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16 June, 2006 1:28 PM
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| Newsletter
No. 286
The following article has been translated by the Shingetsu Institute from the March issue of Gaiko Forum, a journal of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The author is associated with a public policy thinktank and is billed as a specialist on terrorism and crisis management. In the body of the text he provides some useful information about Japanese victims of terrorism. His discussion of the civil liberties implications of his proposals is predictably thin -- to the point of non-existence. However, the information that shocked me the most came toward the end. Apparently, in its new laws to deal with terrorism, the Japanese government has made little or no effort to answer the all important question of “Who is a terrorist?” What was Tokyo’s approach? They have just borrowed the lists of the US and British governments, and have made no independent analysis of their own! Apparently, they are entirely unaware that defining a terrorist group is itself a highly politicized matter, and has serious implications.
HOW SHOULD WE CONFRONT TERRORISM? A CONSIDERATION OF
JAPAN’S TERRORISM POLICIES People are increasingly worried about terrorism that is happening on a global scale. Even though such terrorism is called international terrorism, it often has regional characteristics. Therefore, Japan needs original terrorism measures that take into account the differences with Western countries. Trends of Recent International Terrorism Terrorism is caused by groups such as Islamic extremists all around the world, even after 9.11. In Jakarta and Bali, in Indonesia of Southeast Asia, terrorist bombings have happened four years in a row, seemly carried out by Jemaah Islamiya (JI). The train bombings at Madrid, Spain, in March 2005, and the subway bombings in London, England, in July 2005, were also shocking to Japan. However, when these cases are analyzed, it turns out that they were led by local terrorist groups or individuals. For example, it was reported that the Madrid train bombings were carried out by a group in which Moroccan terrorists were in the lead. All four of the criminals of the London subway bombing on July 7, 2005, had British nationalities, and three of them -- excluding one who came from Jamaica -- were second-generation citizens from Pakistan. Like this, the new type of terrorism and their supporters are appearing one after another in each country and region, and it is becoming more difficult to discover their identities under these circumstances. Their existence is thought to be much more threatening from now on. The Evaluation of the Threat in Japan I heard the speculation in the news about “New York to Madrid to London -- and next might be Tokyo,” when the London bombings occurred. However, we need to recognize that the circumstances of Japan and Western countries have different conditions. At first, I need to point out that London wasn’t specifically targeted on July 7. Of course, the timing was probably adjusted to the summit talks in Britain, but London has been the target of terrorists for a long time. Britain has prevented lots of terrorism like the ricin incident in January 2003, Heathrow terrorism, and chemical terrorism on the London underground. Still, it wasn’t able to prevent the incidents on July 7 and 21. Mr. Stephens, the ex-Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Department said, “The London investigators have prevented at least eight cases of terrorism” (Mainichi Shinbun, online, July 11, 2005). Also, he had a press conference with Mayor Livingstone on March 16, 2004, when he was still the incumbent (right after the Madrid train bombings on March 11), and warned, “We have prevented terror attacks, but it is not certain that we can keep preventing them hereafter.” Additionally, he revealed in December of last year that there were ten attempted terror attacks which targeted London after 9.11, and two of them were after the terror attacks of July 7 (BBC News Online, December 26, 2005). Such a situation is the same in other Western countries, and the authorities of places including New York, Paris, and Rome have prevented several terror schemes. These metropolises have always been targeted. It would be untrue if I say that Japan has experienced no terrorism attacks or plots which were related to organizations like Al-Qaida. On December 11, 1994, a bomb exploded on Philippine Airlines 424, which had left Manila for Narita via Cebu, and was then above the open sea south of Okinawa. In this incident one Japanese national died and the plane did an emergency landing. It turned out that it was committed by Ramzi Yusuf, the criminal from the bombings at the New York World Trade Center on February 26, 1993, and was an experiment for “Project Bojinka” (a US airline bombing plan). In addition, according to the report of the US 9.11 Commission of February 14, 2004, Khalid Shaikh Muhammad, one of the top executives of Al-Qaida and a leading planner of 9.11 said, “(During the 2002 Japan Korea World Cup Soccer Championship), we planned terror in Japan, but there wasn’t the infrastructure to carry it out in Japan. That’s why we didn’t reach a concrete plan and preparations.” What’s more, it was revealed that the suspect Lionel Dumont, a French man who had something to do with Al-Qaida, was hiding in Japan and repeatedly going in and out of the country with a fake passport. It was also revealed that another member of an Islamic extremist group was temporarily staying in Japan, and living with him. However, it is uncertain for what purpose they were staying. It was reported on December 30 last year that a member of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a terrorist organization of Pakistan, had schemed for the establishment of a Japan branch, and entered the nation in 2003 (Sankei Shinbun, December 30, 2005). Against such a background, it is naturally necessary for Japan to reinforce its anti-terrorism measures. However, as I said earlier, many of the past events of terrorism which happened all over the world related Al-Qaida and like organizations were mainly carried out by local terrorists, and the members of Al-Qaida have only been concerned in the money and support. If incidents are happening within such a structure, it is thought (hopefully) to be fairly hard to carry out terrorism in Japan, where there is little infrastructure to do terrorism considering the fact that no Japanese terrorists and strongholds of terrorists related to groups like Al-Qaida have been found. This is corroborated by the statement of Khalid Shaikh Muhammad above, and the situation is very different from that of Western countries. It would be certain that it is a high hurdle to carry out large-scale terrorist attacks in Japan -- like the bombings in Madrid and London -- which require a complicated operations system. Of course, terrorism is possible in Japan because they have various ways to make a small attack. The Japanese Who Became Victims On the other hand, some Japanese and the interests of Japan have been involved in a great deal of terrorism outside the nation caused by Al-Qaida or groups related Al-Qaida (refer to the table below). 24 Japanese were killed in the 9.11 incident; the disco bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002 killed two; and the Bali bombings of October 2005 killed one. Plus, if the “Bojinka Project” had been carried out, thousands of Japanese might have been killed. Table: Radical Islamic Terrorist Events in Which Japanese Have Been Caught Up 02.26.93
-- The explosion at the World Trade Center in New York The Statements of Bin Laden and Gradual Targeting of the Overseas Interests of Japan The statement of Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) which was aired on Al-Jazeera on October 18, 2003 is very important when we think about the threat of terrorist attacks to the overseas interests of Japan. The statement implies that the overseas interests of Japan can be targeted at any time. UBL mentioned “Japan” by saying, “We have the right to attack at the appropriate times and places every country which has joined this oppressive war; especially Britain, Spain, Australia, Poland, Japan, and Italy.” The message was spread all around the world through Al-Jazeera, etc. That’s why terrorists and their supporters in the whole world might target the interests of Japan in each area and territory (country or region). In short, the overseas interests of Japan -- like diplomatic establishments abroad and Japanese leading firms -- have been under such a condition that they can be attacked anytime and anywhere since that statement was aired. The Status Quo and the Problem of Anti-Terrorism Measures in Japan Next, let’s review the status quo and the problem of anti-terrorism measures in Japan. The Japanese anti-terrorism measures have to be considered from two perspectives. One is international contributions, and the other is domestic anti-terrorism measures. These complement each other like wheels of a vehicle. For Japan, international contributions in the age of international terrorism is not only a part of its duty as a member of the international community, as in cooperation with the international community or with foreign countries, but also protecting Japan and Japanese overseas interests, so Japan needs to deal with it independently. It is directly connected with Japan’s domestic security to support Southeast Asia by enhancing their capability for dealing with terrorism, investigative abilities, and security, so that aircraft from the region cannot be used for an attack on Japan and so that terrorists cannot enter Japan easily. Therefore, the International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Division of the Foreign Ministry is actively proceeding to support and enhance Asian countries’ capabilities for counter-terrorism through so-called capacity building supports, by holding seminars focused on nine fields like immigration control, and airline, harbor, and marine safety. It is also providing those countries with machines to support an improved ability to investigate and cope with terrorism, or to beef-up airport and harbor security. In addition, the National Police Agency has, since 1995, been holding an “International Terrorism Investigation Seminar” for the anti-terrorism supervisors of developing countries with the cooperation of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Lately they have held an “Asia Counter-Terrorism Meeting.” When significant terrorist events related to Japan and Japanese interests have happened in overseas, they dispatched a Terrorism Response Team (TRT-2) and supported the investigations through the sending of identification specialists. Such international cooperation is very important as counter-terrorism measures. An “Action Plan” to Prevent Terrorism Domestic counter-terrorism measures, in other words, to prevent terrorism in Japan or to strengthen terrorism controls, are -- as a nation taking its part in the G8 and considering the importance of global cooperative frameworks -- indispensable issues to protect Japanese citizens from global terrorist networks like Al-Qaida. These aren’t merely domestic issues. Japan must play its part in international community. Above all, these measures should be carried out so that Japan cannot be used as a loophole in the international security network. Since 9.11, each ministry has coped with the problem in a kind of haphazard way in Japan, but the government’s “Headquarters for Promoting Countermeasures against International Organized Crime and Terrorism” created an “Action Plan to Prevent Terrorism” in December 2004. The plan was constructed by comprehensively putting together Japan’s plans for anti-terrorism measures, which means that the government’s action plan against terrorism was finally compiled for the first time, ten years after the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and about three years after 9.11. This plan includes 16 items that should be immediately carried out to enhance security, so that terrorists cannot enter Japan or act freely on our soil. The ministries concerned have reached agreement over these precautionary measures and are supposed to carry them out with time limit set. Eight of these measures have already been taken, including the introduction of Sky Marshalls, the obligation to check passports by airline companies, and stricter identification of visitors by hotels. They are supposed to take action on another seven items by the end of 2006, and one item in 2007. Stricter Immigration Controls and Foreigner Control Under the circumstances, Japan’s environment is different from Western countries’, and advantageous toward terrorism like that of Al-Qaida. Although the symptoms that I have mentioned earlier can be seen in the nation, no Japanese terrorists, strongholds of foreign terrorists, and terrorist-assisting networks have been found yet in Japan. The most important thing for Japan is to maintain this present environment. In short, it is necessary to practice stricter immigration control and foreigner control right away in order “not to let terrorists enter Japan” and “not to allow their strongholds to exist.” They have mentioned taking the fingerprints of foreigners in entry permits in the action plan, which is going to be submitted to the regular Diet in 2006. This measure has been already practiced in the “US-VISIT Program” in the United States, and is very effective in preventing terrorists and overseas criminals from entering the nation. The immediate practice of a “JAPAN-VISIT Program” is hoped for. According to the action plan, passports with IC chips covering biometric information (physical information) will be introduced in Japan as of March 20, 2006, which has been carried out as one of the countermeasures. Since Japanese passports are often counterfeited and used for smuggling and other crimes, it is possible that terrorists would enter and stay in Japan with fake Japanese passports, and so IC passports that are difficult to copy should be introduced as soon as possible in the light of countermeasures against terrorism and organized crime. We also need to consider IC visas for the countries that are not expected to introduce IC passports. Regarding the strengthening of the identification of foreign visitors at hotels, which was resolved in the action plan, they have already amended the hotel law and put it into action. On the other hand, some Western countries oblige hotel managers to confirm nationalities and report to the police. This measure is very useful in researching information about terrorists who hide themselves in Japan, and should be reinforced. However a similar problem could happen in rental rooms and weekly apartments, or they might use rent-a-car, rental cell phones, and net cafes. That’s why I guess a new legislative framework is needed which obliges these facilities to confirm and report on the identification of foreigners. Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures and the Identification of Terrorist Organizations The action plan for the prevention of terrorism contains the rules of the basic policies (Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures) and an identification system for terrorists and terrorist organizations (Specified Terrorist Organizations) as “countermeasures to prevent terrorism that should be considered.” The summit talks are to be held in Japan in 2008, and it is a duty as a member of the global society that Japan should take all possible measures and demonstrate Japan’s stern attitude toward terrorism. The Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures and the Specified Terrorist Organizations are matters of the greatest urgency and necessity. Recently, it was reported that “the government fixed the policy to make the Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures,” which refers the empowerment of investigative authorities including arrests without warrants and intercepts against the specified terrorist organizations and individual terrorists (Yomiuri Shinbun and Mainichi Shinbun, January 7, 2006), but they somehow mixed up the “Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures” and the “Comprehensive Antiterrorism Measures Law.” Of course, the empowerment of investigative authority is necessary, but first of all, it is important to gain the understanding and cooperation of citizens and to form framework to enhance antiterrorism measures independently by ministries, organizations, local groups, and industries, including the private sector and institutes that are concerned with these problems. The author believes it is the Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures that mentions these issues explicitly. On these grounds, the Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures should contain the following four items: Japan’s basic attitude toward terrorism; citizens’ understanding and cooperation; the cooperation of the institutes concerned; and the specification of terrorist organizations. Japan hasn’t had a national basic strategy against terrorism, which is a globally significant problem, and it has to demonstrate its attitude toward terrorism and the basic policies of counterterrorism measures to the citizens and to global society. While providing the people with security, there will be a burden for citizens and companies to some extent, but the understanding and cooperation of the people is necessary. Antiterrorism measures aren’t only an issue for security specialists and the ministries related to security. but also a problem for many other organizations. The problem concerns every citizen of the nation. It means that we need to team together and deal with the problem together, while coordinating with the whole government. That’s why it is important that the Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures stipulates that counter-terrorism measures are to be led by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, taking advantage of the cabinet’s ability adjust to circumstances. They specify terrorist organizations based on comprehensive antiterrorism laws in the US and Britain (the US’ Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996 and Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000). The system imposes regulations on specified organizations like immigration regulations for the members of the specified organizations, the freezing of assets, and the regarding of support to specified groups as a crime. However, as for a terrorist specifying system in Japan, the author believes in deepening an understanding of terrorist organizations and terrorist threats more connected to Japan, and this should be observed in the basic law now rather than just imposing regulations. Of course it is preferable for Japan to introduce a system specifying the groups like the US and Britain, but there’s a problem about how we should gather information to make these judgments. In case of the US and Britain, the information which the intelligence agencies have gathered is used in deciding specified groups. On the other hand, Japan isn’t gathering and using intelligence like these two countries. I think it is meaningful just to specify the foreign terrorist groups who have harmed Japanese or Japanese interests, and globally threatening organizations like Al-Qaida, and to tell the nation how threatening they are in their operations. When the specification system is introduced, regular reviews would be necessary where the citizens are informed of the status quo of threatening terrorist groups, and that will make them more interested in and understand the problem better. However, the specification system should be considered carefully because there are cases where the terrorists cannot be recognized easily, as in the London subway bombing, and it is getting harder to grasp the actual conditions of these organizations. Anyway, the author believes that the Basic Law of Antiterrorism Measures and the Specified Terrorist Organizations are inevitable measures in order to demonstrate the attitude of Japan toward terrorism both to home and abroad, and not only for the security of Japan.
COMMENTARY 1) From Ben-Ami Shillony of Hebrew University on May 31, 2006. Dear Professor Penn, I am sorry that I must voice my opinion again. The article by Mr. Isao Itabashi in Gaiko Forum on how Japan should confront terrorism that was carried by your newsletter (No. 286) is an example of a well-balanced, informative and analytical writing. It is the sort of writing that I (and I am sure many of Shingetsu members) would like to read in the newsletter. He provides the relevant data, weighs the various options, makes sensible suggestions, and, most important, treats the readers as intelligent, mature persons capable of making their own judgments. On the other hand, your introduction to that well-balanced article is, regrettably, one-sided and highly biased, treating the readers as halfwits who need to be given the "politically correct" introduction before they read the article. As for the content of your criticism, I think that you are totally wrong. Mr. Itabashi does not have to define terrorists, as no one needs to define paedophiliacs or drug traffickers. All the cases that he mentions in his article are clear cases of terrorism. The attempt to differentiate between "good terrorists" who have to be understood and forgiven, and "bad terrorists" who should be suppressed is intellectually groundless and morally wicked. Terrorists deserve less "understanding" than rapists and drug traffickers (although these two may have also have legitimate grievances) because their danger to society (including their own society) is much bigger. No one denies that human rights should be preserved in the war against terror, but they should be not preserved more than in the war against pirates or serial killers. The problem is not that the new regulations might be too strict so that they may harm innocent people, but that they might be too lax to allow terrorists to slip into Japan, for example. If your parents had been killed in the Twin Towers in 9/11 you would not grieve about the subsequent hunt for the terrorists who were behind this atrocious act, but you would grieve about the scandalous lack of sufficient anti-terrorist laws which might have prevented these criminals from committing their horrendous attack. If the anti-terrorist regulations that Japan is now contemplating will cause you some inconvenience in entering or leaving the country, don't you think they are a worthy (and cheap) price for saving scores of innocent lives? 2) From Wataru Tenga of TransNet International on May 31, 2006. I disagree with your entire statement. Mr. Penn is correct to point out that defining of terrorists is highly political, and the same could be said of your other two examples. Different societies have quite different notions of the age of consent, or of what constitutes a drug. As for the definition of terrorists, we need to be very careful here, because governments tend to apply definitions that serve their own needs, allowing them to whitewash their own atrocities or in some cases lock up innocent people with no accountability. A good case can be made that the so-called global war on terror (GWOT), in which the US has been trying to enlist Japan and other allies, is the most poorly defined war of all time. It is an open-ended affair, lacking clear objectives, on which billions of dollars are being spent with little or no sign of progress. No one has even bothered to define the objectives. No one has explained convincingly how the Iraq War relates to the GWOT. Instead, the GWOT is being used as an excuse to suspend normal freedoms and legal procedures. Shillony writes, “The attempt to differentiate between "good terrorists" who have to be understood and forgiven, and "bad terrorists" who should be suppressed is intellectually groundless and morally wicked.” Then there can be no difference of opinion about such matters as the US occupation of Iraq, killing of Palestinians by Israeli missiles and tanks, the American Revolution, the resistance to Nazi occupation, or the Chechen struggle against Russia? Are all of these settled issues, which only halfwits and the morally wicked bother to think about? And what about the American revolutionist who famously said, Give me liberty or give me death? Should he instead have been calling for stricter laws against his kind? 3) From John Edward Philips of Hirosaki University on June 1, 2006. Shillony writes: “The article by Mr. Isao Itabashi in Gaiko Forum, on how Japan should confront terrorism that was carried by your newsletter (No.286), is an example of a well-balanced, informative and analytical writing.” Much as I agree that the article was useful and informative, I have to disagree that it presented a good analysis of terrorism. The article was not about terrorism as the term is usually defined. It was specifically about Islamic terrorism. This was most clearly shown by its failure to mention such non-Muslim terrorist attacks as the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. No other terror attack has affected Japanese to the same extent. The article contained much useful information about Islamic terrorism, but was marked by a complete lack of critical thinking, and conflation of "terrorism" with Islamic terrorism. If it was meant only to be about Islamic terrorism it should have said so in the title, and it should not have kept saying "terrorism" when it meant only Islamic terrorism. Perhaps diplomats do not want to call things what they are but that is no excuse for us. All terrorism is not Islamic, any more than all Islam is terrorist. Daniel Pipes has long since observed that you do not make war against terror, or any other tactic. I agree with him about that. You make war against an enemy. Professor Pipes wants to define that enemy as "militant Islam." I would define that enemy more narrowly as al-Qa'ida, the group which attacked the US on September 11th, but neither of our definitions logically extend to the invasion of Iraq. The whole subject of the war or wars now being waged by the US and its "coalition of the willing" needs to be carefully discussed and objectively evaluated, if for no other reason than to wage that war or wars successfully. While the article in question does provide useful information about the ongoing war or wars, it does not analyze the nature and purpose of the war or wars. For that lack of critical thinking it deserves to be criticized, even by those who support whatever war or wars the US and its allies are fighting against whatever groups or states. Shillony writes: “On the other hand, your introduction to that well-balanced article is, regrettably, one-sided and highly biased, treating the readers as halfwits who need to be given the ‘politically correct’ introduction before they read the article.” My evaluation would not be as harsh as Professor Shillony's, but I also have disagreements with Professor Penn's introduction. Furthermore, I think that his viewpoints, and the list readers, would have been better served had he made his comments in a separate mailing. I'm also not sure what Professor Shillony is referring to when he talks about distinguishing between "good terrorists" and bad terrorists." I didn't read that in Professor Penn's comments. Rather I thought he was making the point that one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. That may be, but it does not negate the laws of war, or that they should be adhered to by all sides in a conflict. Simply because the term "terrorism" has been misused by some governments and commentators does not necessarily deprive it of all usefulness. To acknowledge that Palestinians have legitimate rights would not necessarily justify suicide bombing. To grant Palestinians the right to elect their own government does not make that government good, nor does it deny other nations' right to cut off aid from that government. Everyone needs to think clearly and objectively about the issues involved. Shillony writes: “As for the content of your criticism, I think that you are totally wrong. Mr. Itabashi does not have to define terrorists, as no one needs to define paedophiliacs or drug traffickers. All the cases that he mentions in his article are clear cases of terrorism.” Yes, all the cases mentioned are clearly terrorism, but all clear cases of terrorism are not mentioned. This fact certainly merits discussion in a forum devoted to Japanese-Muslim relations. Why are non-Muslim terrorists suddenly, if silently, defined out of the category of "terrorism"? Why are the Janjaweed in Sudan somehow not terrorists, despite their genocidal attacks on civilians, their Arab nationalist basis, and their recent support from al-Qa'ida? The answers certainly have importance for the topic of this list, Japanese-Muslim relations, and should be discussed here. Unfortunately Mr. Itabashi is not on this list so we can't ask him. The real story to my mind is the continuing cluelessness of the Japanese authorities about militant Islam in general and al-Qa'ida and its allies in particular. This bothers me, if for no other reason than that an al-Qa'ida cell was found operating in Niigata, not far from where I live. Islamic studies in Japan is, even relative to the size of the country, much smaller than in the United States. That the Japanese authorities have so much trouble finding potential Islamic terrorists could have serious negative implications for those of us who live in Japan.
Tenga asserts: “A good case can be made that the so-called global war on terror (GWOT), in which the US has been trying to enlist Japan and other allies, is the most poorly defined war of all time.” There are many complex issues here that impact in foreseable, and unforeseable, ways on a nation's security. It seems to me, therefore, that Tenga and Penn are correct to indicate that caution in Japan's consideration of adopting the current US Administration's perspective [incoherent or otherwise] on the GWOT is prudent. I would point out that, in the US system, just because a particular Administration has a particular policy orientation this does not mean that serving diplomatic, military, and intelligence professionals [i.e. our institutional structure] agree with it. It also does not mean that the policy will be permanent or even consistently adhered to. In the case of the Iraq War, for example, it is becoming increasingly clear that our professional institutional structure resisted the war option that the politicians proposed and Congress voted for. The various "checks and balances" in our system [institutional within the Executive Branch, Congress, etc.] were adroitly overridden by force and fraud as we have seen. First, given current polling data, we may well see a repudiation of the Bush 43 Administration at the polls this fall in the mid term elections. We may well see the Democratic Party in the White House after the 2008 elections. The national consensus behind the so-called "GWOT" as a global military crusade has crumbled as polling data with respect to the Iraq War seem to indicate. US political elites ("Establishment") are in a state of confusion and dismay about Iraq and the all too evident GLOBAL consequences of the Bush 43 GWOT policy. Is it prudent for Japan to associate its national security policy with the crumbling Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld "vision," a vision which is increasingly repudiated by both Republicans and Democrats? Second, it is correct to raise the matter of how to define "terrorism" particularly within international law. But this is not a new challenge, and the United Nations has wrestled with it for decades. The international legal community has wrestled with it as well and scholars take different positions as to the matter of the "right to resistance" and etc. The definition of "terrorism" or "terrorist organizations" obviously has operational consequences involving the tasking of various security and intelligence resources at a nation's disposal. This is why there was no little consternation in institutional circles, for example, when the Bush 43 Administration early on placed HAMAS and HIZBALLAH on the "terrorist" list rather than keeping the former approach essentially categorizing them as "resistance" organizations. With respect to this longstanding nature of the international debate, as an example I would recommend reference to the Revue Eyptienne de Droit International, Volume 28, 1972, and the following articles therein: W.T. Mallison, "An International Law Appraisal of the Juridical Characteristics on the Resistance of the People of Palestine." [Prof. Mallison, an American, in my view wrote perhaps the most penetrating and meticulous analysis of this issue in a number of venues.] A. Belkharroubi, "Essai sur une Theorie Juridique des Mouvements de Liberation nationale." H. Cattan, "The Arab Israeli Conflict" I. Sagay, "International Law relating to Occupied Territory." Third, the militarization of counterterrorism raises many problems and challenges, policy as well as operational. We must be frank and admit that such militarization provides access to additional billions of dollars of taxpayers' money and business opportunities for interested private firms, such as Halliburton and the Carlyle Group, particularly in the current atmosphere of the "privatization" of war of the Bush 43 Administration. Friends and family of the current Administration have been especially favored. Our European allies, however, emphasize the intelligence and police dimension of counterterrorism while the US has plunged ahead full speed with its militarization. Europeans appear to have no special problems in tracking down and arresting criminals who belong to violent organizations, and commit crimes such as murder, as regular press reports indicate. On the other hand, Americans seem to have problems, while Canadians appear to be slowly waking up to certain issues. On the military side, it cannot be said that the Bush 43 GWOT policy doctrines advanced by Cheney and Rumsfeld and their "Neoconservative" [Wolfowitz, Perle, Feith, Wurmser, Abrams, Joseph, et.al., a very well-known network with foreign connections since the "Iran-Contra" days at least] advisors, in particular, are what the military services would have recommended, or would recommend, if left to their own decision. It should be understood that this Administration has a highly ideological vision for the "transformation" of the military that it has been imposing. But this vision has operational consequences that we can see daily in Iraq, including Haditha and other such stains on our national honor. To obtain insight into the challenges posed to the professional military, newsletter readers should consult, for example, the online publications produced by the U.S. Army War College. The publications and professional perspectives may be surprising to some newsletter readers for their caution and independence. The website is www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil A recent research paper on "terrorism" (Sherifa Zuhur, A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency (Dec 2005)), for example, states in its recommendations "Revise approaches that too broadly define terrorism and extremism and our reponses to them. Regional, ideological, and country specificity is essential (p.59)." On the Iraq War aspect of GWOT, I would recommend Terrill and Crane, "Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq (Oct 2005)," and Hendrickson and Tucker, "Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (Dec 2005)." On transformation, see White, "Transformation for What? (Dec. 2005)." I just raise some of these issues to indicate that the point Tenga and Penn make about a prudent Japanese response to US pressures is well taken.
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