Newsletter No. 819
News-Analysis
November 18, 2007

 

SATOSHI IKEUCHI ON THE ROLE OF THE "MIDDLE EAST" IN JAPANESE POLITICS

Satoshi Ikeuchi, the young scholar and commentator of the International Research Center for Japanese Studies introduced way back in Shingetsu Newsletter Nos. 72 and 107, has been less prominent in the Japanese media in the last couple years than he was in 2004 and 2005. I have also noticed that his message seems to have become more cautious than previously and he seems to be moving somewhat back from the rightwing positions he had staked out, for example, in the piece presented in Shingetsu Newsletter No. 107.

I don't know precisely what accounts for this apparent change, but in the following piece by Ikeuchi carried yesterday in the Yomiuri I find little to disagree with other than a handful of minor characterizations.

Near the end of the piece are a few paragraphs on Japanese attitudes toward the "Middle East" that really demonstrate Ikeuchi's insight. He's one of the brighter young Japanese scholars in this field, and so I hope that he will focus his future efforts on enlightening and well-balanced work such as this piece rather than the conservative ideological fare that we have seen on occasion in the past.

The Middle East is a Hurdle for Japan-US Ties
By Satoshi Ikeuchi

Democratic Party of Japan President Ichiro Ozawa's abrupt offer to quit as party leader, and his decision to retract his announced resignation shortly afterward, combined with a prior political shock -- that is, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's resignation in September -- to highlight what appears to be inscrutable about the Japanese political landscape.

It is disturbing to see that confusion arising from both leaders' announcement of their resignations was largely attributed to their respective temperament and personality. It does not seem their announcements were the consequence of their desperate but failed attempts to grapple with pressing political tasks and issues.

The resignation of a prime minister or an opposition leader should only come at a time when they find it impossible to overcome gridlock facing them after pitting themselves against opponents in dealing with truly important issues confronting their country both at home and abroad.

The turmoil ensuing from the two politicians' announced resignations, which has drawn public attention and triggered various rumors, may have left us oblivious to what should have been perceived as truly essential in many respects.

Neither Abe nor Ozawa bothered to properly explain why they decided to step down. However, the recent political confusion--seemingly a pitiful farce acted out by lawmakers -- may well be regarded as the result of politicians searching for clearly defined principles concerning the Japan-US alliance and this country's national security -- both a basis for our survival in the international community -- and the conflict of opinions therefrom.

Interestingly, the conflict of opinions about basic principles and fundamental guidelines regarding the nation's diplomacy and security policy can be encouraged when it is put into perspective in relation to Middle East issues as an intervening factor behind the whole dispute. Should this line of reasoning be dismissed as a stretch of the imagination? As the English proverb has it, "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail." Does this mean I, a Middle East affairs expert, am inclined to associate any issue with the Middle East?

Politically, the Middle East is the most distant area to Japan. The nation does not have any major political and military involvement in the region, unlike the United States. In terms of economic ties and personnel exchanges, Japan falls behind the United States, European nations or China. Japan's policy toward the Middle East has hardly ranked high on the list of issues to be tackled by the government.

But looking back at the September incident, Abe, at two press conferences held to announce his resignation as prime minister, cited the difficulties he faced in extending the Antiterrorism Law, which allowed the Maritime Self-Defense Force to engage in the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, as almost the sole reason for his decision to quit. He also harped on the importance of Japan's continued support for the "war on terrorism" before leaving office.

Ozawa took the unusual move of contributing an article to the left-leaning monthly journal Sekai in which he proposed that the nation provide assistance for Afghanistan if the activities are sanctioned by the United Nations -- not the United States -- and that the nation participate in activities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) if the DPJ takes power. But the DPJ reversed this position when questions arose over whether Ozawa's assertion meant Japan's involvement in the ISAF would include participation in direct military action. Instead, the main opposition party said it would be possible for Japan to join the ISAF in the form of offering civilian assistance.

Ozawa's resignation offer came a few days after he showed he was open to discussions to form a "grand coalition." At the time, the ruling parties were keen to establish a new law enabling the resumption of the refueling operations. All this transpired as the temporary Antiterrorism Law expired on November 1, forcing the government to halt the MSDF's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean.

Admittedly, the developments leading up to their announced resignations were preceded by media reports pointing a finger at the government over such issues as the pension record-keeping fiasco and corruption scandals involving politicians. Still, what prompted Abe and Ozawa to make grave decisions about the fate of their careers was the choice of policies in the sphere of external relations and national security -- to be more exact, Japan's policy toward the Middle East, an issue that would otherwise be treated as a task of lesser importance in this nation's foreign policy.

Middle East affairs attract public attention in Japan only when the United States is involved. When political pundits and academics insist Japan go it alone in dealing with Middle East affairs, their argument is usually tinged with an appeal to potential anti-US sentiment among the public.

Japan does not have to feel the kind of guilt shouldered by European nations as erstwhile colonial rulers in the Middle East. This provides this country with an advantage in dealing with Middle East matters. But this has occasionally prompted Japan to harbor romantic but unrealistic hopes for its own policies toward the Middle East. In short, political discussions suddenly become lively when Middle East issues are involved.

In reality, Japan's own Middle East policy as such has never been devised or implemented. This nation does not have what it takes to come up with solutions of its own to the complexities of Middle East affairs. To begin with, Japan has no wish to do so, either. The Middle East, as it is discussed as a political issue in this country, is projected as an imaginary ally that gives relief from psychological pains resulting from Japan's asymmetrical relations with the United States as an overwhelming superpower, and gives redemption from the sense of guilt the nation feels in respect of its relations with its neighboring nations in Asia.

Japan's policy toward the Middle East emerges as an overly politically charged issue. In this sense, Middle East affairs could become a stumbling block for Japan-US relations. Middle East issues, therefore, could act as a catalyst for confusion in the Japanese political arena.

Ikeuchi is an associate professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies.