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FUKUDA ADMINISTRATION: TOKYO TURNS TOWARD MODERATION?

We have waited a couple of weeks since reporting major political news in Tokyo in order to see what eventually shook out from the sudden resignation of Shinzo Abe. Now we have a pretty good idea what the shape of the Liberal Democratic Party leadership will be -- at least for the next few months. This newsletter will review what has happened, and then look at the new cabinet and its ramifications.

The LDP Avoids the Aso Trap

When Shinzo Abe resigned, the first batch of commentary looked to Taro Aso as his most likely replacement. Aso had been runner-up in the last leadership contest, and he had become Abe’s close collaborator in recent months. Apparently, Abe himself felt that Aso would probably replace him and so he gave him a couple of days advance notice of his intention to resign.

To the credit of either their intellects or their survival instincts, the LDP didn’t drink the beckoning poison. I’m personally convinced that Aso would have been a disastrous choice of leader who would have had real potential to destroy the party itself. It’s not that Aso isn’t personally charming at times, but the man is also a walking gaffe-machine who would have simply carried on Abe’s dead-end policies and managed them equally ineptly. Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) leader Ichiro Ozawa would have eaten him alive.

There were enough brains left in the LDP to recognize this probability, and so they turned to someone who is expected to be a much more competent policy manager. Even many on the LDP right wing realized that the moderate Yasuo Fukuda was the best thing on offer, and so they rapidly lined up behind him.

Shadow Shogun: Nobutaka Machimura

More than anyone else, the man who made this happen (other than the deft Fukuda himself) was Nobutaka Machimura, formerly foreign minister and now the new Chief Cabinet Secretary. Not only does Machimura lead the largest LDP faction with about 80 Diet members, but it was probably his decision to back Fukuda over Aso that decisively shifted the balance.

In fact, Machimura is probably much closer to the hawkish Aso than the moderate Fukuda in terms of his basic political ideology, so why would he back Fukuda? Answer: Because Machimura is not an idiot. Although he may disagree with Fukuda on a number of crucial issues, he also clearly understands that Fukuda gives the LDP its best chance to stabilize the situation and possibly rebuild over the coming months.

There’s more on Machimura below.

Basic Characteristics of Yasuo Fukuda

There’s a lot of nonsense being written about Yasuo Fukuda in the mainstream press right now. The one which annoys me the most is that many papers are describing him as a “dove.” This is the same man who worked as Koizumi’s close partner after 9.11 sending the MSDF to the Indian Ocean and guiding the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. This is the same man who fully backed the launching of the Iraq War and who openly argued that Japanese public opinion was basically irrelevant in making that decision. This is a “dove”?

Fukuda thinks that Japan should create a positive relationship with China and was critical of Koizumi’s senseless visits to Yasukuni Shrine. He also thinks that negotiations with North Korea are going to involve a certain amount of give-and-take.

Fukuda is in no sense a “dove.” Rather, he is an intelligent, pragmatic conservative. It’s really just another testament to the times that anybody who doesn’t call for a total refusal to compromise and bloody military action at the first hint of any foreign challenge is now described in the press as a “dove.” Mizuho Fukushima is a representative Japanese dove -- not Yasuo Fukuda.

What we can expect from Fukuda is exceptionally competent management of policy. Fukuda will look for policies that can work, and will be skillful in implementation. In other words, he will manage the day-to-day affairs of government with a great deal more deftness than the hapless Abe was ever capable of. He will also be a much more formidable opponent for Ichiro Ozawa than either Abe or Aso. This is because he will attempt to steer the LDP back to the center ground of Japanese politics and this will take some steam out opposition sails.

But the Fukuda Administration will also have three key weaknesses.

First, it seems very unlikely that Fukuda will be able to really connect with the Japanese general public. He has a cold, intellectual demeanor and clearly dislikes the idea of pandering. I laughed out loud when I read in the Japanese press the following exchange. One of Fukuda’s supporters advised him: “Now is the time to show your personality.” Fukuda grimly responded: “I have no personality.”

Obviously, the key task that Fukuda will face is to lead the LDP into a lower house election. If he is able to preserve a 50%-plus-one majority for the ruling party, then no doubt he will be regarded as a success. The chances of the LDP retaining its current Koizumi-era two-thirds majority presently seem close to nil.

Of course, it is only by virtue of the September 2005 elections that the LDP currently has the potential to override the DPJ majority in the upper house. I’m not sure if the commentariat (nor the US embassy) has really thought through just how important the July 2007 DPJ victory really was. In 2008 and 2009 the DPJ is going to be a major player in Tokyo whether the Japanese conservatives or Washington like it or not. This is true even if they lose the next lower house election by a modest margin.

Is it possible for Fukuda to scrape out such an electoral victory? Yes, it is possible. The scenario would be that the Japanese public, while not excited about Fukuda, decides that he is a safer choice than the DPJ -- and we all know that the Japanese love safe choices. On the other hand, if the public decides that Fukuda is just “old LDP” one more time, then maybe the DPJ could achieve its dream of installing its own prime minister.

