Newsletter No. 310
News-Analysis
June 18, 2006

 

With this newsletter, we are launching a new series called “China Report,” which will track large developments in Chinese-Islamic relations, and then consider the possible implications of these events for Japanese-Islamic relations. China is becoming too big of an independent factor in Japanese policy to ignore.

Actually, I would prefer it if another Shingetsu member would take charge of this series. I’m spread pretty thin just tracking Japan, and it would be better if some other (or others) would write the China Report in the future. Is there one of you who would like to write a newsletter on the implications of Chinese policy for Japan about once a month? If so, let me know and I will provide more detailed information.

CHINA REPORT: BEIJING TIGHTENS LINKS WITH THE ARAB WORLD THROUGH HAMAS POLICY
By Michael Penn

On May 31st and June 1st, China hosted representatives of twenty-two Arab nations for a large and important meeting. The gathering was the second event of “China-Arab Co-operation Forum Ministerial Meeting,” and was held in the Great Hall of the People as part of a celebration of fifty years of China-Arab ties. The first Forum meeting was held in 2004.

In his opening address, Chinese President Jintao Hu spoke as follows: “This year marks the 50th anniversary of relations between China and the Arab region. We want to jointly and resolutely build on the experience gained over the last half century... and pave the way for future relations and further develop co-operation in all areas.”

State Councilor Jiaxuan Tang then noted, “China and the Arab countries should take advantage of their economic complimentarity and keep intensifying, expanding and enriching our co-operation. It is advisable to increase dialogue and co-operation in the energy area and establish a long-term and stable relationship of mutually beneficial co-operation in our joint effort to maintain the stability of the global energy market.”

China receives about 44% of its oil from West Asian and North African nations.

One of the goals announced at the Forum was to double the volume of China-Arab trade by 2010. Currently, China’s trade with the Arab League states is said to stand at US$51.3 billion.

Lebanese Foreign Minister Fawzi Sallukh was also quoted in the Chinese media as saying, “China is a great country. The relationships with China are full of chances and possibilities… I'll take the opportunity to express my appreciation to China for dispatching a battalion to join in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).” This shows the multifaceted nature of current Chinese involvement in the region.

In regard to the issue of terrorism, their joint communique contained a statement to the effect that, “China and Arab states condemn terrorism in any form and oppose the association of terrorism with any particular nationality or religion.”

In regard to the nuclear issue Arab League Secretary-General Amr Mussa pushed the idea of establishing a “nuclear-free zone” in the region, and stated, “It is not a nuclear issue of Iran, but a nuclear issue of the Middle East.” This was an indirect but unmistakable reference to Arab concerns about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, and their annoyance that the United States uses its power to keep that issue off the international agenda.

The various parties agreed to hold the third Forum in Bahrain in 2008.

The main point of interest for our purposes was the decision by Beijing to allow new Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmud Zahar, a member of Hamas and, according to the Associated Press, a “hard-liner,” to join these proceedings. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official explained, “We do not agree with Hamas’ policy, but we do respect the choice of the Palestinian people. We are urging the Palestinian government to recognize Israel and return to negotiations with her.”

When this Chinese decision was announced in mid-May, Israel called in the Chinese ambassador and handed over a formal note of protest. Reportedly, the note objected to granting legitimacy to the “Hamas terrorist government,” found it unacceptable that a diplomat on Israeli soil had contacts with “terrorist elements,” and then said that this action “harms Israeli-Chinese relations.”

Foreign Ministry spokesman Jianchao Liu responded in Beijing as follows: “I think it is natural and normal for two countries to have differences on some issues. But we don't think our bilateral relations will be undermined anyway by this issue… According to the usual practice of the China-Arab Forum, we have issued invitations to all members, including Palestine. Palestine has made its decision as to whom they will send to China. We respect the decision made by the Palestine… We value our relations with Israel and we would like to continue to move forward the friendly relations between China and Israel.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry also announced, "China does not favor political isolation and economic blockade [of Palestine]. But at the same time we urge Hamas to renounce violence, recognize Israel and accept agreements already reached… We will take the opportunity of the visit of Foreign Minister Zahar to explain our principled position."

On June 1st, Liu also noted that Beijing has “never labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization.”

Implications for Japan

There can be little doubt that leaders in Tokyo -- especially the China Hawks -- must be very uncomfortable with these latest Chinese moves. Not only is Beijing positioning itself to compete strongly for energy resources in the Arab world, but is also making political noises that would generally go down well in the Arab world, though not in Israel.

Beijing does not want to take any radical political steps, but they are sending out messages that they are the most “reliable” great power as far as the Arabs are concerned. In such a way, they may find themselves the “economic partner of choice” in the region so long as Washington continues striking its hard-line, unbalanced pose in that region.

Leaders in Tokyo like former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto -- and even the Japanese Foreign Ministry -- seem to be aware of the dangers, but Prime Minister Koizumi and the rightwing ideologues that he has now surrounded himself with seem to be much slower on the uptake, believing that a strong US-Japan relationship will ultimately guarantee everything they need.

We have noted earlier in the Shingetsu Newsletter that Tatsuo Arima did put some small distance between Tokyo’s policies and those of Washington at the time of Hamas’ electoral victory, and that this won Japan some popularity in Palestinian circles for a time. By April, however, Tokyo seemed to be backtracking from this independent policy, presumably under pressure from Washington. The current status of Japan’s policy toward new aid projects in Palestine is a study in ambiguity.

In contrast, a Chinese spokesman announced on June 1st that, “the Chinese government has always been closely following the humanitarian situation in Palestine, and will continue to offer humanitarian assistance to Palestine within our capacity.”

If Tokyo plays the game only within the narrow limits set by Washington, while Beijing feels somewhat freer to move outside those limits, then it is not too difficult to see which one of the two main East Asian powers will eventually gain more respect and affection in the Arab and Islamic world.