Newsletter No. 799
News-Analysis
November 4, 2007

 

THE CHINA-JAPAN-IRAN TRIANGLE REVISITED

A news analysis piece appeared yesterday in The People’s Voice, an American publication based in Nashville, that deserves our attention. It was written by Shirzad Azad of Aoyama Gakuin University who has contributed articles in the past to Asia Times Online and other such venues.

In the current article, Azad explores the notion that Japan’s missteps in West Asia are causing it to gradually lose both its economic and political positions in Iran and perhaps other countries. This is an idea that we have also noted last year during our discussions over the Azadegan oil field and in our occasional series called “China Report.”

Behind Azad’s analysis, I think that there lies a frustration, which I have shared, about the tendency of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and other sections of the elite to quickly cut loose their hard-earned friendships in the Islamic world almost as soon as Washington decides that someone is now an enemy and thus a “threat to the international community.” In the 1980s and 1990s, some people used to point to the Japan-Iran relationship as a demonstration that Tokyo’s regional policies really were independent of Washington.

That has become more difficult in the post-Azadegan era, even if we can indeed still perceive a little daylight there. At least Tokyo is willing to engage in many and varied dialogues with Tehran, while American leaders no longer “lower themselves” to actually negotiate with those with whom they have political differences -- after all, it just won’t do to have the Neocons and Fox News screaming “Munich!” behind your back every other week.

All that said, I don’t find Azad’s analysis to be entirely convincing. In my view, what is laid out in this piece is simply a future possibility, and not really a present certainty. China, after all, did not rush to make a deal over Azadegan when Inpex pulled out. Also, Japan’s current Prime Minister Fukuda comes from the school that values cooperation with Beijing. He was a fierce critic on this score of both Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. While it’s not difficult to predict a future flare-up of Japan-China tensions, things are a little bit better right now while Fukuda remains in charge.

So let’s just take Azad’s article for what it is worth, and see if future developments begin to justify it.

How Did Japan Lose Iran to China?
By Shirzad Azad

It has recently become a popular dictum in Japan that whatever the Japanese lose, it finds its way into the hands of the Chinese. Based on such an impression, China’s latest adroitness to put itself at the top list of Iran’s trading partners provides only a small demonstration of how the rising dubious dragon is conquering Japan’s oversea markets one after another.

In the course of one year since the time the Chinese ambassador to Iran announced that his country would become Iran’s primary trade partner in the near future, China replaced Japan for the first time to stand as the Persian Gulf country’s biggest trading ally. Iran had already decided to have Beijing replace Tokyo as the No. 1 importer of Iranian oil.

While the trade volume between Iran and China in 1998 was US$1.215 billion, recent data shows that the two-way trade volume between two nations has advanced dramatically in less than a decade. The volume of Sino-Iranian trade exceeded US$9 billion in 2005, and Iran’s imports from China rose by 360% between 2000 and 2005. Imports and exports between two Asian countries in 2006 surged 43% from the previous year to US$14.45 billion, topping the US$12.3 billion for two-way trade among the two partners.

Iran’s eastward-looking foreign policy and its vacillation with the West might have been influential in China’s gains in that country. However, Japan’s declining share of economic interests in Iran is attributable to other reasons.

China’s soaring energy needs have been a key element in their approach to Iran. Growing Sino-Iranian ties and their close partnership for fuel resources have progressed to a new stage. China’s increasing thirst for oil has made it imperative for the dragon to use its lion friend as leverage to get closer to the resource-rich Middle East.

The Japanese, on the other side, are talking of a new partnership with the Arab countries alongside the Persian Gulf. The fall of the Saddam regime in Iraq has also relatively facilitated the ground for Japanese companies to invest in that turmoil-torn country.

Japan’s dilatory tactics postponing the development of the massive Azadegan oil field, mainly because of American pressures, left the Iranians with no option but to cancel the lucrative contract last year, even though the Japanese don’t want to see the Azadegan prize in the hands of the Chinese.

Considering Iran’s nuclear issue, whenever a top Chinese official meet the Iranians, he or she often emphasizes that the nuclear program is Iran’s legitimate right and it is not the business of the West to oppose Iran’s policy. China’s diplomatic dexterity is demonstrated when it skillfully assuages the West by voting against Iran in the UN Security Council. The Chinese then simply justify their double-crossing behavior toward the Iranians by saying, “We are sorry, but we can’t jeopardize our huge economic market in the United States and hopefully you understand our position.”

Japan, for its own part, opposes Iran’s nuclear policy directly or indirectly, and when it comes to vote in key international institutions working on the nuclear problem, the Japanese feel no hesitation to raise their hands in favor of their Western allies. Japan has also been fully committed in implementing those bodies’ decisions and resolutions on Iran’s nuclear issue.

Chinese smiling diplomacy and face-to-face contacts with the Iranians is paying off enormously. There is even a rivalry among the Chinese leaders to visit Iran. China’s top communist officials from the president to the chairman of National People’s Congress, and from the foreign minister to the heads of many other ministries have all paid visits to Iran. Indeed, hardly any season passes without a VIP visit from Beijing to Tehran. Chinese industries and businesses are even more enthusiastic to go Iran for new opportunities. A Tehran trip has become routine for many top managers of Chinese companies from automakers to textile producers.

Compared to their communist counterparts in China, Japanese top political leaders have so far been reluctant, or better to say cautious, to engage in face-to-face contacts and direct communications with Iranian officials. Former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, father of current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, was the first and the last Japanese leader to visit Iran around three decades ago.

Despite the Chinese surge in Iran, the relationship between Japan and Iran in political, economic, and cultural aspects is moving forward in fairly good condition. Early this week, Iran appointed the outgoing ambassador in Tokyo as deputy minister for European and American affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Iran also appointed the deputy minister for legal and international affairs of the same ministry as Iran’s new ambassador to Japan. Iran’s current foreign minister was once the country’s ambassador to Japan as well. Such appointments indicate that Iran regards Japan as an important partner and a major weight in regional and global affairs.

With 11.5% of the total, Iran is still Japan’s third largest provider of crude oil. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates stand in first and second place with 31.1% and 25.4% respectively.

Although less than 10,000 in number, Iranians are the largest community of foreigners in Japan from a Middle Eastern country. A rising star and popular baseball player, Yu Darvish, comes from an Iranian father and a Japanese mother, is only one outcome of connections between the Japanese and Iranians.

Shirzad Azad is an East-West Asian relations researcher at the Graduate School of International Politics, Economics and Communication, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo.