Newsletter No. 13
June 14, 2005

 

Two factors that are clearly growing in importance in analyzing the current state of Japanese-Islamic relations are Japan’s efforts to gain support as a permanent member of the UNSC and the growing sense of rivalry between Japan and China for energy resources. On Sunday, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun even intimated that Japan’s recent decision to boost spending on ODA is related to the issue of Japan-China rivalry.

Below, I post an article on Japan-China energy rivalry that has just appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle written by two Chinese graduate students, Ryan Ong and Huang Ping.

---

THE ENERGY GAME IN EAST ASIA
By Ryan Ong and Huang Ping

Late last month, Beijing played host to a second round of talks with Tokyo over the Chunxiao oil field near the two countries' disputed border in the East China Sea. Yet after three tense days of discussion, China and Japan could agree only on the possibility of a joint solution. The harsh tone of these negotiations hints at a new conflict in East Asia: energy.

China and Japan are already the world's second and fourth largest energy consumers, and their Asian neighbors are following in their footsteps. From 1965 to 1998, East Asia's energy use grew twice as fast as the world average, according to the U.S. Department of Energy. By 2025, it will consume nearly 30 percent of the world's energy. Energy security has become a major concern for many East Asian governments and an influence on their foreign relations. Oil security is behind Japan's involvement in Iraq and China's recent interest in Sudan, and it is no less influential in regional affairs. In an area rife with other issues, Chunxiao could spark a broader conflict.

How can East Asia address this problem? Attempts at strategic bilateral cooperation have a mixed track record in Asia, pockmarked by failures such as Sakhalin and the Spratly Islands -- subjects of sovereignty claims that remain unsettled, despite decades of intermittent bilateral negotiation. A perfect example: China, Japan and (to a lesser extent) South Korea have sought in recent years to cooperate with Russia in constructing oil pipelines from Siberia to the Asian coastline. The result, however, has been "pipeline politics," with the powers competing, not cooperating, to secure Russian oil.

As this experience shows, bilateral frameworks are a poor means to solve energy disputes that involve the strategic interests of multiple countries. East Asia thus needs a multilateral approach to break the current bilateral standoff. Considering the legacy of previous failed attempts, the region must take a careful approach, gradually constructing a comprehensive framework through a series of trust-building exercises:

-- Common price concerns need to be the first priority of regular meetings, which could decrease tension and increase Asia's collective bargaining power on world energy markets.

-- Technological cooperation would extend the life of existing resources and decrease energy imports.

-- Alternative energy sources, including nuclear energy and natural gas, currently provide less than 7 percent of China's energy, and are similarly underdeveloped in Southeast Asia. Japanese and Korean technology could eliminate this bottleneck.

-- Scientific cooperation, for the future, would break ground for new energy technologies and decrease R&D costs for individual countries.

After establishing a steady dialogue on these "softer" issues, participants should set up a mechanism to discuss and resolve resource disputes and resource sharing.

East Asia will still find it difficult to break out of its traditional "zero-sum" mindset about energy security. Current institutions, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's Energy Working Group and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Meeting of Energy Ministers, are small in scope and limited in effectiveness. They often advocate abstract, nonbinding agreements and produce little tangible progress.

To break through these current patterns, then, Asia needs a concerted American effort. The United States can only lose in a regional energy conflict, both in terms of rising oil prices and the pressure to choose sides. For the United States to play a positive role, it must formulate -- and persist in - - a policy robust enough to draw the region's powers to the negotiating table but sensitive to Asian conditions.

East Asia has begun taking its own steps toward multilateral cooperation. In June 2004, ASEAN energy ministers, as well as those from Japan, China and South Korea, met in Manila to establish principles for a joint emergency oil reserve. They also agreed to a five-year action plan on energy cooperation, including a common power grid and a trans-ASEAN gas pipeline. Initial progress, including on projects in Vietnam and Laos, will be reviewed next month in Cambodia. In March, representatives from Chinese, Filipino and Vietnamese oil companies signed a joint agreement to explore oil resources in the South China Sea. Though this trilateral agreement is hardly comprehensive, it sends a clear message that East Asia is examining other options to address the coming crisis.

These may be "baby steps," but they are toddling in the right direction: toward greater cooperation in East Asia. As China and Japan discuss plans for a third round of talks, and as the rest of East Asia seeks to respond to the most recent energy dispute, they must think beyond the short-term and work toward a long-term cooperative solution.

Ryan Ong and Huang Ping are master's candidates in international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and Fudan University, respectively, studying at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in Nanjing, China. Their co-written piece claimed first prize in the Hopkins-Nanjing Center's 2005 Fei Yi-ming Essay Competition.