Newsletter No. 404
News-Analysis
October 14, 2006

 

TOUTS AND DOUBTS -- THE DEBATE OVER THE SAMAWA MISSION CONTINUES

MOFA continues to tout its reconstruction efforts in Iraq even as the internal political situation in the country deteriorates. It is no longer even apparent that Iraq will survive as a united nation. The head of the British armed forces just contradicted his own government and called for a withdrawal of British forces. A slim majority of the American public now wants a timetable for withdrawal as well. And the daily toll of bloodshed continues on unabated -- But MOFA is still patting itself on the back.

The latest fact sheet of “Japan’s Assistance to Iraq” gives eight pages of detail about how aid money is being spent. According to Tokyo’s pledges at the Madrid International Donors’ Conference on the Reconstruction of Iraq, held on October 23, 2003, Japan will bestow upon Iraq US$1.5 billion in grants and US$3.5 in “soft loans.” On November 24, 2005, Tokyo additionally pledged to forgive 80% of Iraq’s outstanding debts to Japan, which amounts to about US$6 billion more.

Meanwhile, MOFA also announces that Gotaro Ogawa, the new “Ambassador in Charge of Reconstruction Assistance to the Republic of Iraq,” met on the 9th with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Baghdad. Ogawa pledged that Japan’s assistance would continue, and invited al-Maliki to visit Tokyo in the future.

A spate of polls conducted as the GSDF left Samawa indicated that the Japanese troops were able to win some appreciation among the locals in the Samawa area for their contributions to reconstruction and development. The Asahi poll, for example, found that about 70% of the locals gave a positive review to the Japanese performance, while about 30% had negative views.

Under the conditions in which they were operating, it must be said that the GSDF did a pretty good job. They knew that even one mistake could be fatal for the mission, and they seem to have been very careful on the whole, so as not to embarrass themselves and their political masters.

Nevertheless, the debate about the GSDF mission is certain to continue for a long time. Was it a success or a failure? What is the basis for judgment? Does the lack of casualties alone make it a success? Does the judgment depend on the fate of the people of Samawa or the Iraqi nation? Is the effect of the Samawa mission on wider Arab opinion significant? Is its relevance only what it means for domestic politics in Japan or the peace of East Asia? Clearly, one’s view of the success or failure of the GSDF mission depends heavily both on what yardstick you choose to measure it against as well as future events that we cannot yet entirely perceive. It may be thirty years before a truly definitive judgment can be made.

The Shingetsu Institute will revisit this question from time to time, but at the moment I would like to introduce a two-part article carried in the Asahi Shinbun on August 31st and September 1st. This report not only contains some information about the earlier Samawa mission that I have not seen elsewhere, but also introduces the question of the degree to which Japan’s aid in al-Muthanna Province has really reached the people who need it.

A REPORT FROM SAMAWA
Edited by Yasunori Kawakami

Thanks to and Complaints about GSDF Support

The GSDF was stationed in Samawa until just one month ago. When I visited the places where the GSDF had worked to support Iraq, many Iraqis said, “We really appreciated the SDF.” But people there cannot use the medical machinery yet, and there are still dirt roads which they have ordered local agencies to pave. As they were not allowed to have any casualties under the bad security conditions, we could see the limits of the SDF help in the reconstruction projects.

The SDF supplied nine of the newest-model incubators to a children’s hospital in June 2004. Until then, they had only twenty-one of the old type since 1982. They were thus able to reduce the number of newborn baby’s deaths. Previously, fifteen to twenty babies died each month, but it became five babies a month.

On the other hand, there are only four machines working among the twelve examination machines, which the SDF supplied to the examination section of Samawa General Hospital. The automatic urinalysis machines, which were supplied one year ago, are also broken, and they cannot be used anymore. They used to be able to carry out twelve different kinds of tests at once with the machine.

The leader of examination section, Doctor Rais al-Shukr said, “We really appreciated it because the examination capability was improved. We asked the SDF medical treatment workers to fix them, but they always said, ‘next time.’ Then they just pulled out.”

All the machines which were supplied by the SDF had a sticker placed on them: “For the Future of Iraq.” But some of the machinery has never been used. “The explanations are only in Japanese, and we can’t understand it. It doesn’t mean anything to us.” Doctor Al-Shukr said.

In the Najumi area, about 45 km north of Samawa. The SDF repaired 11 km of roads. A farmer Faris Rahim (24) is happy about it: “Thanks to the paving, we can drive a car even when it’s raining.”

