Newsletter No. 432
Editorial-Opinion
November 8, 2006

 

The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus has just released the following report about the possibility of Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya targeting Japan for some kind of terrorist act. I'm not sure why they are raising this issue right now since many months have passed since any of the events they have mentioned occurred. Still, I do agree with the general notion that Japan's closer alignment with Bush Administration policy is gradually increasing the possibility of radical Islamist attacks on Japanese targets. But should Jemaah Islamiya be placed at the top of the list as far as these potential threats are concerned?

JAPAN VULNERABLE TO ATTACKS FROM JEMAAH ISLAMIYA
By Zachary Abuza

Japan's immediate security concern is the threat posed by North Korea, which conducted a nuclear test on October 9. Yet, the country has been singled out by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as an enemy, has had diplomats and aid workers killed by Iraqi insurgents (such as two diplomats in November 2003), has arrested suspected al-Qaeda sleepers and has lost citizens in terrorist attacks in Indonesia (The Star, October 21, 2004). Japanese tourists have been victims of terrorist attacks against soft targets in resort locations such as Bali. If southern Thailand's insurgents ever come to staging an out-of-area attack on a soft target, whether in Bangkok or in a resort area, Japanese citizens would inevitably be among the victims. Is Japan, however, a target in its own right?

On one level, the answer should be an unequivocal "yes." Following the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings, a statement by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade identified Japan as a potential target, as did the October 1, 2004 audiotape by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Osama bin Laden directly warned Japan not to send troops to Iraq in October 2003; Japan eventually dispatched 1,000 to southern Iraq. Al-Qaeda has a consistent track record in following through on its threats. Japan contributed personnel to operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and has been closely allied with the Bush administration's war on terrorism.

Yet, the most immediate threat for Japan that is posed by the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is less certain. In December 2002, Laskar Jundullah -- a JI-affiliated paramilitary group -- bombed a Toyota showroom in Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi (Kyodo News, December 9, 2002). Two Japanese were killed and seven wounded in the October 12, 2002 Bali attacks, and one was killed and three were wounded in the 2005 triple suicide bombings in Bali. Yet there is no significant evidence that JI has determined that Japan itself is a target in its own right, as they have done with Australia, which was singled out in JI web postings. In 2005, there were reports that JI was conducting reconnaissance on a major power plant 150 kilometers southeast of Surabaya that is owned by an international consortium, including Japanese. Two men, arrested for their roles in harboring a JI fugitive, revealed that the plot was abandoned simply because JI did not have the material resources to mount an attack on such a large target (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 17). Those same sources also revealed that JI leader Noordin Mohammad Top ordered operatives to find Japanese-related targets in Indonesia (Terrorism Focus, July 25). Nevertheless, other JI detainees have not revealed a concerted plan to target Japan. When JI's top bomber Dr. Azahari bin Husin was killed, police found 33 small bombs like those used in the Bali II attacks, indicating that JI had adopted a strategy of smaller and more frequent bombings against indefensible soft targets.

Japan has been a target of demonstrations and popular antipathy in Indonesia in the past, and there is latent anti-Japanese sentiment, in addition to general unhappiness with Japan's role in the war on terrorism. To date, however, there have not been any attacks that have specifically targeted Japanese in the region. Japan's large presence in the region -- diplomatically, commercially and as tourists and residents (more than 13,000 in Indonesia, 11,000 in the Philippines and 40,000 in Thailand, according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) -- makes them susceptible targets. Moreover, the continued interest of terrorists in London and the Philippines in targeting airliners directly impacts Japan because airport security in the region is still vulnerable.

 

COMMENTARY

1) From Sandra R. Leavitt of Georgetown University on November 9, 2006:

This was an interesting editorial, providing food for thought. However, I agree with the introductory statement that Japan has more pressing security concerns. These include more pressing conventional threats, nontraditional security concerns (such as piracy and organized crime), and terrorist concerns (such as home-based organizations). As with any country in the world, Japan needs to increase intelligence, surveillance, diplomacy, and interstate cooperation among security agencies. It is doing so at home and through bilateral and multilateral fora.

I have found Dr. Abuza's work mixed. His empirical work makes a substantial contribution to the field of terrorism studies. However, his analysis is often alarmist and full of unsubstantiated assumptions.

For instance, in the piece above, he cites an incidence of Japanese diplomats and aid workers being killed in Iraq. What foreign country has NOT experienced this threat to their nationals in Iraq in what is now technically a civil war zone? (Civil wars are defined as violent conflicts with more than 1000 deaths/year). Foreign nationals from Middle Eastern countries are under greater threat, as are Europeans and Iraqis from all sectors.

And to suggest that insurgents from southern Thailand will strike outside their area is irresponsible and belies reality. More than one-half of the attacks in southern Thailand are unrelated to tensions between the state and its Malay-Muslim citizens. Of the remaining attacks, over one-half are carried out by security forces, not insurgents. Insurgents target symbols of the state and Thais who collaborate with it. Japan is not involved in this conflict in any way. Terrorist "experts" have tried for years to link the southern Thailand conflict to the larger regional and international terrorist threats, to no avail.

After alarmist statements irresponsibly linking Japanese and Japan to terrorist attacks simply because they happen to be present, Abuza admits that "there is no significant evidence that JI has determined that Japan itself is a target in its own right." He also states after more innuendos that "to date, however, there have not been any attacks that have specifically targeted Japanese in the region." This is a familiar pattern in his writings.

Attacks specific to Japanese targets in Southeast Asia, if they come, will be the result of disputes over economic development strategies. And these are avoidable if affected locals are given peaceful avenues for voicing their concerns and if their concerns are not completely ignored. Lately, Japan and regional governments are doing a better job of incorporating local NGOs into decision-making.

It is useful to think about whether or not Japan is a target of Islamist extremists. Beyond that, do not let alarmists contribute to today's fear-mongering.

2) From Michael Laffan of Princeton University on November 9, 2006:

While not wishing to deny the possibility of an attack on Japanese interests in Indonesia, it seems to me that Zachary Abuza is touting for business. Terrorism studies need terrorism, and things have been a bit slow for the JI watchers of late...