The second weakness of the Fukuda Administration is that the new prime minister is clearly not on the same ideological wavelength with the majority of the LDP Diet members. The LDP is now a solidly rightwing party with a few moderate members. Fukuda just happens to be one of those few moderates. The upshot is that Fukuda may have some trouble keeping his own party in line.

The relationship between Fukuda and Machimura will be one to watch. The case could be made that Machimura is actually much more powerful inside the LDP than is Fukuda himself. Will Machimura defer to Fukuda when they strongly disagree on some issue? The working relationship between these two will be crucial for this new cabinet.

Aside from the very serious Machimura factor, we can probably expect constant sniping from the right among many of the more junior members of the LDP. Even Taro Aso may join in this kind of thing.

Fukuda might be tough enough to withstand these annoyances, but he is not blessed with a large coterie of close allies inside his own party, and so will often have to lean on his own personal resources in resisting them. He could become isolated quickly if he is not careful.

The third and final weakness of Fukuda is his age. Although he is very articulate at age 71, it seems quite unlikely that his administration can last for many years even under the best of circumstances. Since everyone believes that he won’t be prime minister in five or even three years from now, this will curtail some of his potential power and influence. Younger LDP members will not be looking to Fukuda for their own futures -- except in the most immediate sense.

The Fukuda Cabinet

Nobutaka Machimura, Chief Cabinet Secretary: I’ve already written about Machimura above, but I should also mention that he seems the ideal Chief Cabinet Secretary type. This is a man who will probably be able to inspire fear in his colleagues and keep discipline in the cabinet. Indeed, the potential problem with Machimura is that he may be a little too strong. Still, this was a solid choice.

Masahiko Komura, Foreign Minister: Komura has been moved from the defense portfolio to the Foreign Ministry, which seems to be a much more natural position for him. Komura knows the ropes as he was Keizo Obuchi’s foreign minister from 1998 to 2000. Some suggest that Komura is a hardliner, but his previous record seems more pragmatic to me. The Japan Times says that he is particularly skillful in answering questions in the Diet. Komura is another solid pick.

Shigeru Ishiba, Defense Minister: This past weekend I had the chance to talk briefly with a Defense Agency official while in Tokyo. He expressed his hope that either Shigeru Ishiba or Gen Nakatani return as minister. He got his wish. (Incidentally, he also said that either Seiji Maehara or Akihisa Nagashima would be popular with the Defense Ministry bureaucrats if the DPJ comes to power). Ishiba is hard right, and not one of my favorite LDP leaders. It appears that he may have been the one who authorized the spying on domestic peace groups (see Shingetsu Newsletter No. 640). Still, to his credit Ishiba was one of the most vocal in calling for Abe’s resignation right after the July elections. I don’t trust Ishiba’s intentions, but he has now proven that he is highly intelligent and has a good sense about Japanese public opinion and what it will (and won’t) endure. This pick should work out for Fukuda at the current juncture.

Bunmei Ibuki, LDP Secretary-General: Unlike the appointments that we have discussed so far, this one is really strange. This is the official number two position in the LDP and Fukuda has turned it over to a rightwing dinosaur with no real political weight. Most of Fukuda’s other picks reflected a desire for competence, but not this one. Ibuki was one of the leaders of the Diet group opposing the “comfort women” issue, and was Abe’s minister of education. He has a habit of saying stupid and out-of-touch things in public. If there is a new LDP gaffe coming, this is a prime candidate for the job.

Akira Amari, METI Minister: Fukuda has stated that he wanted to make as few changes as possible in the cabinet to avoid disruptions during the Diet session. I guess that’s why Abe buddy and political lightweight Akira Amari retains the METI portfolio. Too bad -- this is an important post for Japanese-Islamic relations and a stronger character would be welcome.

Toshihiro Nikai, Chairman of the LDP General Council: This is a holdover from the last Abe cabinet that I like. Similar to Fukuda himself, Nikai is a pragmatic conservative. He will probably help Fukuda in revitalizing relations with China in particular.

Sadakazu Tanigaki, Chairman of the Policy Research Council: Tanigaki is a younger LDP moderate and former finance minister. Although talented, he has spent the last year languishing in the political wilderness because most of the LDP has drifted far to the right of him. Fukuda has put him back in a position of serious influence, and like Nikai he will probably be a genuine ally of the new prime minister.

Implications for Japanese-Islamic Relations

The implications should be substantial because we may see Tokyo move in a more moderate direction, and possibly even in a somewhat more independent direction. One of the key factors shaping recent Japanese policy in many parts of the Islamic world has been the sense of competition with China. We may see this element become less important for a while as Fukuda will probably heal some of those bilateral rifts.

Consider this: If Fukuda is successful in resolving the major issues with North Korea and he lowers the political temperature with China, then perhaps Tokyo might gain more courage to play its own hand in more distant lands such as the Persian Gulf.

It remains unclear how successful Fukuda will actually be, but this is -- potentially at least -- an important turning point in Japanese foreign policy.