Newsletter No. 26
June 26, 2005

 

TENSIONS HIGH OVER SAMAWA MISSION

More information has come out regarding the attack on the GSDF convoy in Iraq. As for the event itself, it occurred on June 23rd at a little past 9 am local time. The convoy consisted of four vehicles carrying 20 men, including a few MOFA officials. They were traveling along a road they frequently use to attend a ceremony marking the completion of some local road construction. The attack occurred at a location about 5 km east of the GSDF camp. It appears that a small remote-control bomb was used to strike the third vehicle in the convoy. After the attack, the GSDF personnel retreated inside their camp and have been ordered to stay there for at least a couple of days.

The reaction in Tokyo was very panicky at first. As the Yomiuri Shinbun put it, the event struck “like water poured into their sleeping ears.” Predictably, however, Koizumi responded by saying that Japan “is not considering” a pull-out from Iraq. Defense Agency Chief Yoshinori Ono also tried to play down the incident by emphasizing that the explosive was very small. The three opposition parties, for their part, renewed their calls for withdrawal. Said DPJ leader Katsuya Okada: “Although we have said before that Samawa is not a non-combat zone, this has now become perfectly clear. We ask again: For what purpose have the SDF been sent? They should be brought home at an early date.”

The local Iraqi authorities have tried to be helpful. Governor al-Hasani of al-Muthanna, a strong supporter of the GSDF mission, is worried that the Japanese might leave. He asserted that “the attack had nothing to do with the local people” and must have been the work of outside criminals.

The local police have tried to help the investigation in their own keystone cop sort of way. Japanese members of the convoy said that they saw a man wearing black pants running into a small house a few hundred yards away from the explosion. When the local cops investigated, they found the house empty, but discovered three guns inside. The locals also have arrested up to 15 vagrants whom they suspected may have had something to do with the attack. Many are justifiably dubious about the effectiveness of these efforts by the local police.

A November 2004 Asahi Shinbun public opinion poll found that more than 80% of the local people in Samawa are grateful for the Japanese reconstruction efforts. The majority reaction in Samawa seems to be concern that the attacks may cause the Japanese to leave. Although there has been some disappointment with the perceived small scale of the Japanese reconstruction efforts, a clear majority in the local area supports them and wants them to continue.

On the other hand, signs of disaffection by a minority are also apparent. Since their arrival in Samawa, there have been at least nine non-lethal attacks on the GSDF:

April 7, 2004: A trench mortar attack near the GSDF base
April 29, 2004: A trench mortar attack near the GSDF base
August 10, 2004: A trench mortar attack near the GSDF base
August 21, 2004: A rocket attack near the GSDF base
August 23, 2004: A trench mortar attack near the GSDF base
August 24, 2004: A trench mortar attack near the GSDF base
October 22, 2004: A rocket attack lands inside the GSDF base
October 31, 2004: A rocket attack lands inside the GSDF base and damages a storage facility
January 11, 2005: A rocket attack lands inside the GSDF base

Since January there have been no attacks on the GSDF base, but other small events have occurred. For example, in late April a man threw a rock at a GSDF vehicle. Similar incidents have occurred several times since then. Also, graffiti has been written on walls near roads in both Arabic and English. One of these messages slandered the Hinomaru, the Japanese flag, although the Japanese newspapers are not reporting exactly what was written. Attacks outside the camp are harder to defend against.

Some, like Governor al-Hasani, have attributed these attacks to outside criminals. That appears to be the line pursued by the local police as well. Others have pointed to large-scale unemployment in the area, and suggest that angry local workers may be involved in the attacks. Still others note the presence of many local supporters of the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and suggest that they may be behind the attacks.

The al-Sadr forces have made clear their opposition to the Japanese presence in Iraq as they view the Japanese as part of a foreign “occupation army” in their country. After the attack, a representative of the Asahi Shinbun went to the local offices of the al-Sadr party and asked them about this latest attack. The response was as follows: “We do not welcome the Japanese forces because they are one member of the occupation. Although we could attack them if we wanted to do so, we have decided to seek change through political means and not military means.” They have thus denied involvement in the attack.

On the 24th, as the Japanese public was just digesting news of the attack, it was revealed in Tokyo that the United States has asked Japan not to observe its December 2005 deadline and to extend the GSDF mission into next year. The majority within MOFA, as usual, seems to be counseling that Japan must accept the American request in order to maintain the good health of the US-Japan alliance. However, the Defense Agency is said to be much more cautious about this, and may put up a political fight.

The grounds for the Defense Agency’s caution are not hard to perceive. First of all, despite the small size of the deployment, the Defense Agency’s resources are being stretched by the mission. More than that, the Defense Agency has gained considerable political stature in the last couple of years, and a fatal attack on the GSDF could undermine much of their political gain in one stroke.

Indeed, that’s why the Bush administration’s request is moronic even from the perspective of narrow US interests. They seem to lack any perception about how politically fragile support for the Iraq mission really is in Japan. Even one bloody attack could cause a major political fiasco. Koizumi has already pushed his luck on this issue to the breaking point. The Bush administration now seems to want to push him over the edge. Clearly, they have little clue about the nature of contemporary Japanese politics, and lack sensitivity to just how much Tokyo has already risked on supporting US policy in Iraq.

INTERVIEW WITH IRAQI AYATOLLAH

Academic-Journalist J. Sean Curtin (Shingetsu Member No. 30) has published an article at Asia Times Online that offers a balanced analysis of the convoy attack. He pays due attention to Japan’s constitutional and public opinion constraints.

In this connection, Mr. Curtin was kind enough to forward a transcript of his complete interview with Ayatollah Sheikh Ahmad Kadhum Sadkhan Al-Bahadeli, a major Shia religious figure in Najaf. Ayatollahs do not often grant interviews with journalists, so it is a rare chance to catch a glimpse of how at least one Iraqi Shia religious leader views the GSDF mission in Iraq. As it turns out, he is a supporter of the mission and his ideas reflect that of the majority of the local population. The interview took place on June 1st:

Sean Curtin: Japanese people are mainly Buddhists or followers of the Shinto religion, so many feel they can act as a relatively neutral party in Iraq and other areas of the Middle East. This is because for Japan there is not the same religious friction that there is between the region's three great faiths, Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Do you have a view on this?

Ayatollah Sheikh Ahmad Al-Bahadeli: We have nothing to fear from the Japanese or their religion because it is a matter between themselves and the Lord.

Sean Curtin: The deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq on a humanitarian mission was quite controversial because of Japan's war-renouncing Constitution. What is your view on the dispatch?

Ayatollah Sheikh Ahmad Al-Bahadeli: I do not have any problem what so ever with it.

Sean Curtin: What kind of impression do Iraqis have of Japan?

Ayatollah Sheikh Ahmad Al-Bahadeli: The Iraqis have a great respect for the Japanese and regard those who have come to Iraq highly. This is because they did not come to Iraq as part of the Coalition. The Japanese only came to Iraq as part of the mission to reconstruct the country and build up our infrastructure. They have already done a lot of goods things and improved the situation.

Sean Curtin: Can you give me an example?

Ayatollah Sheikh Ahmad Al-Bahadeli: Since they started offering services and assistance to the city of Samawah, they have done an excellent job there. One particular scheme comes to mind. They started an ingenious initiative to help clean up Samawah and get rid of all the city's rubbish. In my home city of Najaf, we have hundreds of street workers who are employed to clean up the city, yet still the streets remain pretty dirty. On the other hand, the Japanese came up with a really clever plan for Samawah to solve the same problem. What they did was tell the locals that we are going to buy rubbish and waste from you. They said give us trash and we will give you cash. When people heard about this scheme, they started competing with each other to gather as much rubbish as they could, and in a short space of time the city was amazingly clean. Iraqis think this was a really brilliant idea for solving a serious problem. While it may not seem so important to people in the West, for Iraqis cleaning up the environment is an important issue. This example illustrates that we are getting real benefits from the Japanese presence and we really appreciate their efforts.


Sources:

Asahi Shinbun, “Samawa Bakuhatsu—‘Shukushuku to Junbi Susumeru’—Jiki Haken no Rikuji Dai-4-shidan (The Samawa Explosion: The Next Group, the 4th GSDF Division, ‘Solemnly Continues Preparations’),” Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Asahi Shinbun, “Samawa Rikuji Sharetsu Waki de Bakuhatsu—Sharyo Hason Kogeki no Kanosei Dai (An Explosion as a GSDF Convoy Passes—The Damage to a Vehicle Was Probably an Attack),” Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Furumoto, Yoso, et al., “Samawa de Bakuhatsu—Seifunai ni Kikikan (An Explosion in Samawa Creates a Sense of Crisis in the Government),” Mainichi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Japan Times, “U.S. Urges Longer GSDF Role in Iraq,” Japan Times, June 25, 2005.

Kagaya, Kizuki, et al., “’Rikuji Narata Kanosei’—Shukueichigai Keibi Muzukashiku—Sharetsu Waki de Bakuhatsu (‘A Possibility That the GSDF is Targeted: It is Difficult to Patrol outside the Camp: An Explosion as a Convoy Passes),” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Kawakami, Yasutoku, et al., “Rikuji Sharetsu Waki de Bakuhatsu—Beigun Nayamasu Rokata Bakudan (An Explosion as a GSDF Convoy Passes: The Roadside Bombs That Worry the American Army),” Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Kyodo News, “Samawa Bakuhatsu Chokugo, Fuban-na Otoko—Sharetsu no Rikuji Kankeisha Mokugeki Tososaki Minya de Buki Haken (Just After the Explosion a Suspicious Man Was Seen: According to a Member of the GSDF Convoy, Weapons were Found in the House that He Fled to), Yomiuri Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Kyodo News, et al., “Samawa ‘Senryogun’ ni Tekii mo (There is Also Enmity for the Samawa ‘Army of Occupation’),” Mainichi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Mainichi Shinbun, “Samawa Rikuji Butai Tettai ‘Kangaenai’—Koizumi Shusho (Prime Minister Koizumi is ‘Not Thinking About’ Withdrawing the GSDF from Samawa),” Mainichi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Nihon Keizai Shinbun, “Rikuji no Sharetsu Waki de Bakuhatsu—Samawa Shukueichigai de Hajime—Taiin Keganashi (An Explosion as a GSDF Convoy Passes: The First Time for Such an Event outside of Camp: No One is Injured),” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Nihon Keizai Shinbun, “Samawa Bakuhatsu—Shusho, Jijitsu Kyumei o Shiji—Boeicho Chokan ‘Keibi o Zoin’ (The Samawa Explosion: The Prime Minister Instructs That the Facts be Investigated: A Defense Agency Official Says That ‘Guards Will Be Increased’),” Nihon Keizai Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Nukihora, Kimihiro, et al., “Rikuji Sharetsu no Chikaku de Bakuhatsu—Iraku Chian Akka no Itto (An Explosion Near a GSDF Convoy: Iraqi Security is Steadily Deteriorating),” Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Nukihora, Kimihiro, et al., “Samawa Bakuhatsu Kanyo o Hitei—Sadoru Shiha Jimukyoku (The Sadr Faction Office Denies Involvement in the Samawa Explosion),” Asahi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Takino, Takahiro, et al., “Rikuji Sharetsu Chikaku de Bakuhatsu (An Explosion Near a GSDF Convoy),” Mainichi Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Yanagisawa, Koyuki, et al. “Samawa Rikuji Sharetsu, Bakudan de Hason (A GSDF Convoy in Samawa is Damaged by a Bomb),” Yomiuri Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Yomiuri Shinbun, “Rikuji Narai? Samawa de Bakuhatsu—Anzen Taisaku Tettei e—Tettai Jiki ni Eikyo mo (Was the GSDF the Target? An Explosion in Samawa—Complete Attention to Security Measures—There is also Influence on the Time of Departure),” Yomiuri Shinbun, June 24, 2005.

Yomiuri Shinbun, “Samawa Bakuhatsu—Rikuji Dai-4-shidan wa Reisei—8-gatsu ni mo Haken ‘Junbi Susumeru dake’ (The Samawa Explosion: The GSDF 4th Division is Calm: They Will Depart in August ‘Only Making Preparations’),” Yomiuri Shinbun, June 24, 2005.