. There seems to be a general sense here that Japanese know everything they need to about the outside world, but that foreigners don't (or can't or won't) understand Japan. But I do know that Middle East studies in Japan has been growing much more than African studies has for several decades now. Statistics bear that out.

Penn: I think that when you say that whether Akashi (or any other Japanese) is progressive or nationalist is "irrelevant," you are overstating the case.

Philips: Quite possibly I am. In fact, I hope I am. But if you, or anyone else out there, has a better explanation for Akashi's failure in Bosnia than I do I would like to hear it. Right now, I think that Japanese assumptions about the outside world are not only wrong in many respects, they are potentially dangerous. If Japan really wants to take a permanent UN Security Council seat it is going to have to get serious about foreign language and area studies. Considering the fact that it is not an immigrant country, and therefore starts out far behind the United States in this matter, it is going to have to spend proportionately more on foreign language and area studies.

4) From Fred Uleman of Japan Research Inc. on July 30, 2005:

Disclaimer: I am not a Middle East expert. Indeed, I wonder if I even qualify as a Japan expert. But I live in Tokyo and try to pay attention. That said, I have one, perhaps tangential, point.

Philips: If Japan really wants to take a permanent UN Security Council seat it is going to have to get serious about foreign language and area studies.

Uleman: While getting serious about these things is an excellent idea, the desire for a UNSC permanent seat is not sufficient incentive. It should be clear to any rational observer that a permanent seat is out of Japan's grasp no matter what it does. The current five permanent members have vetoes. That includes China. And China, for one, is not going to do anything -- such as granting Japan a UNSC veto -- that erodes its own position. The idea of a UNSC permanent seat is bandied about and used to prod Japan to do this or that, but it is a never-to-be-realized aspiration and hence an ineffective prod once the Japanese government faces up to this reality. The desire for access to extractive resources has to be the incentive driving Middle Eastern / African language and area studies at this point. There has to be some within-reach tangible incentive for Japan, and the desire for a UNSC permanent seat is not it.

5) From John Edward Philips of Hirosaki University on August 2, 2005:

Uleman: It should be clear to any rational observer that a permanent seat is out of Japan's grasp no matter what it does.

Philips: Let's ignore the implication that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is irrational, and move on to the heart of this important comment.

Uleman: The desire for access to extractive resources has to be the incentive driving Middle Eastern / African language and area studies at this point.

Philips: This certainly should be a necessary and sufficient condition for even the most venal and corrupt elements in Japan to become interested in foreign languages and area studies. It does not, however, explain the growth in Middle Eastern studies and the relative stagnation of African studies, despite the greater variety of natural resources available in Africa. Many explanations are possible, but I would like to hear them from others. It may even be that MOFA and Japanese foreign policy are utterly irrelevant to this matter.

6) From Michael Penn of the Shingetsu Institute on August 6, 2005:

I had hoped that someone else might respond to John Edward Philips' thoughts, but since no one else took up his challenge, I guess that I will.

Philips: It does not, however, explain the growth in Middle Eastern studies and the relative stagnation of African studies, despite the greater variety of natural resources available in Africa. Many explanations are possible, but I would like to hear them from others. It may even be that MOFA and Japanese foreign policy are utterly irrelevant to this matter.

Penn: I don't have a quick and easy answer to the question of why Japanese universities have shown so little interest in studying Africa in spite of the fact that Japan does have some significant interests there in terms of natural resources, trade, and other matters. It seems to me, however, that the answer probably lies in the fact that most Japanese just don't take Africa very seriously in general.

The way that I would try to explain it is as follows.

In my experience, Japanese have a distinct tendency to view the world in hierarchical terms. Even in their own personal relations, subtle distinctions of hierarchy are an important matter. This is something that is built into the Japanese language itself, as speakers of Japanese are well aware. Also, even among relative equals there are small distinctions such as senpai-kohai and the like. On those occasions when I've observed Japanese university student clubs like ESS, I've been struck by how they seem to run it like a military boot camp.

I think that the same can be said of the common Japanese view of the outside world. They see international society largely through the framework of a hierarchy based on political power. This is probably as true inside MOFA as it is in the schoolyard. One result of this view is that Japanese usually expect those higher in "rank" to dominate and defeat those lower in "rank"-- like is often seen during a sumo basho when a Yokozuna faces a lowly Maegashira. That may go a long way toward explaining, for example, why Japanese political and business leaders seem to be greatly overestimating the chances that US policy in Iraq is going to eventually succeed.

As for Africa, Japanese seem to view these countries as being near the bottom of the international hierarchy. Indeed, I suppose that many Japanese see Africa as being only half-civilized. That being the case, most Japanese see no need to learn anything about Africa. After all, Japan is already at a much higher "rank" than those countries. Why should one study one's subordinates?

In one of my own classes, I make my students do presentations about various countries around the world. About two years ago, I remember an episode in which a group of students complained to me that I was making them study "minor countries." Perhaps that says it all.

7) From Fred Uleman of Japan Research Inc. on August 6, 2005:

I was also waiting for others to respond. So now that someone has, allow me… It should be clear to any rational observer that a permanent seat is out of Japan's grasp no matter what it does.

Philips: Let's ignore the implication that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is irrational, and move on to the heart of this important comment.

