Newsletter No. 533
News-Analysis
March 2, 2007

 

CHINA REPORT: XINJIANG

We have recently touched on Japan and Xinjiang in a recent newsletter, and so it was with interest that I recently read two reports on this western Chinese region: one written by Martin I. Wayne of National Defense University, which appears to have been first published by the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); and the other by Daniel Allen, a freelance writer and correspondent for Asia Times Online. At the conclusion of these reports, I will add a few thoughts about their implications for Japan’s Central Asian policies.

AL-QAIDA’S CHINA PROBLEM
By Martin I. Wayne

Al-Qaida has a China problem, and no one is watching. Despite al-Qaida's significant efforts to support Muslim insurgents in China, the Chinese government has succeeded in limiting popular support for anti-government violence. The latest evidence came on Jan. 5, when China raided an alleged terrorist facility in the country's Xinjiang region, near borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. According to reports, 18 terrorists were killed and 17 were captured, along with 22 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and material for thousands more. Chinese reportage on terrorism is notoriously problematic, at times imprecise, or simply fabricated. For the skeptics, photos of the policeman killed in the raid were also released, showing emotional relatives amid a sea of People's Armed Police paying their final respects. Ironically, China's ability to successfully kill or capture militants without social blowback demonstrates the significant degree to which China has won the population's "hearts and minds," however begrudgingly.

China's successful efforts to keep the global jihad from spreading into its territory present a real challenge for al-Qaida. The organization reportedly trained more than 1,000 Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic group that is predominantly Muslim, in camps in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. In late December, al-Qaida's number two, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, called for action against "occupation" governments ruling over Muslims, including reference to the plight of Uighurs in western China. Yet despite this commitment of resources and rhetorical energy, Uighurs across Xinjiang's social spectrum explain that violent resistance is no longer a viable path. Many Uighurs in Xinjiang believe that insurgents worsen Uighurs' plight by making the Chinese more fearful, thereby more repressive. Uighurs today increasingly participate in the Chinese system as local government and Party officials, educators, informants, and police.

Since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, China has been confronting the self-described threats of "extremism, separatism, and terrorism" in its Alaska-sized Xinjiang region in the country's far northwest. Where the region was once predominantly populated by Uighurs, this group is now a minority in its own "autonomous region." The perception of economic discrimination as well as resentment at Chinese rule have helped fuel a low level insurgency in Xinjiang for nearly two decades. Local men who traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets returned home with new skills and attempted to ply their trade. Young Uighurs were inspired by the power of men, armed with Allah and AK-47s, to defeat a superpower.

Political challenges in Xinjiang took many forms: some Uighurs worked for greater autonomy, others for greater political freedom or democracy, and still others sought secession from China. As in many similar situations with Muslims fighting against local regimes, al-Qaida reportedly attempted to lend support by training fighters and funding a local affiliate, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Uighur groups fighting against Chinese rule assassinated local officials and engaged in bombing campaigns that reportedly included a 1997 explosion outside Zhongnanhai, the enclosed compound in Beijing where China's top leaders work. This period was separatism's high-water mark. The massive 1997 Yining riot involving over 1,000 Uighurs, in which over 150 reportedly died from security force excesses, has not been repeated. While there has been ongoing low-level violence in Xinjiang since 9/11, Chinese government claims that this is the result of Uighur separatists are suspect.

China's initial actions were brutal, and credible reports of security force excesses and torture persist. However, success came as China reduced the brutality of its repression and pulled the military out of direct confrontation with society. China built up more restrained, effective, and specialized police forces and tactics and reinvigorated political and educational projects in Xinjiang. The Chinese government purged separatist sympathizers from local governments and attempted to remove political dissent from religious worship. At the same time, availability of Uighur language education was broadened and Beijing sought to expand economic development in Xinjiang, which was viewed as the key to success. Uighurs in Xinjiang repeatedly explained in interviews that these changes made participation in the Chinese state more attractive, despite perceptions that economic opportunities primarily benefited the Chinese.

After an initial period of repression, China has used political means to keep the insurgency in Xinjiang to a remarkably low level. Beyond simply killing or capturing suspected insurgents, China has created a path for young U-ghurs -- one achieved through participation in the system rather than fighting it. China's proactive approach, reshaping society from the bottom up, has been so successful that much of the current debate centers on whether China really confronts a serious threat of terrorism in Xinjiang.

Zawahiri's call to arms in late December and the People's Armed Police raid in early January highlight what some China-watchers miss in reading the latest Chinese defense White Paper: despite China's more confident role on the world stage, its primary concern is still internal security. The English language China Daily argued that the January raid in Xinjiang is a "wake-up call that the threat of terror is not only clear and present but more dangerous than ever."

The raid in Xinjiang upon a group taking mining explosives and building IEDs represents a threat similar to the attacks of Madrid and London: home-grown individuals, radicalizing, building weapons with supplies at-hand. Yet the most important fact is that China was able to stop this group before it acted. According to government reporting, security forces have repeatedly interdicted arms and disrupted plots in this county, while insurgents have not recently been able to carry a single plot to fruition. This success is partly due to China's ability to provide an alternative path for Uighurs which limits their willingness to support or tolerate violence.

The contrast between China's project in Xinjiang and U.S.'s actions in Iraq is stark: where China realized that local politics was a key factor for strategic effectiveness, the U.S. has focused on targeting an ever-growing pool of insurgents and terrorists. China's ultimate success in frustrating al-Qaida's designs on Xinjiang rests upon its recognizing and responding to the political nature of the threat.

A VITAL PLACE CALLED XINJIANG
By Daniel Allen

BEIJING -- Strategically situated in the heartland of the Eurasian continent, the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang is no stranger to the vagaries of international trade and the machinations of major world powers.

In the latter half of the 19th century, Russia and Britain played out part of their "Great Game" in Xinjiang, each vying for supremacy in the no-man's land between the Russian and British empires through espionage, intrigue and political brinkmanship. Further back in time the region was a vital link in the famed Silk Route, crisscrossed by thousands of kilometers of mercantile arteries facilitating the omni-directional flow of goods, thoughts and cultural identities.

Today, Xinjiang finds itself once more a key pawn in a game of geopolitical chess, and the stakes are higher than ever. Well-worn trade routes bearing heavily laden camel caravans have been replaced by multi-lane tarmacked highways and serpentine pipelines. Bustling market towns with legendary names such as Turpan, Kashgar and Yarkand increasingly cater to foreign tourists and upwardly mobile traders from neighboring states looking to cash in on the Chinese economic miracle.

China's energy plans for the early 21st century were unveiled at the 2000 National People's Congress. The focus was on construction of a now-functional 4,200-kilometer east-west network of gas and oil pipelines running all the way from Xinjiang to Shanghai. Last May, oil was pumped directly into Xinjiang from Kazakhstan for the first time, along a recently completed 960km cross-border pipeline.

When fully functional, this pipeline will carry 20 million tons of Kazakh oil a year, accounting for 15% of China's imports for 2005. It is just part of a 3,000km project that aims to join China to the Caspian Sea, thereby removing the need for China's Middle Eastern oil supplies to navigate several potentially risky sea lanes.

Driven by the need to sustain a booming and energy-hungry economy, the Chinese government has made securing access to the largely untapped reserves of oil and natural gas in Central Asia a cornerstone of its economic policy for the next two decades.

Exploitation of energy resources close to home is essential if China is to reduce its reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas -- at present Iran alone accounts for about 15% of China's oil imports. Energy deals by Chinese companies in politically sensitive areas such as Iran and Sudan have done nothing to ease Sino-US relations, and recent US attempts to contain these regimes have directly challenged China's energy-security policies. The need to secure a safe oil supply is the major driver in Chinese thinking toward its western neighbors.

China's ever expanding pipeline network has the potential to bring about a significant strategic realignment of Xinjiang and the adjacent region. Central Asia, with its huge reserves of oil, gas and minerals, has already seen some sharp rivalry among the United States, Europe and Japan. All of the major powers, in conjunction with multinational corporations, are seeking to secure alliances, concessions and possible pipeline routes in the area.

Oil and gas pipelines to China from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could easily be extended to link into the pipeline networks of both Russia and Iran. This model has been dubbed the "Pan Asian Global Energy Bridge" -- a Eurasian network of pipelines linking energy resources in the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia through to China's Pacific coast. A major part of the old Silk Route is inexorably turning into the "Black Gold Route" of the new millennium.

Despite its geographical proximity, China has played only a marginal role in Central Asia for the past century. Economically, politically and culturally the Central Asian states were firmly locked within Russia's sphere of influence. The breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence in 1991 brought radical changes, however, including the opening of the "Bamboo Curtain" to the East. Shuttle traders bringing consumer goods began to fan out across the region, then came big business and senior politicians.

Beijing has set up trade missions in every Central Asian country, invested in local enterprises and infrastructure projects, and donated money to aid organizations. The Chinese government has also raised the profile of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which aims to promote the joint interests of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Across Central Asia increasing numbers of Chinese shops, markets, products and traders pay testament to Beijing's deliberate and well-orchestrated foreign and economic policies. In addition to its role as a conduit and supplier of fossil fuels, Xinjiang is experiencing rapid growth in cross-border trade, and the autonomous region has become a bridgehead promoting China's economic and trade ties with Central Asia and Russia. Trade between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan in 2005 was valued at more than US$6 billion, accounting for 73% of the total trade between the two countries, and it is predicted that the value of all Xinjiang's foreign trade will top $9 billion this year.

China and Kazakhstan are in the process of establishing a free-trade zone, uniting 13 square kilometers of northwestern Xinjiang (Port Korgas) with a smaller area of Kazakhstan near Almaty. With new rail lines, highways and an international trade center under construction, the aim is to create an industrial hub that will further stimulate the multilateral flow of goods and services. A second border trade zone was opened last March at Jeminay -- Xinjiang currently has 16 "land ports" open to foreign traders and business people.

With Xinjiang bordering eight countries, the Chinese government is also working to encourage international trade in a southwesterly direction. A new highway is under construction across the Taklamakan Desert from Alar to Khotan, and China and Pakistan have recently agreed to open four new road links through the Khunjerab Pass, doubling the number of overland routes between the two countries. The Chinese government is also planning to build several new highways into Nepal from Tibet, to supplement the existing Kodari Highway and increase access to northern India.

Last July 6, the border between India (Sikkim) and China (Tibet) at Nathu La was opened to trade for the first time in 44 years.

China's trans-border highways are no longer mere conveniences for the People's Liberation Army, but instruments for the expansion of Chinese economic influence into the subcontinent, breathing new life into the former Silk Route's southern branches.

The huge Chinese infrastructure investment in Xinjiang has been accompanied by a boom in tourism. The increasingly accessible Taklamakan dunes, snow-covered mountains, clear glacial lakes, fabled oasis towns and distinctive Uighur culture are proving a major drawing card for both foreign and Chinese tourists.

According to the Xinjiang Tourism Bureau, the region received 88 tourists and earned $46,000 in 1978. Last year it hosted more than 310,000 overseas travelers and recorded a foreign-exchange income of nearly $91 million, a 1,000-fold increase. Tourism-related turnover exceeded 11.6 billion yuan ($1.4 billion), accounting for 5.3% of the autonomous region's gross domestic product. One-day travel packages, especially from Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, have become increasingly popular, and a growing number of visitors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are also being attracted by Xinjiang's scenic landscapes.

In the next five years, to consolidate tourism as one of its pillar industries, Xinjiang will step up efforts to promote a range of activities such as mountain hiking, resort skiing and desert trekking, as well as further developing tourist-related infrastructure. It is hoped that international air routes between the regional capital Urumqi and Japan, Hong Kong and Europe can be opened in order to increase accessibility.

So, what does the future hold for Xinjiang? Aided by lavish government pump-priming, a major resettlement program has made this unlikely backwater the richest provincial-level region outside China's coastal capitalist belt. Ways of life are changing across the autonomous region, and changing fast.

Under a long-term program announced in 1999 to develop the west, Beijing poured $30.7 billion into Xinjiang, with the current five-year plan calling for an additional $51 billion. The Chinese government is aware that only intelligent investment coupled with enlightened social policies and a genuine concern for the environment will support Xinjiang's multiple roles as a thriving trade axis, center for tourism, and crucial energy gateway.

IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPANESE CENTRAL ASIAN POLICIES

Wayne’s essay begins with the dramatic and startling theme of al-Qaida in China, but much of what he says in the body of the report suggests that, not only al-Qaida, but violent insurgency among Uighurs in general, is well under control in China, and does not present a very serious threat, in spite of some isolated incidents. If Wayne is correct that the majority of Uighurs (who are not even a majority in Xinjiang as a whole) now feel that non-violent avenues of participation in Chinese society are expanding, then one wouldn’t expect the issue of Uighur insurgency to ever become a very serious issue for Japanese policy either.

Allen’s report is more suggestive for our purposes because he views the role of Xinjiang from a much broader perspective than that as a potential security threat. He even mentions Japan a couple of times.

A few points stand out.

First of all, China’s effort to establish a “Pan-Asian Global Energy Bridge” through Xinjiang is clearly of considerable interest to Japan should it come to fruition. Currently, all East Asian countries receive the lion’s share of their oil through the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Malacca Straits. If China should be successful in establishing direct pipeline linkages with Central Asia, the Caspian, and even Iran, then this would have a major impact globally.

As for its specific impact on Japan, I have found that at least one other writer has previously addressed this question, however briefly. Sergei Trouch, writing in 1999 for the journal of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution, suggested that the establishment of such a “Pan-Asian Global Energy Bridge” would possibly lead to a closer Japan-China alignment and a weaker US-Japan alliance. He wrote as follows:

“China is reasonably confident that its involvement in an international pipeline network would facilitate Japanese and Korean investment in China's internal pipelines. These pipelines, while connecting Xinjiang with the eastern provinces, would eventually become an important link in the overall chain... China's position at the center of the "Pan-Asian Global Energy Bridge" would provide a very important advantage in the refining process, with China's coastal regions serving as the refining link between Middle Eastern and Central Asian crude oil, and the Asian-Pacific markets... One possible tendency might be growing economic and security cooperation between China, Japan, and Korea. It is clear that all three countries have strong a strategic interest in the benefits of continental access to Middle Eastern and Central Asian energy reserves. The compatibility of all three countries' interests in this energy route is obvious. It has already brought Japanese companies -- regardless of their anxieties over transportation dependency on China -- to jointly participate with the Chinese in Central Asian energy projects… Another possible development stemming from these events, as well as from the decreasing importance of the sea-routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, could be the eventual reshaping of the basic security arrangement between the United States and Japan. Japan, feeling that the sea-routes of the Asia Pacific are less vulnerable, while relying to a greater degree on the stability of its ties with China, might be interested in a less binding set of military commitments in its alliance with the United States. As Ikuro Sugawara, a leading Japanese strategic thinker working for the Japan National Oil Corporation (JNOC) has stated, “the new Asian players, including countries such as India and China, will compete fiercely for stable oil supplies and may insist on views different from those shared by the United States and Japan. Japan -- which is an integral part of the Asian market and is as dependent as its neighbors on the Middle East for oil -- will not be able to follow the US line as closely as it has in the past.”

Trouch and Sugawara’s forecasts of how such pipelines would affect Japanese foreign policy represent only one possibility, and don’t seem to acknowledge how the nationalist trend in Japan would cut against this scenario. Then again, they were speaking in 1999 when Japan-China relations were not actually all that bad. These were the pre-Koizumi years in the relationship.

Returning to Allen’s report, his accounts of the tightening economic links with Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and the rest, are also significant for our purposes. The Shingetsu Institute has been following the development of “Central Asia Plus Japan” rather closely. At various times, we have seen that some analysts have asserted that competition with China is one of the main sources of Tokyo’s growing interest in Central Asian matters.

Clearly, China is at a major advantage with Japan in this region, especially if Xinjiang develops as a bridge between these Central Asian countries and the China coast. Allen’s point that 73% of China’s trade with Kazakhstan is based from Xinjiang seems significant. The fact that Beijing is pouring billions into the economic development of Xinjiang, and wants to establish free trade zones also catches the eye. One wonders if half-hearted efforts by Japan’s Foreign Ministry can really match this level of Chinese investment in Central Asia -- especially as the years go on.

Finally, Allen’s paper notes that air routes between Japan and Urumqi may develop in the future. If Japanese tourists begin pouring into Xinjiang in greater numbers, this may have some impact on Japanese-Islamic relations in more unpredictable ways.

For example, some years ago there was a Japanese man in Kitakyushu who opened a Uighur-style restaurant that I used to patronize. Sadly, it later went out of business. However, if Uighur culture should become better known in Japan, perhaps this may influence the local cultural scene in other ways as well.