Newsletter No. 303
News-Analysis
June 14, 2006

 

BEIJING NOW HOLDS THE KEY TO JAPAN-IRAN RELATIONS

The Washington Post has run an article that seems to have clarified many of the issues that have perplexed us in regard to the sanctions issue and the Azadegan issue. In the final analysis, it seems that the key to the future of Japan-Iran relations is now held by none other than the Chinese government.

First of all, it should be noted that Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Eraqchi came to Tokyo and met Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the 9th. He also had an extended discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister Tsuneo Nishida, whom we may therefore surmise is a key official in regard to Japan’s policy on the Iran nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, we don’t really know what was said at these meetings, but they do give further evidence of how much Tokyo-Tehran discussions have been intensifying of late.

Another report has US Treasury Secretary Snow prodding Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki about the possibility of Tokyo imposing financial sanctions on Iran in cooperation with whatever new “coalition of the willing” that Washington can drum up. This is said to be the very first time that Washington has requested Tokyo’s participation in sanctions in cabinet-level discussions.

But the real material of interest comes from a Washington Post article published yesterday by Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer. If the Post has gotten the story right, then many of the gaps in our knowledge about what is really going on may have just been filled in.

First of all, the story suggests that Washington is losing the battle to keep Tokyo on board with its Iran policy: “Despite months of pressure from Washington, Japan has become increasingly reluctant to join a Bush administration plan for sanctions against Iran if negotiations fail to resolve concerns over the country's nuclear program, Japanese and U.S. officials said Monday.”

We have already seen some hints of this in previous Shingetsu newsletters, but this report is a strong confirmation about our suspicions that Tokyo hasn’t been buying Washington’s line.

We have also noted here that Japan has been sidelined from the main discussions over the Iran nuclear crisis. In this regard the Post article notes: “Japan is smarting about being largely left out of negotiations with Iran even while it is being asked to make the largest potential sacrifice. A new proposal -- including incentives for Iran to open its nuclear program that have somewhat brightened the prospects for a negotiated settlement -- was presented to Tehran this month by a club of nations comprising the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China.”

This is very interesting. The clear suggestion is that Washington has miscalculated their approach to Tokyo over this issue. We may surmise that the Bush Administration was upset by Japan’s investment in Azadegan in February 2004, and may have decided to “punish” Tokyo by keeping them out of the main negotiations over the nuclear crisis. However, this strategy has now backfired because it has made Tokyo less willing to go along with sanctions. Note that Germany -- which also has no UNSC veto -- was included in the main nuclear talks, but not Japan, which is much more heavily invested in Iran, and is in fact said to be Tehran’s largest trading partner in the world.

So where to go now? Note the following passage from the Post article: “Japanese officials have said that while they have deep concerns about Iran's nuclear program, they worry that aggressive sanctions could create a foothold for China. Viewed by Japan as its prime competitor in the global energy market, China ranks just behind Japan in consumption of Iranian oil.”

We can therefore posit two likely possibilities, if the facts in this article prove to be true:

1) If Beijing does not support UN sanctions against Iran, then Tokyo will not join any American “coalition of the willing” for sanctions. They will not sacrifice their own economic interests and watch China clean up the field.

2) If Beijing does support UN sanctions against Iran, then Tokyo would have less to fear in this regard, and would be willing to join a sanctions regime.

Thus, oddly, it is Beijing that now holds the key to the future of Japan-Iran relations.

One final question that the Post article may have resolved regards the landmine issue: “Inpex has so far postponed full-scale development work, citing a dispute over the number of land mines to be cleared from a drilling area that is estimated to contain reserves of about 26 billion barrels of oil. But sources familiar with the project have also described the delay as an effort by Japan to buy time -- to ensure that progress is made in the nuclear standoff before the Japanese company pumps hundreds of millions of dollars into the project.”

Therefore, it seems that Tehran’s complaint that Inpex has been deliberately dragging its feet on this project is indeed rooted in reality. Inpex has been moving slowly mainly for political and not technical reasons. We have suspected that before, but now there is some firm evidence.

Congratulations are due to the Washington Post for finally reporting what the Japanese media seems to have been more hesitant to report. If everything in the report is true, then the picture has become much, much clearer.