Uleman: Aside from the fact that even the MOFA and other commentators are catching on to the impossibility of this quest, I note that there may well be other, rational reasons for pursuing the impossible. For example, if a UNSC seat is accepted as an objective by other Ministries, this can lead to increased ODA spending, more budget for diplomatic missions, and a host of other collateral benefits for MOFA. Much the same as we know missile defense is not going to work but the military-industrial complex hypes it.

Philips: This… does not, however, explain the growth in Middle Eastern studies and the relative stagnation of African studies, despite the greater variety of natural resources available in Africa.

Uleman: But what is the awareness level on African resources? For over three decades, Japanese have been very much aware of the importance of the Middle East. The "A" in OAPEC was not, after all, for Africa. Plus, the political turmoil makes African resources seem less accessible and Africa thus a less important source. Thus for the most part, the priorities are elsewhere. It may be regrettable, but it is understandable.

7) From Keiko Sakai of the Institute of Developing Economies on August 10, 2005:

Everybody is wondering why Japanese policymakers don't study Africa, or why they are not so interested in areas such as this. In fact, there are a number of reasons. First of all, the regional bureaus within MOFA, such as the Middle East and African Bureau, have far less influence on policymaking in MOFA than some others. The North American Bureau is the most powerful, and its staff are the elite of the elite. It is often said that the China school sometimes tries to challenge this mainstream, but in vain (although there are many pro-China MPs such as Makiko Tanaka). The African school is at the bottom of this hierarchy. Mr. Penn is right to say there is a hierarchy, but it is not as simple as a senpai-kohai-type traditional patriarchal structure. It is clear that the "special relationship" with the US is the main factor that underpins this political hierarchy within MOFA.

Secondly, the African school within MOFA is not bound by a common language. Arabist diplomats can be united and join together in a certain policy (if they wish to do so), but most of the diplomats for African countries are French speaking ("Why do I have to be in Zaire although I wished to enjoy the fashionable life in Paris!") or English speaking ("I was pushed out of the elite course of the North American Bureau!"), and few of them are really area specialists.

Thirdly, the mainstream of African Studies in Japan is focused on natural sciences such as zoology (according to a colleague of mine), and students have difficulty finding attractive courses on modern African studies (especially in political science) in the universities. However, this situation is more-or-less the same as in Middle Eastern studies, or perhaps even worse. Only a few political scientists in Japan are teaching Middle East politics. On the other hand, MOFA often offers the post of senmon chosain (special research attaches) in their embassies, and they (that is, Arabists or specialists on Persian languages), after finishing their jobs in the embassies, can rarely find a job in academic institutions. They often end up working in research institutes such as the Chuto Chosakai (The Middle East Research Institute of Japan) or the Chuto Keizai Kenkyujo (The Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern Economies). MOFA and the other ministries rely more on these researchers than they do those from strictly academic circles.

The point is a that high interest in the Middle East on the part of MOFA or the Japanese government is not necessarily closely related to the development of Middle Eastern studies in Japan.

Philips: Japanese assumptions about the outside world are not only wrong in many respects, they are potentially dangerous. If Japan really wants to take a permanent UN Security Council seat it is going to have to get serious about foreign language and area studies. Considering the fact that it is not an immigrant country, and therefore starts out far behind the United States in this matter, it is going to have to spend proportionately more on foreign language and area studies.

Sakai: Yes, you are right. I am SO AFRAID that Japan is becoming more and more isolated from the outside world, and it seems similar to the pre-WWII Japanese Army that never listened to the words of the Japanese Navy, which had a more enlightened and cosmopolitan view. However, it is not just a matter of their ability of speaking foreign languages. I have repeated the same thing more than a thousand times to the public, and they still don't understand. Because of this apparent gap in understanding, I sometimes wonder if I'm really speaking in Japanese!

Seriously, though, (and what I am most angry at) is that Japanese have become more and more irrational, emotional, and illogical -- especially the younger politicians. This applies to Koizumi as well. They seem to lack the ability to consider the political situation rationally and logically. China will be our next-door neighbor forever, whether or not Japanese nationalists like them. Japan will never have enough military power to coerce China with military threats (as the US has done in the Arab world). Maintaining good relations with China is indispensable. This should be an obvious point. But, in spite of this, Japan (both the people and the policymakers) seem to enjoy inflaming the situation with their anti-Chinese or anti-Korean sentiments -- apparently only for fun! I really wonder why.

Philips: It is axiomatic in Japan that ethnic conflict is natural and that all conflict is ethnic.

Sakai: This may be a part of the reason that Japanese easily become irrational "nationalists." They have simple understandings (or misunderstandings) of the relationship between conflicts and ethnic diversity. However, my understanding is that Japanese academic circles used to be dominated by class-conflict analysis, rather that ethnic-conflict analysis, until about the 1970s. (At that time, most of the school teachers were on the political left.)

In fact, when I attended class at the American University in Cairo, I was a little bit astonished that most of the students (Americans as well as Egyptians) tried to explain the political conflicts in the Middle East from an ethnic viewpoint (i.e. Shia vs. Sunni; Druze vs. Maronite). Most Japanese scholars of the Middle East still prefer to analyze social and economic differences. However, I believe is that this leftist academic trend lost influence drastically in the 1990s, and people have naively introduced new ideas of ethnic conflict combined with traditional racist theories.

I really fear that this childish "nationalism" of the new generation of Japan can easily lead to a war with our neighbors.