Newsletter No. 1084
News-Analysis
July 20, 2008

 

SEARCHING FOR THE LOW-RISK PATH TO BOOST AID FOR AFGHANISTAN

Congratulations go out to Tobias Harris (Shingetsu Member No. 167), who quite accurately predicted almost a week ago that the Japan Self-Defense Forces would not be sent to Afghanistan at this juncture. He wrote his prediction on the 14th and then on the 18th the mainstream media came out with headlines like “No Japanese SDF Mission to Afghanistan.” Harris read the subtle signs and thus was ahead of the curve. Bravo!

New Komeito is being blamed / credited for the decision to drop plans for the SDF mission. While I would not want to deny that Komeito’s opposition may be a key factor, I also think that many inside the ruling LDP and the bureaucracy were also distinctly unenthusiastic about the proposed mission. Hanging the decision around New Komeito’s neck is probably, in part, a political convenience: The LDP can tell their hawkish constituents “It wasn’t our fault!” and Komeito can tell their more dovish constituents “Look what we were able to do for you!”

Apparently, the factfinders that Japan sent out to Afghanistan came back with a pessimistic assessment. They found that violence was increasing and that overall security was deteriorating. This poured cold water on some of the government’s desire to send the troops. However, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Takashita still denies that any firm decision had been taken: “As of now, the government has taken no decision on the possibility of sending Self-Defense Force personnel… We are considering various possibilities on how we could contribute in Afghanistan in the context of Japan’s policy to become a peace-fostering nation.”

Some of the current reports do inform us in clearer terms what kind of mission was being envisioned. The factfinding mission sent last month (which we noted in Shingetsu Newsletter No. 1050) visited not only Afghanistan, but also Tajikistan. The general idea was that the GSDF would deploy CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters and the ASDF would send C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The Defense Ministry, however, was dead-set against the CH-47 helicopter deployment in particular. These choppers fly at low altitudes and are thus vulnerable to attacks by surface-to-air weapons. Afghan insurgents have brought down helicopters many times in the past, and the Defense Ministry did not want to face the potential political consequences of such a scenario.

Pressure and requests for direct Japanese military involvement in Afghanistan have been coming from Washington and from NATO. It was American officials who specifically requested the use of CH-47 helicopters. As the Financial Times correspondent put it: “Washington is looking for ways to send more troops to Afghanistan in response to escalating attacks from Taliban forces. US officials in Tokyo have made no secret that they would like Japan to do more within, or even beyond, the constraints of the country's pacifist constitution.” The comments from NATO made it clear that a Japanese SDF mission would be “welcome,” but it does not appear that they have been lobbying Tokyo as aggressively and proactively as the US officials.

Robert Dujarric of Temple University in Tokyo was right on the mark with the following comment: “It may have dawned on them that Afghanistan is not a very safe place. The ideal operation for Japan is one where they get some credit from the US, but don’t put lives on the line.” That’s very much the point: While the hawks like Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura, some senior MOFA officials, and the editors of the Yomiuri Shinbun may be eager to send the SDF all over the world to demonstrate Japan’s physical commitment to the US alliance and their so-called “international responsibilities,” there are some rather serious political obstacles to be grappled with. Here is a list of five key difficulties:

1) They are operating in a political zone which is probably illegal under the Japanese Constitution, and is certainly well beyond the original spirit of the Preamble and Article Nine, Section Two.

2) They would have to write and pass a new deployment law that would probably have to be even broader and vaguer than the 2003 Iraq deployment law.

3) They would be putting Japanese lives at serious risk, and if deaths did result, they would have to explain it to a public that already does not view this administration favorably, and does not support this deployment.

4) The bill would probably have to be passed forcefully by once again overriding the opposition-controlled House of Councillors. This would put New Komeito under particularly heavy political strain.

5) Washington’s “expectations” of their Japanese allies have been rising since the Aegis deployment to the Indian Ocean and the Samawa mission. These rising expectations have been pushing the bar higher and higher in terms of what American officials regard as being an “acceptable” contribution from their Japanese allies. In other words, the more Tokyo has offered, the more Washington has been encouraged to demand more from them. Japanese leaders have yet to draw any clear lines showing the limits of their support for American military adventures abroad.

The issue of increased support to the Karzai regime, however, is not going to disappear. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura may have been overruled this time, but many in Tokyo are sympathetic to his basic concern: “We must consider seriously whether refueling alone is sufficient and the government is studying this matter from various perspectives.”

Also, whether John McCain or Barack Obama emerges as the next US president, it seems rather clear by now that no major changes in Afghanistan policy are contemplated. McCain has yet to draw out any significant differences between his policies and those of President Bush. Obama has just visited Afghanistan and a local leader commented: “Obama promised us that if he becomes a president in the future, he will support and help Afghanistan not only in its security sector but also in the reconstruction, development, and economic sectors.” Indeed, a President Obama is highly likely to actually increase US involvement in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) as he withdraws from Iraq. Beyond that, he seems to have fully embraced the War on Terrorism concept: “Iraq is not the central front in the War on Terrorism, and it never has been… We cannot tolerate a terrorist sanctuary, and as president I won’t.”

In November, then, the American public will have the democratic choice between voting for a candidate who supports the “War on Terrorism,” and a candidate who supports it. They will also have the choice between voting for a candidate who supports more military action in Afghanistan, and a candidate who supports it. Only their respective Iraq policies and their approaches to the use of diplomacy show a significant difference between the two candidates at this point.

So what remains for Tokyo? They will take a look at closer involvement with the joint military-civilian provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). The Japanese government will also be considering personnel support for the Program for Support of the Integrated Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). On June 18th, in fact, Tokyo already provided more than US$4.5 million in grant aid to the United Nations Development Programme in Afghanistan for Phase Two of the DIAG program. At the end of June, Tokyo also contributed US$2.7 million to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In short, the Japanese government has yet to find the low-risk path by which they can effectively signal to the world their enhanced commitment to Afghanistan, but they’ll certainly keep looking!