However, they have a problem about the paving of 25 km of road to Sawa Lake to the west of Samawa. The SDF ordered a local agent to do the paving within one year in February 2005. But the construction stopped when only 5 km was paved. The cost was over US$1.8 million yen. The machinery for the construction is just sitting on the side of the road. Kadim Nasr (40), who lives near there complained, “The SDF also has the responsibility about the stoppage of the construction. They just paid the money, but didn’t monitor the results well enough.”

A Project in Samawa: The Hopeful Power Generator Does Not Work at All: Relying on Agents Made It Worse

When the SDF orders a project, it would properly be influenced by the quality of the agencies. While the SDF has stationed in Samawa, it ordered over 130 projects, including 31 road pavements, repairing 36 schools, and fixing up 66 places such as hospitals and waterworks. But in al-Muthanna Province, whose population is only 600,000, there are few experienced agencies.

The Samawa Sports Club in the Baath area has soccer fields, handball fields and basketball courts. The SDF ordered a local agency to repair them in February. One year since the completion of this project, the grass soccer field is withered and has many sinkholes. When we walk on it, our footprints leave tracks. In the rubber handball field, the paving comes off from contact with our soles. The soccer coach, Abd al-Husain (41) said, “We cannot even practice.” The manager Aziz Jabr notes, “The construction was so terrible. I complained to the SDF, but got no answer from them. This is not the only project of the SDF that has had problems.”

Large power generators were set up by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in a residential area of Samawa in June 2005. It cost about US$1.4 million for nine generators, which were to produce 500 kw to 750 kw of power. But none of them is working. In Samawa, it becomes 50 degrees celsius during daytime and even 40 degrees in the night. Because of this, there are power failures during half the day. The project was for people in poor areas, and the people were glad that “life becomes better.” But when the state power department investigated, they found that they were used generators. The provincial government refused to accept them as it was “a breach of contract,” and cut the supply of fuel. The power generators are still not used.

The Deputy Governor Hadi Jabr pointed out, “It was a mistake that Japan did not confirm the generators themselves, and paid all the money to the agency.” It was the same agency that supplied the power generators as gave up the road pavement between Samawa and Sawa Lake. It was a bad choice.

It was not the SDF’s real mission to support Iraq continually. We can now discover the gaps between the local needs and what was expedient for Japan in using the SDF.

Peace Was Established Through Using Powerful Tribes

I visited the old SDF camp in the southern part of Samawa. There are one hundred tents on the over three square km of ground. The commander of Iraqi garrison, Brigadier General Husain Zuwaid, talks about the SDF pullout in July: “When we went to their camp, the landowners and the people who were involved gathered there with guns. The SDF left like they were running away. They didn’t really talk to us enough about the delivery of the grounds.”

All the landowners were from the Zayyad family. They have the most power in al-Muthanna Province: “The SDF opened many doors for them, and gave them business with money. The SDF even hired guards and cleaners from them. In return for that, the SDF got order.”

The SDF did not suffer any casualties in Samawa. The strong tribal society prevented the coming of armed insurgents. The Zayyad family was the leader in this.

Samawa’s main anti-SDF group was the anti-US insurgent group led by Muqtada al-Sadr. As it is linked with warfare against the US forces, they attacked the SDF’s camp with trench mortars. They and the US forces agreed to a ceasefire in 2004, but they kept attacking the SDF. An Iraqi said, “They usually used to attack on Wednesday nights after the Mahdi Army had a meeting. But gradually they started to attack randomly. The leadership of the SDF thought it must have been Zayyad elements that were dissatisfied with the SDF.”

The SDF paved the roads in this important group’s area, repaired schools and established hospitals. In those kinds of areas, they think that the SDF gave them “gifts.” One important person in the Zayyad family is Lisan Mutashir (40), who had been a member of the state council. The SDF repaired 1.5 km of road from Lisan’s home to the main road, and finished it just one month before they pulled out. The cost was about US$100,000. Lisan insisted that he “has helped the SDF in many ways such as organizing guards from their family.”

Confirming security was the prerequisite condition of the SDF’s support activities. But the SDF kept staying there even after they were attacked by rockets again and again. Their goal was to keep Samawa a “non-combat area” by winning over tribes to their own side.

Based on a poll in Samawa, 31% people said that the GSDF’s activities “didn’t work.” Among these dissatisfied people, 25% said, “Only particular people got the benefits,” and 24% said that, “Only particular areas got the benefits.” People feel some bias because the Zayyad family got too much good treatment. Though the Iraqi people received some aid, they became a tool for the SDF to remain in Iraq.