Newsletter No. 19
June 20, 2005

 

The following analytical piece has been contributed to the Shingetsu Newsletter by David Adam Stott. Mr. Stott is a Lecturer in the Department of International Relations at The University of Kitakyushu. He specializes in the applied political economy of civil war in Southeast Asia, and has concentrated so far on the civil conflicts that affect Muslims in Indonesia’s Aceh province, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines.

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JAPAN AND INDONESIA BOOST MILITARY TIES AS SHIP ARRIVES IN JAKARTA

On 21 May, 2005, a report by Antara, the official Indonesian news agency, was carried by the website of the Indonesian newspaper Media Indonesia mentioning that Japan is to provide several patrol vessels to deal with piracy in Indonesian waters. As the world’s largest archipelago, Indonesia is particularly vulnerable to piracy and consistently records the world’s highest rates of such incidents. The Antara report indicated that a Japanese team had already arrived in Indonesia to evaluate what types of patrol ships are necessary. This preceded the visit to Japan of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) on 31 May - 3 June, 2005.

On 7 June, 2005, a Marine Self-Defence Force (MSDF) spokeswoman revealed that the 5,200-ton Yashima, equipped on board with a surveillance helicopter and “regular arms,” left Yokohama for Jakarta, where Japan and Indonesia are to carry out their first joint drill. The ship is scheduled to arrive in Jakarta on 21 June, following a stop in Sorong in the easternmost province of Papua for a joint drill on how to handle a major oil spill. Sorong, mistakenly reported as being in western Indonesia, is a fading oil town in the Bird’s Head area of northwestern New Guinea, and home to a monument commemorating the Japanese war dead from World War II. It is not clear whether the MSDF forces will have time to visit the attractive beaches and islands nearby.

In recent years, Tokyo has become increasingly strident in voicing its desire to strengthen bilateral security cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the region’s vital sea lanes. However, this is by no means a new phenomenon; one of the purposes of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to protect oil shipments from Indonesia to Japan. Today approximately 80 percent of Japan’s oil supplies come from the Middle East and have to be funneled through the narrow Malacca, Lombok or Sunda Straits, of which Indonesia is the custodian.

In addition to the obvious interest both have in protecting shipments of Middle Eastern oil, Indonesia and Japan are, respectively, the world’s largest exporter and importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG). This synergy is exacerbated by the fact that LNG consumption in Japan has increased markedly in the last decade and looks set to continue to do so in the future. Indonesia currently supplies about 36 percent of Japan’s LNG needs, followed by about 19 percent from Malaysia. In addition, Indonesia is the world’s biggest exporter of plywood, again followed by Malaysia, largely fuelled by Japanese investment which initiated the timber boom in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo). That Japanese and Indonesian interests often coincide is underlined by the fact that Indonesia is the largest recipient of Japanese ODA and was, for much of the 1990s, the foremost recipient of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Asia. Given the large volume of Japan-bound traffic through Indonesian waters it is understandable that the Marine Self-Defence Force is concerned to protect Japanese investment using the sea lanes, with some 20 percent of ships transiting the Malacca Straits estimated to be Japanese owned.

The Antara report of 21 May appeared the same day that Singapore hosted 14 navies for the first joint sea exercise of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, whose 18 members include Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Tonga, the United States and Vietnam. Fifteen ships, in addition to a number of maritime patrol planes and helicopters, carried out two days of manoeuvres in the South China Sea to ascertain how well their ships and aircraft work together. Japan has been among the prime movers in the Symposium.

Whilst Singapore and Japan began joint training exercises and patrols in Singapore in July 2001, Indonesia and Malaysia have been more reluctant. Thus, Jakarta’s decision to allow Japanese patrols of its sovereign waters is slightly surprising. Indeed, just on 7 June, 2005, Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono reiterated his opposition to joint patrols with neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore, and referring to Japanese and American offers of joint patrols was quoted as saying, “If certain advanced countries want to assist, it is advisable that it be in the form of capacity building, not military forces or warship deployment.” However, the Antara report quoted Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Slamet Soebijanto as saying that, “We welcome all foreign aid in securing the Malacca Straits, as long as it is not in the form of military force.” So, do Japanese patrol ships not constitute “military force”? Regardless, it must be noted that government officials contradicting each other in public has been a common feature of Indonesian politics since the fall of Suharto in May 1998.

So why did Jakarta change its mind on this issue? Indonesia badly needs renewed foreign investment to kick start an economy still reeling from the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. Naturally, Jakarta looks to Japan given the two countries economic ties and previous high levels of Japanese investment. Furthermore, the Indonesian agreement to allow patrols is probably linked to FTA talks between the two countries, with Jakarta trying to add impetus to the discussions with greater security co-operation.

More broadly, Indonesia is also seeking to enhance military cooperation with a number of countries with a view to modernising its armed forces and reinforce its territorial integrity in the midst of ongoing separatist struggles and communal violence in outer provinces such as Aceh, Papua, Maluku and Central Sulawesi. For example, on 18 May 2005 Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono held talks with his visiting Dutch counterpart Henricus Grogorius Joseph Kamp on bilateral military cooperation, while it was revealed that Indonesia has ordered submarines from the Netherlands with delivery scheduled for 2007. In addition, the Netherlands also wants to supply spare parts and provide repair and maintenance services for its F-27 and F-28 fighters, which are being used by the Indonesian Air Force. Previously, in October 2004, Defence Minister Juwono was quoted as saying, “We will explore all other countries for arms supplies, such as Japan and Eastern Europe.” This followed recent weapons procurement from Russia, Singapore and South Korea in response to the ongoing US embargo on military aid imposed in the wake of the violence that accompanied the East Timor referendum in August 1999.

Indeed, Indonesia’s primary goal is the resumption of military aid from Washington and this was high on the agenda when SBY left Japan for the United States on the second leg of his recent international tour. The killing of American citizens at the US-owned Freeport mining operation in Papua in August 2002 has provided more reason for the U.S. to maintain the embargo, and greater incentive for Jakarta to seek both alternative suppliers and other avenues to overturn the embargo. Thus, enhanced bilateral security cooperation with Japan at a time when relations between Tokyo and Washington are said to be an ‘all-time high’ can only benefit the realisation of this goal, and greater military ties with other American allies such as the Dutch can be viewed through the same lens.

As for Tokyo, besides the deterrent that the Japanese patrols hope to send to maritime criminals there are other political expedients behind this decision. Firstly, Japanese diplomats are busy canvassing support for United Nations Security Council reform that will allow Japan to obtain permanent membership. Strained ties with China and South Korea place greater emphasis on gaining support from other Asian nations, and Indonesia remains the most important player in ASEAN, traditionally a bastion of Japanese influence. Second is the intensifying rivalry with China over political and economic influence throughout the Asia-Pacific. In November 2004 it was reported that China agreed to support Indonesia renewing its military capacity, and mutual cooperation in other fields, such as energy, fisheries and agriculture, is increasing. Secondly, the recent seizure by pirates of the Japanese-owned and registered tugboat Idaten, and the abduction of its Japanese captain and chief engineer along with a Filipino deckhand, has highlighted the sense of piracy risk, with Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura himself heading a crisis task force to get the hostages back. It appears that high-level intervention has finally convinced Jakarta that its military and economic interests are best presently best served by yielding on the sensitive issue of joint-patrols in Indonesian waters.

 

Sources:

AFX News Limited, “Indonesia against joint patrols of Malacca Strait,” 7 June, 2005

Antara, “Japan to Provide Vessels to Assist Indonesia with Malacca Strait Security,” Media Indonesia website, 21 May, translated from Indonesian by BBC Worldwide Monitoring Reports, 23 May, 2005

Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Singapore to host 14-nation sea exercise,” 19 May, 2005

Fabiola Desy Unidjaja, “RI, China to boost cooperation,” The Jakarta Post, 6 November, 2004

Thai Press Reports, “Indonesia and Holland Intensify Military Cooperation,” 23 May, 2005

The Jakarta Post, “Indonesia to seek weapons from Eastern Europe, Japan,” 25 October, 2004

The Standard (Hong Kong), “Rumsfeld in unity call on strait pirates,” 7 June, 2005